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ABSTRACT
The Water/Energy Nexus: Climate, Consumption and Ecosystem Services
by
Hildegaard Dina Link P.E.

Advisor: Yehuda L. Klein PhD
Water and energy are drivers of living systems. This work provides an assessment of the
Water Energy Nexus in the United States, comparing the well-watered north-east and
the arid west. Electric grid systems are most stressed on hot summer afternoons. Grid
stress can lead to cascading failures of electricity, water and wastewater treatment
systems. (Zimmerman, 2017) Water for power generation and/or water supply depend
on ecosystem services. The ecosystem services and resource trade-offs embedded in
provision of a watt of power and an ounce of potable water, however, have yet to be
comprehensively enumerated nor have the cost relationships been explicitly quantified

My data collection and analysis suggest that in the study areas water and electricity use
increases in hot weather. Geography and the age and size of homes are also qualifiers.
Data analysis suggests that wealthier people use more water and electricity per
household/person than the less wealthy. Review of water provisioning ecosystem
services reveal regional differences. The Texas Colorado River watershed serves multiple
uses; water supply, water for electric generation, irrigation and water for unrestricted
recreation. (LCRA, n.d.) The Cat-Del watershed serves only one; water supply. The value
of ecosystem services and payments for ecosystem services are reflected in part in the
price of water and electricity services and in the regional taxes in the study areas. In
addition to the price of water, payments for ecosystem services include transaction costs:
regulatory activities that monitor and protect environmental quality and infrastructure
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necessary to bring the service to market. (Coase,1960) Research for this paper
uncovered an exciting possibility. Regardless of the ecosystem Services payment
framework, no large-scale mechanism for identifying and aggregating payments for
ecosystem services in water and electric utilities were found. This gap in utility
accounting offers an opportunity for transforming utility accounting systems to identify
and account for payments for ecosystem services (PES). Developing large scale corporate
PES accounting systems is the next step in the process.
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PREFACE
This work evolved from several decades of work as an engineer in the United
States water, wastewater and electric industries. I began my professional life in
the sewers and wastewater treatment plants of New York City where I learned
about electric demand management and the cost of using electricity during the
peak load time of day. I was one of the first plant process engineer/ operators to
recommend shifting pumping to electric grid off peak hours.
Working in power plants, I came to understand the impact of water quality on
power generation. Working emergency response in the field during extreme
weather induced power failures made me consider the possibility of cascading
failures in water, wastewater and electric systems.
Once I arrived in my doctoral program, I learned there was a phrase to describe
the vulnerabilities I had witnessed; the Water Energy Nexus. My research has
allowed me to plumb the depths of my infrastructure anxieties and consider the
many drivers of failure. With my understanding of failure has also come ideas for
remedies.
I hope my work can be the beginning of a paradigm shift, a new way of thinking
about electric and water/wastewater service delivery.
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The Water Energy Nexus in Consumption Behavior: Introduction
For Iron Age people on the out islands of the North Atlantic, life’s essence was comprised of fire
and water (Kondratiev, 2003). Often set in opposition, water and energy are actually twins;
paired draft beasts of living systems. In contemporary infrastructure, however, water and energy
use are calculated separately (DOE, 2016). Economists and public servants manage water and
energy as separate commodities in separate utilities. Civil engineers study water; electrical and
petroleum engineers study energy. Utility managers rarely generate combined water and energy
load curve (Larsen & Drews, 2019). Water does not figure into peak electric load management
strategies. Electricity demand seldom figures into water treatment calculations (House, 2006).
Still, water “production” requires energy and energy “production” requires water. Separation
defeats equitable, efficient allocation. As our expanding human population faces the crises of
climate change bound to freshwater and fuel depletion, efficient allocation is essential to
sustainability (Gadonneix, 2010).
The Water-Energy Nexus
In 2004, the United States Congress commissioned a study on the “interdependency of energy
and water focusing on threats to national energy production resulting from limited water
supplies.” (US Dept of Energy,2006) The resulting 2006 Sandia National Lab (SNL) report
catalogues water use for energy extraction and distribution as well as power use for water supply
and wastewater management. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 required the US Department of
Energy (DOE) to prepare a national Energy-Water Roadmap to assess the effectiveness of
existing programs within the DOE and other Federal agencies in addressing energy and water
related issues (US Congress, 2005). SNL generated a roadmap from a set of regional workshops,
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identifying a set of minimum research needs, defining the direction of research, development,
demonstration, and commercialization efforts needed to reduce water demands in energy
development (DOE 2006, Ho et al., 2006). Mechanisms to understand and effectively manage
water energy interdependencies are far from complete, however. As weather patterns evolve and
urban population density increases, the need for well-considered, well-researched management
strategies grows increasingly urgent.
Project Relevance
Systems Operation
The SNL report describes interdependencies in large-scale water and energy processes (Pate, et
al., 2007). Water and energy processes are particularly vulnerable at the local scale when
extremes in weather and consumption behavior may be coincident. A single local electric system
failure on a hot day can impact systems nationally (Simonoff et al., 2005). Coincident electricity
and water consumption behaviors may create reinforcing feedback loops that accelerate systems
failure (Zimmerman et al., 2017). Examining regional/urban scale water and electricity use
behavior together will identify combined consumption trends and potentially dangerous
correlations in water and electricity systems operation. Identification of these critical transition
points will enable utilities and regional system operators to realign combined consumption
behavior for water and energy system resilience.
Climate Change & Ecosystems Services
Writing on Water/ Energy interdependencies at the outset of the twenty-first century, Pate,
Hightower et al. (2007) predicted that changing temperatures and precipitation patterns will
have impacts across all sectors of the economy. Changes in land use can generate additional
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stresses on both the electric grid and water supply. Concentrating populations in urban centers
pose a particular challenge. A number of urban mega-regions in the US, among them New York
City and San Francisco, depend on large forested watersheds to “cost effectively” provide large
volumes of high-quality potable water (McDonald and Shemie, 2014). Increasing population
and increasing development increases demand for energy/electricity and water. Climate changebased changes in water availability and increasing demand for water and electricity create a
socio-environmental conundrum. Balancing the need for housing with the associated water and
electricity demand requires a new calculus of value. Land use planning generally supports
development of land to its’ highest potential value (Fedak, Sommer et al., 2018) Implicit in this
paradigm is the low value of “undeveloped” land. As urban regions race to adapt to a changing
“natural” world, the water abstraction value of undeveloped land must be considered. Evolving
environmental and ecological/economic accounting systems can support assessment of
ecosystems services value of different land use choices. Connecting ecosystems services of
undeveloped land with essential urban water and electricity delivery can enable planners and
engineers to build resilience into long-range regional plans.
Payments for Ecosystems Services, Water and Electricity Pricing
Moving from current practice to adaptive, resilient design in infrastructure often challenges long
held operating conventions and politico-economic alliances (Solecki, Link and Garshagen,
2016). Operating procedures in electric utilities include elaborate mechanisms to recover the
costs of generation and distribution (Lazar, 2016). Electricity pricing in the US is set by a cost
recovery-based market system (Braithwaite, Hansen, O’Sheasy, 2007). Water pricing generally
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is not. Water utilities in G8 countries 1are often supported through water rates and/or local
taxes. Water service elsewhere is often provided by a hodge-podge of public and private entities.
In many cases, prices have little relationship to the actual cost of supplying water (Bakker,
2014). Full Cost Recovery water pricing has been identified as an essential element of
sustainability and resilience in a range of documents. These documents include Brundtland’s
“Our Common Future” (World Comm. on Env. and Devt., 1987), the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005) and US EPA guidance on water asset
management (US EPA, Building Sustainable Water Infrastructure). The logic of “Full Cost
Recovery” water pricing seems unassailable. It has however generated a robust scholarly debate.
Arguments against “Full Cost Recovery” water pricing; include ensuring access equity for nonaffluent users and ensuring the operability of nationally important industries (Bakker, 2014).
Whether water prices reflect the “full cost” of delivering water or not, the full value of
ecosystems services necessary to collect high quality water is rarely an explicit line item in the
cost accounting or price setting. As we strive to curtail the impact of human consumption on
terrestrial systems, understanding the relationship or lack there-of between the nominal price of
our consumption and the actual value of the support systems is essential to efficient, equitable
allocation.
Problem Statement
This work provides a unique assessment of the scale, the scope and the relationships tangled in
the Water Energy Nexus. Electric systems are most stressed on hot summer afternoons. Grid
stress can lead to electric failures and cascading failures of water and wastewater treatment

Russia was suspended from the G8 in 2014 and withdrew in 2017. This group of major
industrialized countries is now known as the G7.
4
1

systems (Zimmerman, 2017). Water for power generation and/or water supply depend on
ecosystem services. The ecosystem services and resource trade-offs embedded in provision of a
watt of power and an ounce of potable water, however, have yet to be comprehensively
enumerated nor have the cost relationships been explicitly quantified.
Hot weather electric grid stress is driven by consumption (FERC, May 2019). Can hot weather
water use and/or wastewater flows exacerbate hot weather grid stress? Identifying correlations
between household and regional water use during heat waves can enable a range of management
strategies to mitigate infrastructure vulnerability during extreme heat. The cost of delivering
electricity in the US changes hour by hour (NYISO, n.d.). The cost of water changes more slowly.
Water pricing paradigms very widely across geographies and climate zones (Debaere et al.,
2014). Much early WEN scholarship focuses on the arid west (Pate, et al. 2007). Subsequent
work examines infrastructure vulnerability in a range of geographies. This analysis shines a light
on regional climate and economic differences in water/energy management paradigms and
resource market vulnerabilities
A review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Accounting and Financial Reporting for
Public Utilities regulations and Accounting Procedures for Energy Utilities offers little guidance
on the ecological economics of water and electricity provision (FERC, 2018). Because markets
respond to price points, monetizing the value of ecosystems services that support electricity and
water supply enables more informed consumption and land use choices. A review of New York
and Texas rate setting documents do not reveal combined ecosystems services accounting
procedures in use at the utility scale (NYC Water Board, Rates & Regulations, Lower Colorado
River Authority, 2017). Aggregating payments for ecosystems services can reintroduce
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externalized relationships into water and electricity provisioning and facilitate consumer facing
solutions to the Water/Energy Nexus.

Intellectual Merits, Contribution to the Discipline and Benefits to Society
Water and electricity are currently managed separately even in regulatory agencies tasked with
overseeing both (NYS DPS, n.d., US DOE, 2016). The technical details of water and electricity
provision are so different; it is difficult to consider them together. Electricity must be used as it
is generated. Generators dispatching power into the system must first synchronize to system
conditions. Electricity “leaks” cause loss of life and property (Urbina and Tavernise, 2004). By
comparison water is a relatively well-behaved resource. It stores well. It can be transported in
un-insulated conduits or open channels. Leaking water lines have been left to leak for
generations with little danger to life and health (Hill, 2018). The obstacles to joint water and
electricity management are large enough that the value proposition or cost/benefit basis for
collaboration must be unassailable. Answers to the questions proposed for this dissertation will
illuminate the value proposition and provide a basis for new inter-utility collaboration.
Civil infrastructure; water and energy systems, are designed to a set of identified physical
constraints. Design constraints include population served, weather patterns and per capita use
(ASCE, 2007). The solutions to the Water Energy Nexus proposed by the 2007 SNL report to
Congress are only part of the solution. SNL proposed discretionary in-facilities technical fixes.
The other half of the solution is consumption behavior. Consumption behavior can cause
electric faults and system failures (Wu, et al.,2014). Consumption can overwhelm water
provision systems as well (Harris, et al., 2014). Modulating consumption during high stress
periods can provide new levels of relief to both electricity and water utilities. Engineered
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solutions evolve in response to a given set of social needs. Social behavior is malleable. Water
and energy access, in many places, is not (Kearney, et al., 2014).
The outcome of the analyses proposed here will clarify the impacts and risks of consumption
behavior tradeoffs. Figure 0.1 below show the how the questions answered by this dissertation
can yield greater insights. Understanding the positive and negative synergies of water and
electricity consumption will enable informed decision making in the context of climate change
adaptation and planning for population growth. Water and electricity prices vary spatially, over
time and with the weather. Examining pricing for both water and electricity together will
illuminate decision processes that influence scarcity and combined system resilience.
Figure 0.1 – Water and Energy use, Temperature and Ecosystem Services

Research Design and Methods:
Questions
My investigation takes the form of three distinct inquiries:

7

1.

The Water Energy Nexus in Regional and Local Scale Consumption: What Consumption
Trends Drive Hot Weather Electricity and Water System Operation? A quantitative
examination of regional/urban scale water and electricity use behavior to identify
weather/ temperature-based water and electricity consumption trends that drive systems
operation. The null hypothesis is that weather and climate affect neither electricity use,
nor water consumption.

2. The Water Energy Nexus and Ecosystems Services: What are Some Potential Impacts of
IPCC Climate Projections on Water Supply and Electricity? An evaluation of ecosystem
services required for water and electricity provision using the InVest open access model.
The null hypothesis is that the value of ecosystems services used for the same purpose
would be substantially the same.

3. The Water Energy Nexus and Payments for Ecosystems Services: What are the Price
Impacts of Including Ecosystems Services Value in Utility Rates? - Ecosystem services
dollar value impacts on water and electricity prices were evaluated. The null hypothesis
for this evaluation was that water and electricity costs do not reflect the monetary value
of ecosystem services. The outcome of this evaluation is mixed based on region
Study Sites
Study sites for this analysis are New York state and New York City, Texas, the city of Austin and
the Texas Colorado River basin. Sites were chosen to compare WEN in extremely different
climates both at the regional and local/urban scale.
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Urban agglomerations are “load pockets” for both water and electricity (Kanuri, et al., 2016).
“Load pockets” create delivery problems described in the electric industry as congestion, in the
water industry as drought. After agriculture and electrical generation, urban centers are the
largest users of water (US EPA, n.d.). In New York State, urban consumption dominates water
and electricity use contours. (NYSDEC, Water Use & Conservation, US Energy Information
Administration, 2018). Small changes in urban use behavior can contribute to resolving regional
scarcity. In Texas, agriculture dominates water demand (Texas Water Development Board,
2017) Climate, demographics and history drive scarcity. I examined urban and regional
electricity and water use behavior in New York State and in Texas to estimate the range of
behaviors. In addition to extreme differences in climate, these two sites have very different
electricity and water governance infrastructure. I compared the Colorado River in Texas to the
New York City Catskill-Delaware water system as hydrologic systems serving major cities.

Data and Research Methods
Question 1 - What Consumption Trends Drive Hot Weather Electricity and Water System
Operation?
Individual consumption data of any kind is protected by US privacy legislation. Reliably
measured publicly available data on water and energy use is available however as wastewater
flows and electric load. I used electric load data from the New York State Independent System
Operator and from the Electric Reliability Council of Texas. I used wastewater treatment plant
effluent available thru the US EPA Enforcement and Compliance History On-line website as a
proxy for water consumption. Statistical analyses were corrected for storm flow. Demographic
data was taken from the US census.
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I used exploratory data analysis to consider relationships between seasonal and regional
variation in water and electric energy use in New York and Texas. I compared spatially explicit
weather data with regional energy use and water use data and demographic data using
statistical techniques. Wastewater treatment facilities in the ERCOT and NYISO service region
were mapped. The total wastewater flow for each NYISO or ERCOT load zone was calculated
using ArcGIS for the summer months over a 7-year period. Monthly wastewater flow/population
served values were calculated for each county. Population normalized electricity use values were
calculated for each load zone for each month of the time interval. Summer month electricity use
for wastewater treatment and water use for electrical generation indicators were calculated over
a 7-year period. Regression models were generated to correlate population normalized
wastewater flows with a range of weather, demographic and land use variables for New York
State and for Texas.

Section 2 - What are Some Potential Impacts of IPCC Climate Projections on Water Supply and
Electricity?
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) data was taken from the University of
California Davis down scaled IPCC data set. Pricing information for water was taken from the
New York City Water Board and the Lower Colorado River Authority. The Stanford University
Nat Cap InVest ecosystems services models were used to assess water discharge volumes and
quality in a range of climate conditions. The value of changes in water availability and water
quality were compared to a 2010 baseline using detailed physical analyses of hydrologic systems
and 2010 water prices. These variations were compared to the managing utility budgets for the
New York City water utility (NYCDEP), the Lower Colorado River authority (LCRA) and the City
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of Austin budget. This combination of analyses suggests potential impacts of climate change on
both water availability and public finance. This framework functions as a spring-board for
discussions of water and electricity prices in the third section of this dissertation.

Section 3 - What are the Price Impacts of Including Ecosystems Services Value in Utility Rates?
Electricity prices across the US are based on a full cost recovery focused wholesale market
aligned with location based marginal prices (LBMP). While electricity prices vary across the
country, they vary based upon a predictable algorithm (FERC, 2015). Water prices do not have a
similar rationalization process (Hall, 2009). Furthermore, water prices in the geographies under
analysis vary from zero for property owners using well water to a compilation of consumption
volume-based rates. Analysis in this section considers PES for the LCRA and the NYCDEP using
both quantitative and qualitative methods. The first part of the analysis offers a detailed
treatment of ecological economics and frameworks for payments for ecosystems (PES) services.
The second section endeavors to uncover a trail of PES in public utility accounting. Public utility
finance documents and public utility accounting guidelines were reviewed in depth to determine
if ecosystems services or PES were included in pricing protocols. The third section is a
comparison of drought indicators – the Palmer Drought Severity Index, with water prices for the
Lower Colorado River Authority and for New York City. The goal of these analyses was to sleuth
out potential connections between climate as a proxy for ecosystems services and water prices.
Closing Thoughts
Integrated management of water and electricity requires an understanding of resource codemand as well as shared supply inputs. In this work, data was gathered and analyzed to reveal
the shared supply and demand mechanisms. Ecosystem services value and value correlation to
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current resource pricing can measure the impact of ecosystem changes on resource
availability/supply. Analysis of water and electricity use as temperature varies sheds light on
climate-based demand. Together these analyses suggest how climate-based supply intersects
with climate-based demand and climate-based vulnerability of water and electricity delivery
systems.
Understanding the ecosystem depletion vulnerability of water and electric systems is necessary
for long term resilience planning. Understanding the economic tradeoffs in essential ecosystem
services regions will enable creative collaboration between utilities and mitigate against political
stalemates. Reintegrating the value of environmental inputs and economic tradeoffs into
resource pricing will help utility operators and consumers make sustainable choices. Water and
electricity provision may never be disentangled but understanding how they come together may
keep the tangle from becoming a noose!
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The Water Energy Nexus in Consumption Behavior: Literature Review
Overview
What Is the Energy Water Nexus?
Provision of essential resources are the core concerns of civilization. Rome rose to power and
remained in power because of their service delivery systems – roads and aqueducts
(Roda,2016). In the modern era US, the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 delivered more than
electricity. It delivered “civilization” (Drake, 2014). It changed how people in rural America
farmed and used energy. Rural electrification also changed how rural Americans used water.
The stated goal of the program was to increase availability to electricity for “persons in rural
areas” (Rural Electrification Act, 1936). The outcomes included wholesale cultural and
landscape transformation and ultimately transformation of the entire western hydrosphere
(Gleick, 1994). The rural electrification initiative was the driver behind the construction of
innumerable hydro-electric projects that promised to modernize and improve the quality of life.
The diversion and damming projects had the dual purpose of generating electricity and
providing water for a range of human activities. The hydro-social paradigm (Linton, 2010). that
evolved from that act has grown into a Gordian knot of contemporary agricultural, electric
generation and residential water demands. While the inter-relationship between water and
electricity is particularly tense in the American west, water/energy tradeoff challenges, the
Water/Energy Nexus, are common to many regions of the US and the world. Federal programs
to mitigate these challenges first appeared in the US as part of energy legislation.

1992-2005 - Energy Policy Acts and Situational Drivers

22

The Energy Policy Act of 1992 evolved out of the first Bush presidency and shifting oil
availability (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2012) against the backdrop of the first gulf war. It called
for, among other things, increased focus on energy efficiency (Joskow, 2001). Buried deep in the
section on ‘Hydro Power Provisions’, the act states: “Secretary of the Interior is further
authorized and directed to conduct feasibility investigations of opportunities to mitigate
damages to or enhance fish and wildlife as a result of increasing the amount of water available
for such purposes because of water conservation efforts on Federal reclamation projects.”
(Energy Policy Act of 1992, 1992). The legislation directs hydro utilities to consider power
generation/ ecosystem tradeoffs and begin to monetize them.
” Such feasibility investigations shall include, but not be limited to—
(1). an analysis of the technical, environmental, and economic feasibility
of reducing the amount of water diverted upstream of such Federal
hydroelectric power generation facilities by Federal reclamation projects;
(2). an estimate of the reduction, if any, of project power consumed as a
result of the decreased amount of diversion;
(3). an estimate of the increase in the amount of electrical energy and
related revenues which would result from the marketing of such power
by the Secretary;
(4). an estimate of the fish and wildlife benefits which would result from
the decreased or modified diversions;
(5). a finding by the Secretary of the Interior that the activities proposed
in the feasibility study can be carried out in accordance with applicable
Federal and State law, interstate compacts and the contractual
obligations of the Secretary; and
(6). a finding by the affected Federal Power Marketing Administrator
that the hydroelectric component of the proposed water conservation
feature is cost-effective and that the affected Administrator is able to
market the hydroelectric power expected to be generated.
(b). [Consultation.]— In preparing feasibility studies pursuant to this
section, the Secretary of the Interior shall consult with, and seek the
recommendations of, affected State, local and Indian tribal interests, and
shall provide for appropriate public comment. “ (Energy Policy Act of
1992, 1992)

23

This language marks early steps to understand the Energy/Water Nexus. Shortly after
promulgation of the 1992 Energy Policy act, Peter Gleick published an extensive analysis of the
water and energy interdependencies. His work was an analysis of energy for water provision and
water for energy capture and distribution. He offers analysis of desalination technologies and
detailed consideration of a range of energy generation systems (Gleick, 1994). Americans
responded with initiatives across the country to improve energy efficiency in all aspects of life
including “public health”. The public health sector included hospitals, water and wastewater
treatment facilities (Alliance to Save Energy, 2013). In New York State, the New York Power
Authority worked to improve process energy efficiency in government entities. New York State
water and wastewater treatment facilities were the beneficiaries of these initiatives (EPRI,
1996).
Nine years later, the tragic events of 9/11 turned attention to the troubled relationship between
American oil consumers and foreign oil producers again. The subtext of the ensuing Middle East
wars was energy availability and independence (Sherman, 2006). Climate change merged with
these concerns in the public psyche to support broad scale government research and
development into transforming energy paradigms. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 building on
earlier legislation, called for the following provisions:
“IN GENERAL —The Secretary shall carry out a program of research,
development, demonstration, and commercial application to—
(1). address energy-related issues associated with provision of adequate
water supplies, optimal management, and efficient use of water;
(2). address water-related issues associated with the provision of
adequate supplies, optimal management, and efficient use of energy; and
(3). assess the effectiveness of existing programs within the Department
and other Federal agencies to address these energy and water related
issues.
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(b). PROGRAM ELEMENTS—The program under this section shall
Include —
(1). arsenic treatment;
(2). desalination; and
(3). planning, analysis, and modeling of energy and water
supply and demand.
(c). COLLABORATION—In carrying out this section, the Secretary
shall consult with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Secretary of the Interior, the Chief Engineer of the Army
Corps of Engineers, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense,
and other Federal agencies as appropriate.
(d). FACILITIES —The Secretary may utilize all existing facilities within
the Department and may design and construct additional facilities as
needed to carry out the purposes of this program.
(e). ADVISORY COMMITTEE—The Secretary shall establish or utilize an
advisory committee to provide independent advice and review of the
program.
(f). REPORTS—Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the assessment
described in subsection (b). and recommendations for future actions.
“(Energy Policy act of 2005)

Western Water and the Sun Belt Expansion
Cheap energy meshes uncomfortably with recurring drought in the arid American West (Gleick,
1994) (Goldenberg 2013). Water supply was all but ignored in the early twenty-first century
sunbelt real estate boom. Especially in the western sunbelt, lax environmental and labor laws
coupled with lower land costs and lower costs of living grew urban and suburban populations in
the arid southwest at epic rates (Hirt, Gustafson and Larson, 2008). Water demand increased to
meet residential and electric generation demand. The first inkling of concern surfaced when
electric generation was threatened by residential water demand. The heroic civil engineering
projects that brought life to the desert stuttered to a crawl (McCall et al., 2016).
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The Sandia National Lab Report 2005 –2007
The Energy Policy act of 2005 directed the US Department of Energy (DOE) to develop an
energy and water program to include “research, development, demonstration, and commercial
application” to energy for water, water for energy. Sandia National Labs (SNL) was
commissioned to evaluate” energy-related issues associated with provision of adequate water
supplies, optimal management, and efficient use of water” (Energy Policy Act of 2005). The final
SNL report opens by saying “Federally supported research and development was carried out to
address key concerns including advanced fossil and nuclear energy technologies, energy
efficiency, infrastructure systems, pollution control and prevention, and renewable and
alternative energy. SNL scholars, however, noted that the “intimate relationship between energy
and water” (Pate et al., 2007). remained to be examined on a national, regional or local scale
(Pate et al., 2007). The 2006 Department of Energy report to Congress in response to the
Energy Policy act of 2005 concludes with a mandate to find new technologies to conserve energy
and water in power plants and water treatment facilities (USDOE, 2006). The 2007 paper on
energy water interdependencies published independently by the Sandia National Lab team,
Pate, Hightower, Cameron and Einfeld takes a much stronger stance. “The authors recommend
a more proactive approach to energy and water development and management; while
acknowledging that the cost of new technologies may limit their rate of deployment. Given the
constraints, it may not be possible in many regions of the United States to meet their growing
energy and water needs by following the current US path of largely managing water and energy
separately while making small improvements in freshwater supply and small changes in energy
and water use efficiency.” (Pate et al., 2007). The 2007 Pate et al., article is a rigorous analysis of
regional and national scale trends in water withdrawal and energy provisioning. The team
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delineates existing conflicts and identifies potential flash points in the Water Energy Nexus
across the country.

2007-2015 Operationalizing the Response
The SNL report and subsequent outreach activities generated a large body of scholarship. In the
early years after the SNL report release, much research focused on the water intensity of largescale energy extraction, electric generation and the energy intensity of water treatment. A 2017
survey of water energy nexus literature points out the need for an investigation of geographic
specificity in water energy nexus studies and investigation of short-term seasonal and annual
temporal variation of nexus dynamics (Wang, 2017). Scholars also investigated the origins of the
nexus. Population growth, additional thermoelectric generation capacity and changing
precipitation patterns have all been cited as drivers of the EWN. Mismanagement of water
resources and poor regional coordination of water demand were identified as particularly
problematic in fast growing regions of the sunbelt (Sovacool and Sovacool, 2009). Much work
has focused on the vulnerabilities of the hydroelectric paradigm in the arid west (Water in the
West, 2013). In later work, the WEN literature calls out water and energy management silos and
high-water intensity ratios of bio-fuel and extreme resource extraction. Lack of truly integrated
water and energy management policy generates waste in both sectors (Hussey and Pittock,
2012). Hussey and Pittock (2012) identify the lack of detailed data needed to quantify WEN.
They also note the conflicts generated by development of large-scale engineering solutions to
water scarcity such as desalination and inter-basin water transfers. Hussey and Pittock question
popular wisdom that conservation of one resource translates to conservation of the other and
challenge scholars to identify positive conservation feed-back loops and destructive substitution
choices. More productive electricity and water tradeoffs exist. Water recycling can support water
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and embedded energy conservation (Voinov and Cardwell, 2009). Voinov and Cardwell (2009)
dive into the math of energy return on invested water. Their detailed process unit by process
unit estimates of energy use in water and wastewater treatment. They close their analysis
graphing energy and water consumption relative to quality of life and gross domestic product.
Their research suggests that life satisfaction as a function of GDP approaches an asymptote very
early in consumption curve. They conclude that reduced consumption is the primary
component of sustainable human systems.
Renewable energy systems have been identified as low water intensity electric generation with
potential to shave both conventional electric demand peaks and water demand (Hickman et al.,
2007). Renewables are also proposed as ways of powering energy intensive processes such as
reverse osmosis and desalination in water demand peaks without exacerbating negative energy
water consumption feedback loops (Alkaisi, Mossad and Sharifian-Barforoush, 2015).
Resource availability is part of the water energy nexus. Equally important however are the
impacts of system stress and overload. Debra Perrone, Jennifer Murphy and George Hornberger
(2011) refocus the WEN discussion at the local scale of human systems. Their paper posits a
Resource Islands model targeting the urban nexus. Their model incorporates geographic
location and delivery infrastructure efficiency. The model analyzes the full range of locationspecific impacts of water and energy acquisition, use and disposal (Perrone, Murphy and
Hornberger, 2011). One conclusion from the Resource Island analysis of Tucson, Arizona is that
the annual allocation of Colorado River water is more energy intensive than recycled wastewater
(Perrone, Murphy and Hornberger, 2011).
Urban electricity and water systems can create combined vulnerability. While electric generation
depends on water supply, water and wastewater treatment depend on electric distribution.
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Failure of one delivery system can lead to wider system failures. The interconnectedness of
essential services; electricity and water, create unique risks for cascading water and electric
systems. Between 1990 and 2004 the North American Electric Reliability Council reported
about 400 electric system outages (Zimmerman et al., 2005), many without long term negative
impact on resource delivery systems but expensive and meaningful in the lives of utility
managers and resource users. The 2003 Black-out in North America on August 14 exemplifies
the potential impacts of interconnected systems failure.(Buldyrev, et al.,2010). In Cleveland,
Ohio, failure of the measures to protect the water supply persisted much longer than the
duration of the electric outage. Cleveland’s water supply system experienced pressure losses and
the area was under a boil water advisory until 17th August, three days after the onset of the
electric systems failure. Detroit’s water supply was under a boil water advisory until 18th
August, four days after the electric systems failure (International Water and Sanitation Centre,
2003, cited in Zimmerman and Restropo, 2006). Essential services systems are designed to
withstand certain stressors; extreme weather, earthquakes and more recently terrorist attacks.
In contemporary tightly coupled complex urban systems catastrophic failure can evolve from
predictable failures (Little, 2010). The focus of this work is the impact of increasing ordinary
summertime temperatures on interdependent urban and regional electricity and water systems.
The logical extension of the Energy Water Nexus in the US is the Energy Water Food nexus. In
the western United States and in many parts of the world, irrigation consumes the lion’s share of
water (Fahlund, A., Choy, M. L. J., and Szeptycki, L, 2014). Irrigated agriculture has an energy
impact as ground water irrigation requires pumping. Crops irrigated with ground water have
both an energy intensity and a groundwater intensity (Vora, et al., 2017). Understanding the
energy water food nexus brings a range of political economic issues into focus. Because food
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(like energy products) can be both a local good and an international commodity, disentangling
the energy water food nexus requires clear-eyed consideration of the potential inequalities that
may evolve from poorly considered policy (Romero, et al., 2017). The energy water food nexus is
beyond the scope of this paper.

Scales of Resource Governance, Abstraction and Distribution
Governance, or how we manage electricity and water systems, is as important as the technical
details of electricity generation and water/wastewater treatment. Concern over production and
consumption of coupled energy and water use stems principally from the operational focus of
water and power utility companies (Scott et al., 2011). Invariably the management question
becomes one of scale. Large-scale mechanisms of mutually constituted energy and water use are
easily observed and calculated. The nexus of water and energy scarcity is often resolved with
inter-basin water transfers that are both capital intensive and politically cumbersome (Norman
and Bakker, 2009). Large-scale solutions neglect the fact that water and energy scarcity is
driven substantially by individual users. Patterns of resource use for individual consumers are
more difficult to evaluate. The scale of analysis changes everything. Doreen Massey (1993)
writes passionately about local scale. Locality, she writes, is more than an artifact; it is a
continuous organic construct. Continuous flows into and out of localities reveal mechanisms of
socio-environmental change. “Places are best thought of as nets of social relations.”
(Massey,1993). Massey’s localities are assemblages of individual actions, desires and intents
extending to the global scale. Relationships with distant energy and water sources shape life on
a very intimate scale. Actions of individuals reverberate across thousands of miles (ibid.). In his
article on scale and causality, Stallins (2012) reconsiders environment as a behavior modifier.
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He argues for a biological view of scale and causality. Biological needs endure but how those
needs are remediated depends on many variables. The final phases of SNL workshops called for
problem solving on a scale appropriate to individual political actors and resource users
(Hightower, 2010). Stallins (2012) uses the power of small groups of individual organisms as a
metaphor and a physical model for socio-environmental change on a small scale that casts its
nets wide. Because sea changes can begin at the micro scale, examining the water energy nexus
at the user community scale makes sense. How we create solutions to resource scarcity depends
very much on where and why we use.

What is Governance and What is Being Governed?
Before discussing governance and management systems, we must be clear about WHAT is being
governed. Resource governance systems include the physical network of collection/generation
and distribution, the markets where resources are bought and sold and the regulatory framework
that presides over both the market and the landscape (geography) of resource delivery (Florini
and Sovacool, 2009). The two systems under consideration, water and energy, are optimally
governed at different scales (Scott, et al., 2011). For example; retail water distribution networks
are governed at a very granular scale. Inherent product loss in water distribution and wastewater
collection systems, incentivizes locally managed distribution of water to individual households.
Local scale water management minimizes pipe runs and pipe connection losses (Norman, Bakker
and Cook 2012). Wholesale water delivery in the arid west is managed at the federal level (Vaux,
2005). Electricity markets are generally governed at the state or regional scale to allow the
maximum number of participants while limiting line losses and connection balancing challenges
associated with out-of-network transportation or power wheeling (NYISO, n.d.). Regulatory
frameworks in the US operate at the regional or national scale. Frameworks governing domestic
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water supply and electricity delivery are tasked with maintaining product quality and service. The
US Department of Health and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are national
frameworks governing/ensuring the quality of service nationally.
As noted earlier, one of the core functions of civil society and civil infrastructure is to provide the
resources for human needs. How are resources allocated? How are decisions made? For the
engineer decisions are made based on mechanical systems efficiency (National Research Council,
2001). For the economist decisions are made based on economic efficiency. The competing
exigencies of the physical, mechanical, economic and political worlds must be woven together to
create governance (Bakker,2010, p. 44 cited in Perreault, 2014). Bakker defines governance
somewhat broadly as “a process of decision making that is structured by institutions; laws, rules,
norms, and customs, and shaped by ideological preferences.” “The concept of governance serves
as a broad conceptual framework for analyzing the interplay of institutional arrangements,
spatial scales, organizational structures and social actors involved in making decisions regarding
nature and natural resources (Himley, 2008, cited in Perreault, 2014). Governance refers to the
functions of government, but also, and importantly, the relations among government, quasigovernmental and non-governmental actors and agencies. Environmental governance is
particularly concerned with the act of governing resources and environments, and the ensemble
of organizations, institutional frameworks, norms and practices, operating across multiple spatial
scales, through which governing occurs (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004, cited in Perreault, 2014).

What is being governed? – ELECTRICITY
Electricity can be described as a mob of unruly electrons that must at all costs be governed! The
technical term for escaped electrons is “grounded current”. Uncontrolled, uninsulated grounds
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or “faults” burn living tissues and melt inert material (OSHA, 2002). A large fault can burn
through power lines and disrupt the regional flow of electricity (Lin, et al.,2011). The idea of
“governing” electricity, however, may conflict with the popular notion of electricity as an energy
commodity. Electricity is not only a commodity but an essential service (Hausman, et al., 2006).
While commodities can be managed at a market scale, essential services must be managed at the
scale of service delivery. Essentially, it must be managed at multiple scales, those of generation,
transmission and distribution at the substation and individual load levels. At the outset of the
twenty-first century, the scale of energy markets ranges from global to subnational. The scale of
electricity markets is limited by access to transmission. Aligning electricity markets with the
changing needs of user populations can be a challenge (ibid.).
Florini and Sovacool (2009) note that “international energy markets often lack appropriate
governance. Price signals are distorted by national government policies on both the supply and
the demand side. Investment in future energy supply is often inadequate and fails to serve the
public interest, leading to extreme price volatility. Because national governments see energy
services as crucial to national security and national power, they intervene in the sector to
promote energy ‘‘independence’’ or at least to assure supplies. Yet governments largely fail to
regulate the unintended international consequences of energy consumption. Management of
cross-border emissions of mercury and heat is rarely addressed. Mitigation of acid rain or
climate change is only considered under international pressure” (Florini, A and Sovacool B.
2009).
Poocharoen and Sovacool (2012) continue to critique energy market governance; “Governing
structures that are market-oriented function by price-based mechanisms, whereas governing
structures of bureaucracies function by rule-base mechanisms or so-called administrative
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orders”. The disconnect between price-based market processes and government operating
procedures leads to sub-optimal resource allocation. They draw attention to an alternate
governance mechanism – networked governance. “Some conclude that the network form of
governance is somewhere in between market and bureaucracies or that networks are a
combination of markets, hierarchies and collaborative arrangements.” (Koliba et al., 2011, cited
in Poocharoen and Sovacool, 2012).
Current electricity market governance in the US is based on the Locational Marginal Pricing
(LMP) system. The LMP system, based on operations research theory, is designed to meet
several economic objectives at once:

1. Minimize the cost of generating enough electricity to meet load by using the least cost set
of available generators possible given various constraints.

2. Produce the instantaneous price of electricity, at every point in the system, which
reflects the instantaneous short-run marginal cost of serving one incremental unit of load
at that location. This price is referred to as the “locational marginal price” (Hausman et
al., 2006).
The 2006 analysis of LMP Electricity Markets prepared for American Public Power Association
by Synapse Energy Analysts reports; “In terms of investment signals, we find that LMP has not
been successful in providing the necessary incentives for socially-optimal investment in
generation or transmission infrastructure, nor does it ensure the high levels of reliability
demanded by consumers. There is simply no evidence that the price signaling associated with
LMP has been an effective spur to investment in generation, transmission or demand response
initiatives, and some evidence to the contrary. We conclude that the LMP price signals are
overwhelmed by other factors in these areas, such as structural barriers to entry, competing
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economic incentives, and the lack of a clear mechanism for assuring return on investment in
certain types of projects.” (Hausman et al., 2006).
Ostrom and others posit that conditions that give rise to effective governance of common
resources such as climate and energy include ensuring that those involved in addressing climate
change-related problems including low carbon electricity supply, modes of transport, agriculture
and forestry, and off-grid energy use share responsibility for current and future outcomes and
agree to promote common solutions. Collaborative governance is only possible when reliability
and frequency of information is high, and when participants create social norms that favor
compliance and continual monitoring. Ostrom, Sovacool and others point out that fostering
conditions of trust, reciprocity, and civic duty can convince individuals and groups to emit fewer
greenhouse gases and respond collectively to energy dilemmas.” (See Sovacool, 2011 and
Ostrom, 1993). The German experience integrating renewables into the national production
market is instructive. Jacobsson and Lauber (2006) write “Policy-making is not a ‘rational’
technocratic process but rather one that appears to be based on such things as visions and
values, the relative strengths of various pressure groups, perhaps on beliefs of ‘how things work’
and on deeper historical and cultural influences.

What is being governed? WATER
Water governance in the US is varied and location specific. Water availability and access are
almost entirely dependent on climate. As such water governance is reflective of socioenvironmental relations of place (Linton,2010). “Water is neither purely ‘natural’ nor purely
‘social’ but simultaneously and inseparably both: a hybrid ‘socio-nature’ (Perreault 2014).
Bakker’s (2002) distinction between H2O and ‘water’ is useful. “Whereas H2O circulates through
the hydrological cycle, water as a resource circulates through the hydro-social cycle – a complex
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network of pipes, water law, meters, quality standards, garden hoses, consumers, [and] leaking
taps” – in addition to the processes of rainfall, evaporation and runoff associated with the
hydrological cycle (Bakker, 2002, p. 774, Perreault 2014). In many ways water is managed in the
context of use. Water for transportation is managed to optimize boat travel. Water for recreation
is managed to maximize value for water sports. Water for industry, agriculture and residential
use is managed for quality and availability.
In the US, there are several layers of water oversight. Nationally the USEPA enforces water
regulations. Water is also regulated on the state level by state health departments and state level
environmental/water oversight agencies (Kirchhoff and Dilling, 2016). The US EPA regulates
the quality of water, temperature and chemical make-up. through “the Safe Drinking Water
Act.” (USEPA.gov). It monitors, provides oversight and regulates surface water quality through a
host of regulations including the Clean Water Act (ibid.). The USEPA also regulates ground
water quality in aquifers used for drinking water (ibid.). Governance of water volume allocation
is a byzantine and crony ridden affair in most parts of the country. Cross border water allocation
is problematic on a good day (Norman et al., 2013).
In the western U.S. water is governed by the Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), the nation's largest
wholesale water supplier, operating 338 reservoirs with a total storage capacity of 245 million
acre-feet (USBR, 2019). Critics of this system claim that allocation of water by the USBR is
driven by “Water Nobility,” politically connected mostly agriculture users, and by politicians
who want to entice high dollar construction projects to their constituencies that have little
impact on water scarcity (McQuillan, 2015).
On the east side of the Rockies, water allocation is frequently managed via quasi-governmental
entities. Scholarship on water supply management in the arid west is abundant. In the east, the
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New York City watershed agreement is often cited as a model for water supply management
(Kirchhoff and Dilling, 2016). The difficulty in applying the NYC model for water supply
management across the country is that the watershed and southeastern New York region is
dominated by the economy of New York City. There is very little in the NYC watershed
agreement that would enable equitable allocation of water among a host of powerful economic
players. The 5 counties of the NYC watershed are among the poorest in the state with very little
in the way of agriculture or industry (Cairns, 2006). The 19th century Leatherstocking region
was an agro-industrial hub providing produce, livestock and animal products as well as valueadded agriculture and silviculture products to urban centers across the northeast. The fortunes
of the watershed region began to fail with the rise of irrigated agriculture in the arid west. As
New York City’s thirst grew the economic vitality of the surrounding regions dwindled (Calhoun,
1997). Only now at the are the fortunes of the Hudson Valley and the Watershed region
experiencing an uptick in agricultural output. The watershed management techniques of
purchasing land and limiting land use over a spread of 5 counties do not deal directly with
competing demands for water (Church, 2009) (Downeast Development Consulting, 2017).
Indeed, with the exception of several watershed cities, water collected in the New York City
reservoir system is not available to residents of the watershed.
There is a second reason the NYC watershed agreement has limited applicability. The watershed
protection plan deals almost entirely with water quality. Water quantity is generally not a
problem on the east coast of the U.S (Shi, Devineni et al., 2013). Treating it to meet drinking
water standards economically is. In well-watered regions, the stress to be managed is the cost of
treating water. In arid regions, the stress to be managed is allocating a limited volume of water
to the satisfaction of all stakeholders (National Research Council, 2011). The 2030 Water
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Resources Group notes; “even in countries with the most advanced water policies there is still
some way to go before the water sector is managed with the degree of sophistication appropriate
for our most essential resource. Without a step change improvement in water resource
management, it will be very difficult to meet related resource challenges, such as providing
sufficient food or sustainably generating energy for the world’s population.” (2030 Water
Resources Group, 2009).

Scales of Abstraction and Distribution
During the 19th century each of New York City’s five boroughs had water supply companies. At
the turn of the 20th century New York City drew water from nearby Westchester county. The
Croton reservoir system was the first out-of-city water project (Koeppel,2001). As cities grow
both in density and in size, changing land uses invariably compromise the water resources that
originally lead to human settlement. Water abstraction2. is not new. The great centers of ancient
civilizations had water collection and diversion systems. Population growth, urban densification
and expansion call for increased delivery of water. In the US suburban development can impugn
the integrity of small-scale local waterworks (USEPA, 2011). In the New York area, many
suburban municipalities in Westchester county purchase water from the New York City system
rather that undertake expensive water treatment plant upgrades. In the San Francisco Bay area,
the city of San Francisco, parts of Berkeley and several South Bay communities all draw water
from the Hetch Hetchy reservoir in Yosemite National park (SFPUC, 2016).
Expanding geographies of water abstraction require more creative governance strategies
(Ostrom and Ostrom, 1972). The command and control approach to Works Projects

2

borrowed from the Latin-abstract here to remove forcibly, https://www.merriam-webster.com
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Administration (WPA) era reservoir building and inter-basin water transfers has led to water
crises in the West (Gleick, 1994). Inter-basin water transfers built to support expanding urban
centers and agro-industrial economies often cause dispossession of politically marginalized
communities both in the US and globally. Watershed scales of management become obsolete
when water is moved from one basin to another. In the context of the Water/Energy Nexus
scholarship points to Integrated Water Resource Management as possible way forward (Norman
and Bakker, 2009).
“The Global Water System (GWS) is defined by a series of interacting components: (1) water as
part of the physical hydrologic cycle; (2) biological systems, as integral transformers of water
fluxes and quality; and (3) human institutions, as agents and experiencers of environmental
change. A systematic assessment of how each of these components and their interactions define
the evolving state of the GWS is a fundamental challenge confronting the Earth and humandimensions science communities.” (Vorosmarty et al., 2004). “It is within the context of
expanded multilevel arenas, where different problem definitions and management strategies
can be safely shared and openly debated, that scales for systematic and meaningful patterns of
socio-political interaction can be best pursued. Thus, instead of forcing watershed-based
governance processes and structures, we conclude that the exploration and examination of more
creative and flexible ways of linking watershed imperatives to socially and politically relevant
scales . . .is warranted.” (Ferreyra et al., 2008). In this context, the task and challenge for IWRM
and environmental governance is to ensure that existing and emerging agro-environmental
scales for collaboration and integration are constructed within ‘‘expanded arenas’’ that include
environmental actors and, by so doing, further instead of narrow the range of legitimate
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perspectives and plurality of ideas (Termeer and Koppenjan, 1997; Goverde and Nelissen, 2002
cited in Ferreyra et al., 2008).
Resource Economics
The progress of economic theory reads like a tale of lost innocence. Economists over time realize
that the earth is not infinite, and that humanity will eventually have to pick up their own
garbage. Classical economics concerned itself with classes not individuals. The wealth of nations
was based on trade (as opposed to the king’s fortune) and labor was the basic creator of value
(Smith, 1776). Intervention in trade, i.e. the king messing with the market, was anathema.
These theories and models evolved as the feudal era gave way to the industrial revolution. They
took hold in the context of an undeveloped countryside and a substantially rural population
where environmental goods were in abundance. To simplify the mathematics, natural resources
were modeled as infinite (Smith, 1776). This may have been a reasonable assumption at the
time, similar to the physical models of Newton ignoring the impact of subatomic particles. Not
long after publication of Smith’s Wealth of Nations, however, potato crops failed across Europe
several years in a row. Only the rural folk of Great Britain starved. Their leaders, following
Adams’ thinking, didn’t want to upset the markets by intervening to feed their people (Wootton,
2017).
As the industrial era progressed, the realities of resource limits became apparent. Raw
materials, especially energy and land inputs are not endless. Neo-classical economics evolved
as the notion of a finite earth began to take hold in the second half of the twentieth century
(Williams and McNeill, 2005). While neo-classical economics acknowledges that non-human
resources may be limited, it places great faith in human ingenuity and models economic growth
as if any lack of natural resources/raw materials can be made up by injection of human created
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resources or manmade capital. Out of this optimism arises the model of infinite growth. “The
idea that man-made capital will substitute for natural capital because ‘well-functioning markets’
will signal the impending shortage of natural capital, stimulating technological progress to
invent a substitute, is a key postulate of this model.” (Williams and McNeill, 2005). At the core
of this sanguine approach is a tautology – man-made capital is dependent on natural resources.
Scholars “Daly and Farley (2004:151) in Williams and McNeill (2005) point out the logic in this
is tantamount to saying that if a cook is baking a five-pound cake, he or she can increase it to a
1000 pound cake with no increase in ingredients but just by stirring harder and baking it longer
in a bigger oven. In the real world, natural resources are actually necessary to maintain manmade capital in good working order. Not to put too fine a point on it, man-made capital is
actually made out of the flow of resources and energy from natural capital.” (Williams and
McNeill, 2005). “The neo-classical school takes inspiration from Newton's mechanics. They tend
to believe in value neutrality and objectivity and regard their arguments as 'scientific'. Rational
decisions are connected with the existence of optimal solutions based on calculations in
monetary or other unidimensional terms (the assumption of complete commensurability). It
has to be noted that to put a precise monetary value to an environmental externality implies the
solution of very important problems, e.g., uncertainty connected to the environmental impact,
correct time horizon and correct discount rate (Munda 1997).
Environmental Economics has been described as an outgrowth of neoclassical economics,
studying two fundamental questions: the problem of environmental externalities; and the
correct management of natural resources. Of particular interest is optimizing inter-generational
allocation of non-renewable resources (Munda 1997). The focus on inter-generational equity
creates a framework for discussing “sustainable” development (World Commission on
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Environment and Development,1987). A framework of “weak” and “strong” sustainability, with
“strong” sustainability of course as the most desirable and “weak” sustainability the most
achievable (Biely et al.,2016). Weak sustainability is the purview of environmental economics.
Strong sustainability is the bedrock of ecological economics (Dietz and Neumayer, 2010).
Ecological economics evolved in opposition to the neo-classical/environmental economics
concept of strong commensurability – that natural resources and man-made capital are
interchangeable (Pelenc, 2015). In many ways, ecological economics represents a paradigm shift
in economic thought replete with angry naysayers and hostile critiques. “For ecological
economists, the economy is a subsystem of a finite, non-growing, materially closed (except for
solar energy) environmental eco-system. … The economy is firmly ensconced within the
environment. Neoclassical economists, meanwhile, view things the other way round … where the
ecosystem is a subset of the economy. According to this notion of the world, the economy
extracts raw materials from the environment and then sends waste back into it.” (Williams and
McNeill, 2005). For ecological economists, economic growth only takes place within the sphere
of the natural world (Williams and McNeill, 2005). Strong commensurability allows for the
monetization of environmental goods. Ecological economists insist that the value of
environmental goods is not always monetizable and that value may change over time in a
random way. The value of environmental goods will be poorly behaved variables in econometric
modeling. Strong Sustainability requires a non-negative change overtime of stocks of natural
capital (Munda 1997). Giuseppe Munda calls for post-normal science as a means of
transforming economics. “As a post-normal science, ecological economics recognizes the
presence, importance and legitimacy of different value-commitments for the appropriate
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management of uncertainty. It does not claim ethical neutrality, nor an indifference to the policy
consequences of its arguments.” (Munda,1997).
Sustainability
O’Riordan and Voisey (1997) write, “Sustainable development is a neo-renaissance idea that
covers the whole of human endeavor and planetary survival.” Who could oppose it? As it turns
out Eric Swyngedouw (2010) opposes it! Swyngedouw theorizes that “the politics of
sustainability and the environment, therefore, in their populist post-political guise are the
antithesis of democracy and contribute to a further hollowing out of what for Rancière and
others constitute the very horizon of democracy as a radically heterogeneous and conﬂicting
one. For that reason, as Badiou (2005a) argues, a new radical politics must revolve around the
construction of great new ﬁctions that create real possibilities for constructing different socioenvironmental futures.” (Swyngedouw, 2010). Where Swyngedouw sees a neoliberal enforced
harmony that narrows the range of potential futures, Munda sees an unruly contested dialogue
that moves participants toward solutions along a path that may be uncomfortable but ultimately
transformational. Neither seem terribly focused on O’Riordan and Voisey’s (1997) “secure
wealth creation.” Munda, Norgaard (1994) and their cohort are, in many ways,
transcendentalists, assembling the practical economic framework for sea-change. Swyngedouw
is the defensive linebacker reminding us that to argue is to care deeply and to harmonize is to
capitulate.

Resilience
In managing terrestrial system changes in the Anthropocene, there are several trains of thought.
Sustainability and resilience are often used interchangeably. The concepts are not, however

43

interchangeable (Fiksel, 2006). “The extent to which the 21st Century world will be
"sustainable" depends in large part on the sustainability of cities. Early ideas on implementing
sustainability focused on concepts of achieving stability, practicing effective management and
the control of change and growth-- a "fail-safe" mentality. More recent thinking about change,
disturbance, uncertainty, and adaptability is fundamental to the emerging science of resilience,
the capacity of systems to reorganize and recover from change and disturbance without
changing to other states-- in other words, systems that are "safe to fail." While the concept of
resilience is intellectually intriguing, it remains largely unpracticed in contemporary urban
planning and design.” (Ahern, 2011). Ahern (2011) stresses return to existing states. Panarchists
understand resilience as the ability of systems to recover though not necessarily with the same
key stakeholders. The forests of the American Northeast are resilient. Trees have taken over
land cleared for 18th and 19th century New England farms, but the giants of colonial American
forests; the chestnut and the American elm are gone. Panarchists suggest that a system that
experiences regular small disruptions is less likely to experience a disruption that drives the
system over the threshold of collapse (Scheffer et al., 2002). This definition of resilience meshes
well with Ahern’s concept of “safe to fail.” Sustainability is static. It suggests long-term viability
and the comfort of the familiar. Resilience is volatile, constantly reforming. and small
alterations that add up to big differences Resilience is ambiguous, it implies change and
discomfort. Perhaps this is why corporate America has sustainability officers but rarely
resilience consultants. Municipal governments, especially coastal municipalities have resilience
plans.
Analytical Methods – Statistical Modeling and Ecosystems Services
Statistical Modeling
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Statistical modeling is used extensively in electrical load/demand forecasting. Load forecasting
takes place on a range of temporal and geographic scales from short term that predicts grid
loading on 15 minutes to 24-hour intervals to long term forecasting that predicts electricity
demand over the course of a decade (Suganthi and Samuel, 2012). Electric demand modeling is
used to inform system design, maintenance and upgrades as well as product purchases on the
electricity markets, load shedding efforts and geographically specific voltage reductions. The
focus of short-term electricity demand modeling is temperature and humidity (Hong and Fan
2016). The goal of short-term modeling is to manage weather relate grid stress and maintain
operational cost efficiency. Medium and long-term forecasting are more focused on
demographic and density-related changes in the service territory to ensure adequate
infrastructure and manage long term costs (Alfares and Nazeeruddin, 2002).
Types of models used include
(1). multiple regression,
(2). exponential smoothing,
(3). iterative reweighted least-squares,
(4). adaptive load forecasting,
(5). stochastic time series,
(6). ARMAX models based on genetic algorithms,
(7) . fuzzy logic,
(8). neural networks
(9). expert systems.
Typically, however water demand modeling is the purview of civil engineers and proceeds at a
much less granular scale.
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Water demand forecasts are needed for the design, operation and management of urban water
supply systems. In this study, the relative performance of regression, time series analysis and
artificial neural network (ANN) models are investigated for short-term peak water demand
forecasting. The significance of climatic variables (rainfall and maximum air temperature, in
addition to past water demand) on water demand management is also investigated. Water
demand modeling falls into two categories – design modeling and modeling for operations
(Bougadis et al., 2005). Design modeling is part of long-term infrastructure planning based on
projected “growth” in the service territory. In regions with abundant rainfall water, demand
planning considers agriculture only peripherally (2030 Water Resources Group, 2014) focusing
on industrial, commercial, domestic water and fire management use. In arid regions where
agriculture must be irrigated water demand estimates include agriculture, industry/power
generation, residential and “fire flow” demand (LCRA, 2018).
Water demand modeling continues to evolve as spatial analysis capabilities improve and
statistical analysis tools become more readily accessible. Current scholarship in water demand
modeling includes a range of statistical methods from linear regression modeling to artificial
neural networks. Scholars offer conflicting pictures of data availability for water demand
modeling. Water resource planners are often very sanguine about the granularity of available
data (House-Peters and Chang 2011). Energy water nexus scholars are less so. Chini and
Stillwell’s (2017) editorial entitled “Where are all the data ?!” speaks to those concerns. Existing
water planning modeling is frequently focused on residential demand (see House-Peters and
Chang, 2011 and Adamowski, 2008). As noted earlier, the scale of analysis is the core factor in
the range of demands considered. Modeling Water demand for a single urban center may be too
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granular to include regional power generation water demand modeling water demand for an
entire region may be untenable because of the periodicity of the various data sets involved.
Ecosystems Services
Former NYCDEP commissioner Albert Appleton’s (2002) article on ecosystems services and the
New York City water system yanked the concept of ecosystems services out of the dank reserves
of academic economics into the bright light of public awareness. Appleton’s paper narrated realworld, big Wall St. money, operationalization of a hitherto academic concept: “ecosystems
services” (Norgaard, 2010). The ecosystems services analytical method found its way into the
engineering and planning tool-box. It also became a credible weapon for environmental
activists, conservationists and earth scientists. The basic premise that all value in economic
systems begins with the value of raw materials comes directly out of environmental economics
and later ecological economics. It is a gift to anti-development activists everywhere. At last a way
to defeat the demands for the highest value use of land. Indeed in 1997 Costanza calculated that
the ecosystems services of the planet were at least $33 trillion dollars annually, 1.8 the times the
value of the gross global product (Costanza et al., 1997). The translation of that calculation?
There is no act of development that can create more value than simply leaving existing
ecosystems alone! However exciting Costanza’s incendiary announcement may be, the
transformational work of ecosystems services analysis must be done at a very granular scale
evaluating the value of ecosystems on a project by project basis.
In 2015 President Obama signed an executive order requiring all federal projects to include an
ecosystems services analysis (Obama White House, 2015). Ecosystems services analysis can be
traced back to the UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report on Ecosystems and Human
Wellbeing (Ch5, 2003). The ecosystem services framework offers excellent insights into value
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inputs embedded in human activities. The literature on ecosystem services as relates to water
provision is robust and evolving. McPhearson (2013, 2014), Anderson (2014) and others write
extensively on explicit spatial assessment of not only of the values non-human systems provide
for human consumption but also on the impact of scale on value trade-offs when ecosystem
services are invoked to provide a necessary human good.
Scholars have found clear tradeoffs and synergies in ecosystems management outcomes. Studies
in the California Blue Oak region found that grassland states maximized agricultural
productivity (short-run agricultural output) at a loss of soil health, biodiversity, and other
ecosystem services (Eastburn et al., 2017). Forested states, however, maximized more difficult to
monetize services such as soil and nutrient conservation, carbon sequestration and robust
biodiversity. Synergies were found when several states evolved together. Grassland states with
contiguous woodlands optimized agricultural value while retaining nutrients, reducing invasive
economically useless species as well as retaining diversity and richness of native plants
(Eastburn et al., 2017). “This integrative approach can be adapted to a diversity of working
landscapes to provide useful information for science-based ecosystem service valuations,
conservation decision making, and management effectiveness assessments. . Identifying these
win-win bundles of ecosystem services may enhance the efficiency of Payment for Ecosystems
Services markets. Ecosystem service markets or payments for ecosystem services are also
potential options to assist ranchers with management tradeoffs in meeting the economic
realities of agricultural production.” (Eastburn et al., 2017).

Ecosystems services valuation have been used to support the preservation of urban green space
(McPhearson, 2013) and peri-urban agriculture (Wang and Swallow 2015). Ecosystem services
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scholarship has produced a number of models and frameworks for evaluation of ecosystem
services. The Invest Model (Natural Capital Project, n.d.) has been used to evaluate ecosystem
service trade-offs. The Aries model (Artificial Intelligence for Ecosystem Services, n.d.) allows
for modeling across both geographic and temporal scales. Both the Aries and InVest models are
spatially explicit. Both of these models/platforms manipulate geographically expressed data and
generate outputs that are accessible in tabular and mapped format. The I-Tree model (USDA
Forestry Service, 2006) developed by the US forestry service focusses on the ecosystem services
provided by trees. These models offer robust services assessment algorithms consistent with
current earth science and environmental engineering. The challenge of ecosystem services
valuation is monetization, reduction of service values to a single metric, price.

Philosophically, politically and economically, monetization of services is problematic
(Unmussig, 2014) (Norgaard, 2010). Proposing dollar values of ecosystems may or may not
ensure sustainable resource use policy. Acknowledging the necessity of realigning public
decision making with a broader base of stakeholders, this work will consider ways to monetize
water supply and electricity generation supporting ecosystem services. The ecosystems services
paradigm identifies four types of ecosystems services; provisioning services, supporting services,
cultural services and regulating services.
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Figure 0.2 - The Ecosystem Services Framework

Valuation of some provisioning services is fairly simple and can be based on market values.
Proposing monetary values for services where markets do not exist or are subsidized is a
significant challenge. Once a monetized value is arrived at, the next challenge is to generate
stakeholders support. As noted, earlier valuation is a physical, economic and political process.
Trump era attacks on ecosystems services valuation highlights the politics involved. In June of
2017, Trump Era USEPA administrator Scott Pruitt attacked the Obama era “Waters of the
United States” valuation of ecosystems services. He rejected the $555 million water pollution
prevention ecosystems services benefit and insisted EPA economists assign “no quantifiable
value” to wetlands (Davenport and Lipton, 2017).
“On June 13, my economists were verbally told to produce a new study that changed the
wetlands benefit,” said Elizabeth Southerland, who retired last month from a 30-year
career at the E.P.A., most recently as a senior official in the agency’s water office. “On
June 16, they did what they were told,” Ms. Southerland said. “They produced a new
cost-benefit analysis that showed no quantifiable benefit to preserving wetlands.”
(Davenport and Lipton, 2017).
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This politico-economic squabbling can have far reaching consequences. Philosophical
arguments dominated essential services provision during the “Great Hunger” in 19th century
Ireland. 19th century English parliament and academics squabbled over grain markets as Irish
peasants starved (Wootton, 2017). With this history in mind, this work will focus on building
ironclad algorithms for assigning dollar value to environmental assets.
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Q1 – The Water Energy Nexus in Consumption Behavior: What
Consumption Trends Drive Hot Weather Electricity and Water System
Operation? - a comparison of the Arid West and Northeastern United
States.
Chapter 1.1 Background
What is the Problem?
Summer peak electricity demands associated with ambient temperature maxima place high
stresses on the electricity transmission and distribution system (Bartos et al., 2016). The energy
demands of water and wastewater treatment have the potential to exacerbate hot weather electric
grid stresses. The water demands of electric power generation can have significant impact on water
delivery and disposal systems. Water availability and electric grid stability are most problematic
during the high temperature summer periods (Pate et al., 2007). Spatial distribution of
consumption behavior can intersect with infrastructure vulnerabilities causing cascading failures
(Zimmerman, 2004). Is there a correlation between electricity use, water consumption and hot
weather at the regional/urban scale?
Cascading infrastructure failures is the term of art for the failure of one resource delivery system
leading to failure of others. Cascading infrastructure failures are emerging as a key concern to
entities as disparate as the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Department of Health
and Human services, FERC, and the USEPA (Saidi et al., 2018). In her 2004 paper titled “Decision
Making and the Vulnerability of Interdependent Critical Infrastructure”, Rae Zimmerman notes
that “Infrastructure interdependencies are now recognized as both opportunities as well as points
of vulnerability.” (Zimmerman, 2004) Risk management scholars point to blackouts in the US and
beyond to highlight the far-reaching impact a single critical infrastructure failure can have
(USEPA, 2004).
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System Operation
Electricity for Water
In August of 2003, an electric system failure cut electrical power to the entire Northeastern US.
When emergency generators at New York City Wastewater treatment facilities couldn’t be started,
500 million gallons of untreated sewage were released into the recreational waterways surrounding
the city. At the height of the water recreation season, with average daytime temperatures reaching
95 degrees F, New York City beaches were closed at once (Beatty et al 2006). In the rust belt cities
of Cleveland and Detroit, loss of power during the 2003 blackout resulted in failure of water
treatment systems and boil water alerts that lasted for several days (Zimmerman, 2006). Blackouts in the Carolinas and in California lead to water treatment plant shutdowns, raw sewage leaks
and partial shutdowns of state water systems (Zimmerman, 2006). For communities that use ultraviolet disinfection to avoid the risk of storing chlorine gas at water and wastewater treatment
facilities, electric power loss is a disaster. Had the NYCDEP Croton filtration plant been online with
their banks of ultraviolet disinfection lamps, a third of NYC would have been boiling their water
after the 2003 blackout. Gude notes that across the US water and wastewater treatment account for
from 3 to 4 % of national electricity use. In some municipalities, this can amount to from 20 to 40%
of total energy consumption (Gude, 2015). With these synergies in mind, understanding the drivers
of water use, wastewater generation and electricity use may provide insights that stave off the
cascading failures associated with resource delivery crashes.
Water for Electricity
Electricity generation and fossil fuel extraction are also highly dependent on water. Pate notes that
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in the past 30 years water withdrawals for domestic supply and energy development have been
increasing. Most of the energy sector water withdrawals were for thermoelectric generation (Pate et
al. 2007). The vulnerability of electric generation to water scarcity is currently being played out in
the American southwest. In his work on the Water Energy Nexus, Horak cites the potential impact
of drought in the American Southeast on nuclear power production (Horak 2010). In July 2012
nuclear power plants across the US were forced to cut send out because of water concerns (Daly,
2012). The interdependence of these two resources creates conditions for cascading catastrophic
failures of critical systems. In the southwest of our country, electric power generation is in direct
competition with domestic and agricultural users for water. In the currently well-watered northeast the connection between electric generation and wastewater disposal poses some similar and
some different hazards.

The Nexus
Water and electricity, like many other critical resources, are often managed in silos (Hussey and
Pittock, 2012). In increasingly interconnected urban and regional systems, understanding the
potential for cascading failures can improve planning for extreme weather and emergency
response. Currently, water and wastewater treatment plant design practice consider electrical
redundancy only peripherally (ibid.) Publication of the 2015 EPA guidance document “Power
resilience for water and wastewater treatment facilities” (USEPA, 2015) underscores the general
absence of back up generation equipment and generator operating expertise at wastewater and
water treatment facilities in the U.S.
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Electrical generating stations often rely on the municipal water supply for steam generation,
cooling water and other process water needs. Water treatment is always required to bring the
domestic water available up to quality required for steam generation (Vakkilainen, 2017). In some
municipalities, different water sources are used at different times of the year (NYC DEP, 2018).
Differing water sources produce different quality water (Linton, 2010) requiring different
treatment processes. The deep interdependencies in these resource management systems are cause
for concern and opportunities for innovation. Key stakeholders in these processes wastewater and
electric utilities, regional electric system operators, regional infrastructure managers, and public
health oversight entities and urban/regional planners.
The primary avenue for change evolving from this work is improved electric demand
response/demand management in water and wastewater treatment plants. Enhanced
understanding of water, wastewater and electricity syncretism can improve cross utility
communication and open avenues for improved extreme weather response. Additional
opportunities for change are:
●

Altering the current philosophy of design in water and wastewater treatment facilities to
include more comprehensive backup generation capabilities,

●

Reducing the risk of untreated sewage releases to surface water during hot weather

●

Altering consumption behavior to increase water available for electric generation in water
scare areas.

●

Providing the basis for urban design and zoning to reduce the impact of electricity and
water use syncretism

Regional Consumption Study Areas
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Populations across the globe are concentrating in urban areas (UN DESA, 2018). In many areas,
urban resource consumption dominates the regional water and electricity use paradigm. Buildings
3consume

the largest portion of the urban electric load (US Energy Information Administration,

2015). Domestic water use is a large portion of urban water demand. In most water or electricity
delivery service territories, urban centers constitute the largest user population, the fastest growing
load and the most intricately meshed delivery infrastructure (Sauri, 2010).
In many cases water abstraction and electricity generation are regional processes. Regional
temperature variation and climactic forcings can have significant impact on both water and
electricity availability and on user behavior (Gude, 2015). To capture the variation in water and
electricity user behavior across the spectrum of US climate regions, the states of Texas and New
York were chosen for study. For the purposes of this study, Texas is emblematic of water and
electricity availability and user behavior in the arid southwest. In many ways Texas and the
southwest region are already experiencing the impact of climate variation on water availability and
electricity generation (Stillwell et al., 2011). New York State was chosen as a region containing a
range of climates and the Global City, New York. The climates, density variation and long history of
water abstraction make it useful as an analytical mesocosm. Consistent with national trends,
municipal water use comprises the largest non-irrigation water demand in the state of Texas (Texas
Water Development Board, 2016). In New York City, residential buildings make up over 80% of
annual water demand (NYCDEP, 2015). In urban load pockets, small changes in individual or
household use behavior can make a significant contribution to resolving electricity and water
scarcity locally and regionally.

Urban buildings consume more than any other system for example transportation,
Telecommunications, water supply, electric generation etc.
3
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Electric Distribution
In New York State, electricity delivery is managed by the New York Independent System
operator. “The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) operates competitive
wholesale markets to manage the flow of electricity across New York, from the power producers
who generate it to the local utilities that deliver it to residents and businesses.” (NY ISO, n.d.)
In Texas, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) manages the flow of electric power.
ERCOT controls 90 percent of the electric load in the State of Texas. ERCOT, the independent
system operator for the region, schedules power on an electric grid that connects more
than 43,000 miles of transmission lines and 550 generation units. ERCOT also performs
financial settlement for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail
switching for 7 million customer sites in competitive choice areas. ERCOT is a membershipbased 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation, governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight
by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Texas Legislature. ERCOT's members include
consumers, cooperatives, generators, power marketers, retail electric providers, investor-owned
electric utilities (transmission and distribution providers,) and municipal-owned electric
utilities (ERCOT, n.d.)

Electric distribution governance mechanisms/markets are similar across the country. The dayahead market framework used nationally enables a stable platform for electricity trading and is
ideally the most efficient way to allocate resources (Joskow, 1976). While the electricity allocation
paradigm is largely the same, there are some practical and philosophical differences between the
ERCOT management approach and the NYISO approach. Based on the NYISO web presence and
annual reports, NYISO manages generation for price, reliability and by extension fuel efficiency
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and air emissions minimization. Reviewing similar resources for ERCOT, Texas “focuses on grid
reliability, efficient electricity markets, open access and retail choice”. Despite the marked lack of
public discussion of environmental quality in any of the ERCOT web collateral, ERCOT manages
the largest wind generation portfolio of any system operator in the country (ERCOT, 2015, 2016).
The similarity between Texas and New York state critical resource delivery is limited to the day
ahead electricity market structure. New York State and Texas have extreme differences in both
climate and water governance infrastructure.
Water Management: Texas
The 2012 Texas state water plan states, “the Texas Water Development Board acknowledges that
water scarcity is an issue in Texas. The urgent message of the 2012 State Water Plan is that in
serious drought conditions, Texas currently does not have and in the future will not have enough
water to meet all the water demand. These demands include domestic water supply, business and
industry demand, and agricultural demand. The state of Texas’ population expected to grow by 82
percent in the next 50 years. The plan also presents the estimates of the economic losses likely to
occur if increasing water supply needs cannot be met“ (Texas Water Development Board, 2011).
Historically, irrigation has claimed a very large portion of Texas fresh water. Electricity generation
water demand is tiny by comparison. Residential/municipal water demand in Texas is projected to
claim an increasing share of available water in coming years.
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Figure 1.0 Projected Texas Water Needs by Use Category (acre feet/yr.)

(TWDB, 2006)
Water abstraction is managed in Texas as a collaboration between the Texas Water Board and
several government and quasi-governmental organizations; The US Bureau of Reclamation, US
Geological Survey, US Army Corps of Engineers, The International Boundary Water Commission
and the Lower Colorado River Authority (Texas Water Development Board, 2001). Wastewater
treatment is managed by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) in conjunction
with several municipal and regional entities (Leos, 2019). Surface and ground water have different
histories. Surface water allocation was from precolonial times managed via riparian rights;
landowners adjacent to a body of water had the right to determine how that water was used
(TWDB, n.d.) (TSL, 2016). In the late 1800’s the Texas Supreme Court noted that the riparian
surface water scheme was unsuitable for settlement of arid regions (ibid.). “Beginning in the 1890s,
Texas began to implement a legal doctrine known as prior appropriation. Simply put, prior
appropriation means that the state issues water rights for surface water with multiple stakeholders.
Rights may be assigned according to seniority among the permit holders, or allocated according to
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a complex formula between residential, industrial, and agricultural users. In 1913, the legislature
created the Texas Water Commission (now the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality) to
oversee water appropriations. Prior appropriation was implemented incrementally over many
decades, and conflicts between permit holders and those with existing riparian rights were a source
of numerous court cases well into the 1980s.” (ibid.) Ground water in Texas is managed using the
“rule of capture” doctrine meaning anyone can drill a well on their land and withdraw as much as
possible regardless of the impact on neighboring wells. Despite multiple suits and appeals, the rule
of capture doctrine for groundwater management still stands (ibid.). Texas municipalities draw
source water from many sources. A large portion of Texas water is supplied from reservoirs
managed by the Bureau of Reclamation. Another portion of Texas water is supplied from reservoirs
managed by the Lower Colorado River Authority. Figure 1.1 below shows the proposed mix of
source waters for coming decades. Surface water and ground water are traditionally the largest
portion of water supply. Conservation holds much promise for the Texas Water Development
Board. Many sources under consideration in Texas are untapped in the cooler damper northeast.
Desalination of seawater, surface and ground water are all proposed to provide relief to water
stress in Texas Desalination is a high-energy demand process that can exacerbate electricity/water
interdependencies in hot weather. Water reuse is a relatively new approach to water management
in the US. As recently as 20 years ago, reuse of wastewater was stigmatized and bore a high “ick”
factor (Bauman,1983) (Hartley, 2006). Persistent drought in the American South west has
effectively eliminated the social objections to wastewater reuse. Wastewater reuse is finding an
increasingly large place in the water manager’s tool kit.
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Figure 1.1 Recommended Water Supply Strategies for 2060

(TWDB, 2011)
For a large part of the Texas population, municipalities manage water distribution (TWDB.2011).
Texas municipal water utilities such as Austin Water, San Antonio and Houston water systems bill
customers using a “block” based rate system where rates increase with the volume used (SAWS,
n.d.)( Austin Water, n.d. (Greater Houston Partnership, n.d.). As we will see this differs from water
rates in the well-watered state of New York.
Water Management: New York State
Water resource oversight in New York State is provided by the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) Bureau of Water Resource Management (BWRM). The
NYSDEC BWRM is tasked with protecting, managing, and conserving New York State's
groundwater and surface water supply sources. The BWRM also protects groundwater and surface
water quality in the New York City Watershed and other major watersheds. The BWRM manages
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public water supply permitting, analysis and approval of aquifer pump tests and reservoir capacity;
drought management; Great Lakes water withdrawal registration; statewide water withdrawal
reporting; groundwater; interstate water supply partnerships; reservoir releases; water
conservation; and water well drillers registration. The BWRM is responsible for State Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permit compliance in the New York City watershed (NYS
DEC, n.d.).
Figure 1.2 a - New York State Public Water Systems by Source
Type:
Number of Systems
Surface Water

Ground Water

Purchased Surface
Water

Purchased Ground
Water
https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/water/drinking/facts_figures.htm

Figure 1.2 b - New York State Public Water Systems by Source
Type: Population Served
Surface Water
Ground Water

Purchased
Surface Water
Purchased
Ground Water
https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/water/drinking/facts_figures.htm
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Public water supply in New York State is withdrawn from either surface or groundwater (NYS
DOH, n.d.). Figures 1.2 a and b b show the breakdown of water sources for municipal water supply.
Even though over 60% of New York State residents live within 50 miles of the ocean (Long Island
Sound Study, 2010), desalination does not currently figure into the New York State municipal
water supply mix.4
Purchased surface water from the New York City watershed supplies many communities in
Westchester county. Suffolk county and parts of Nassau county in southeastern New York State
draw municipal water supply from groundwater as do communities across the state (NYCWB,
2015).

United Water N.Y., Rockland County’s drinking water supplier, proposed the Haverstraw Water Supply
Project to pump Hudson River water, desalinate it, then sell the drinking water to Rockland County
residents. https://www.riverkeeper.org/campaigns/river-ecology/waterfront-developmentreview/united-water-desal/ In 2016 Rockland county sued to stop the project.
http://www.realestateindepth.com/news/rockland-sues-state-water-utility-over-desalination-plantcosts/
4
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Figure 1.2c

Wastewater treatment in New York State is managed on the municipal or county level.
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In New York State, relatively plentiful rain and fewer acres under till result in a water use profile
significantly different from that of Texas (NYSDEC, 2015). Figure 1.3 below shows that the largest
water withdrawals go to thermo-electric generation. The next largest withdrawals go to domestic
water supply. The configuration of water use in New York State suggests a very strong relationship
between public water supply and electric generation (NYSDEC, 2015). While electric generation
uses are non-consumptive (water entering the plant is discharged at the same rate), the potential
for overlapping water supply and electric demand may exist in evolving population, weather and
climate scenarios.
Figure 1.3

http://www.dec.ny.gov/lands/92865.html

79

Water supply for most New York State users is managed regionally, on a municipality or county
basis. Water and sewer rates differ across the state. The City of New York Department of
Environmental Protection charges $3.81 per hundred cubic feet (cf) for metered water and an
additional $.49 per meter per day within a billing period (NYCWB, 2015). Monroe County along
the Lake Ontario in western New York has a block-based rate schedule. The cost of water for
Rochester residents in Monroe County DECREASES as users purchase more! (MWCA, 2016) In
Albany N.Y., the minimum water charge of $34.91 includes 1,300 cf of water monthly. Increasing
volumes of water cost users more per cf (Albany Water Board, 2012). In Suffolk county on Long
Island, water users pay a flat rate of $1.354 per 100 cf (SCWA, n.d.).
Weather and Climate: Texas
Temperatures in Texas range from average January lows of 20° F along the northern border of the
Panhandle and 50° F in the Valley to typical summertime highs in the 90s° F. In the higher
elevations of western Texas and along the immediate coastline summer highs of 80s are more
common. The Edwards Plateau across the Low Rolling Plains and the Cross Timbers experience the
warmest temperatures with readings over 100° F (NCDC, 2014).
Monthly average precipitation is less than half an inch in west Texas and over four inches in parts
of East Texas. The mountainous Trans-Pecos region and the High Plains are the only areas that
regularly receive any accumulation of snow. While May is the wettest month of the year in many
parts of Texas, the western portions of the Trans-Pecos and High Plains are wettest in July and
August (NCDC, 2014).
Typical high summer temperatures mean that ordinarily evaporation consumes the steady
summer rainfall in all areas of the state. Below-average rainfall can cause serious environmental
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stress in summer. During drought conditions, evapotranspiration from the soil and plants is all but
eliminated. Loss of evaporative cooling exacerbates summertime heat and drought events. Water
scarcity is not new to Texas. Records from Spanish exploration of the Southwest document drought
as a recurring problem (Cook et al, 2007).
Weather and Climate: New York State
There are substantial differences in temperature across New York State. The average annual mean
temperature ranges from about 40 degrees Fahrenheit (° F) in the Adirondacks to near 55° F in the
Greater New York metropolitan area. In January, the average mean temperature is approximately
16 ° F in northern most regions but increases to about 26 ° F along the Great Lakes and in the lower
Hudson Valley and to 31° F on Long Island. The highest temperature in New York State is 108° F
was recorded in Troy on July 22, 1926. Temperatures of 107° F have been observed at Lewiston,
Elmira, Poughkeepsie and New York City. The record coldest temperature is -52° F recorded in
northern Herkimer County in February 1934 and again in February 1979 (NCDC, 2014).
The summer climate is cool in the mountainous regions and at higher elevations on the Southern
Plateau. The New York City area and lower portions of the Hudson Valley have relatively warm
summers. Temperatures of 90° F or higher occur from late May to mid-September in all but the
normally cooler portions of the State. The New York City area and most of the Hudson Valley
record 18 to 25 days of 90° F or higher during the warm season. While temperatures of 100° F are
rare, many long-term weather stations, especially in the southern half of the State, have recorded
maxima in the 100 to 105° F range. Minimum summer temperatures drop to the 40s and upper 30s
with some frequency in the northern interior of the state. It is not uncommon for temperatures to
approach the freezing point in the Adirondacks and Southern Plateau during June and the latter
half of August (ibid.).
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New York State has a fairly uniform distribution of precipitation during the year. There are no
distinctly dry or wet seasons regularly repeated on an annual basis. Precipitation is normally
sufficient to supply the State's water resources for municipal and industrial supplies,
transportation and recreation. Rainfall is usually adequate during the growing season for economic
crops, lawns, gardens, shrubs, forests and woodlands. Severe droughts are rare, but deficiencies of
precipitation may occur from time to time, causing temporary concern over reduced water supply
and increased moisture stress in vegetation (ibid.).
Current and Future Vulnerabilities
In high population density parts of Texas and New York State, high electric demand is associated
with hot weather (ERCOT, n.d.) (NYISO, n.d.). In Texas, the nexus of electricity generation,
agricultural and municipal water demand can impact electricity availability in hot dry weather
(lcra.org/water). In New York State, residential and commercial electric demand and water
supply/wastewater treatment electric demand can intersect in a dangerous feedback loop in hot
weather threatening water supply and wastewater treatment (NYSERDA, 2010). For Texas, energy
intensive water treatment may actually worsen overlapping water demand. Potential increases in
the New York State agriculture sector may alter regional water demand profiles. In the next
sections, I will examine current usage patterns and consider the impact of evolving patterns of land
use, regional climate and evolving populations.

Chapter 1.2 - Methods & Materials
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The socio-environmental conditions that drive electric use5 also drive wastewater generation (Ma
et al., 2015). The scale of inquiry can impact the data available (ESRI, 2003). Increasingly the need
to manage raw water abstraction leads water managers to use statistical modeling techniques to
predict demand (Rinaudo, 2014). In this section, I endeavor to model both electric use and
wastewater generation.

Data: Data Sources and Data Quality
Data gathering was a substantial challenge in this effort. Electric load data was taken from
independent system operator archives (ERCOT, n.d.) (NY ISO, n.d.). Wastewater treatment plant
(WWTP) flow was used as a proxy for water use6. WWTP flow data from monthly Discharge
Monitoring Reports (DMRs) is available from the USEPA Enforcement and Compliance History
Online (ECHO) system (US EPA, n.d.). Weather data was taken from the National Climate Data
Center Climate Data Online website (NCDC, n.d.). Demographic data was taken from the
American Community Survey website (US Census Bureau, 2010)
Demographic Data
Considering trends that drive hot weather electricity and water system operation, consumer
behavior in response to weather is the key vulnerability to be mitigated (Meier et al, 2017).
Providing consistent high-quality service is the hallmark of sound public utility operation (US
FERC, 2018). Evolving demographics and volatile weather intersect to challenge utility service
providers. Scholarship on demographics and consumption points to increasing consumption with
hot weather, population growth and high end development
water users not connected to water supply and wastewater disposal systems are more
numerous in rural, exurban and suburban regions (APA, 2016).
5
6
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increasing affluence across all goods and services sectors in all weather conditions (Suganthi &
Samuel, 2011) (Rice 2007). Scholarship on carbon footprint and demographics also indicates that
affluence and resource consumption are linked (Lutzenhiser & Hackett, 1993). Intuitively,
wealthier consumers will consume more. Earlier research in South Eastern New York (SENY)
suggests that consumers in larger homes and in lower population density areas consume more
electricity per person in warm months than consumers in smaller residences and higher density
areas (Link, Klein et al, 2015). Electricity consumption appears to vary not only with affluence but
with patterns of habitation. Based on this research, understanding how consumption varies with
patterns of habitation can enable resilience planning across a range of geographies.
While population estimates are available for all counties in New York State and Texas, ACS housing
data are not published for all counties in New York state or Texas. Thirty-nine of the sixty counties
in New York State and one hundred and twenty of the three hundred plus counties in Texas have
published ACS housing data. Counties with unpublished housing data in both Texas and New York
State are the least populous, most rural counties in each state (US Census Bureau, 2010).
Electric Load Data
Electric load data collection was straight forward. Electric load data is stored in small time
increments in independent system operator archives (ERCOT, n.d.) (NYISO, n.d.). The smoothed
data sets from both the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) provide zone load data in 60-minute intervals (ERCOT, n.d.)
(NY ISO, n.d.). Historical load data for New York state and Texas are available in the NYISO and
ERCOT archives respectively for every hour of every day from 2007 to the present (ERCOT, n.d.)
(NYISO, n.d.). Both the ERCOT and the NYISO capture electric load information based on ‘zones”.
The NYISO ‘Load’ Zones are based on congestion pricing; areas where the location based marginal
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prices are the same (NYISO, n.d.). ERCOT zones follow the contours of the Texas weather patterns
and are called Weather Zones (ERCOT, n.d.).
Weather Data
Weather data was taken from the National Climate Data Center Climate Data Online website
(NCDC, n.d.). Weather data is delivered on a station by station basis for most counties. While
gathering weather data was a straightforward process, creating weather data sets at the scale of
electric use or wastewater generation was a challenge. Texas data was bundled into ERCOT
weather zone groupings for download and averaged across each weather zone for every month
from January 2005 to November 2015. The NYISO load zone/county matchup process was much
more problematic. NYISO load zones can include parts of counties or can be entire metropolitan
regions (NYISO, n.d.). Weather stations are not uniformly distributed. In rare cases there are
multiple weather stations in one New York State county. More frequently though, a single weather
station must serve several counties. A single weather station in Manhattan’s Central Park serves all
five counties of New York City. New York weather zones and counties are relatively small by
comparison to Texas and standard deviations calculated for weather variables are comparatively
small. The size of NYISO weather zones and the consistency of data suggested that averaging
weather data by NYISO weather zone was a conservative choice. Averaging weather variables
across Texas counties and zones was more problematic. The Texas weather zones are over twice as
large as New York State load zones (ERCOT, n.d.) (NYISO, n.d.). Precipitation reported in the
NCDC website for Texas can vary by as much as a factor of 50 from weather station to weather
station in the same weather zone. This is particularly problematic in the western part of the state.
Water/Wastewater Data
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Wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) Discharge Monitoring Report (DMR) data was chosen as a
proxy for water use to focus analyses on non-landscape use of water. DMR reports are submitted to
state environmental regulators monthly as part of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
system (NPDES) program (US EPA , n.d.). The NPDES program was created by the 1972 Clean
Water Act (USEPA, n.d.). DMRs are forwarded to the EPA for publication by state regulators.
Discharge Monitoring Reports measure WWTP performance against the discharge limits set out in
their NPDES permits (ibid.). WWTP discharge data is the most variable. Among the
inconsistencies on WWTP DMR data are:
●

Varying reporting requirements from state to state and for different size treatment
facilities generate data inconsistencies. Larger WWTPS are required to submit monthly
reports. Smaller facilities are on a quarterly reporting schedule in many states.

●

Late or missing DMR reports are not back filled and leave spaces in wastewater data sets,
creating problems for statistical analysis.

●

Incomplete DMR data is generally not redressed in the ECHO system.

●

The USEPA publishes county populations associated with each treatment facility but not
the actual number of households served by each plant.

●

Differing water/wastewater treatment payment schema across the country make
consistently tracking user populations impracticable in many municipalities.

Statistical analysis requires data sets with matched temporal and geographical scales (Chou et al.,
2018). Because the smallest increment of time for WWTP flow available through ECHO is one
month, electric load was summed by month for each zone7. Zip codes were assigned to

The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) requires data reported in
wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs) to be measured. In
7
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load/weather zones using ArcGIS. Population estimates for each load/weather zone were estimated
using zip code populations from the 2010 US census data. Population was summed across each
zone. Electric use data was aggregated to a monthly number for each zone, divided by zone
population to generate zone based per capita energy use and then assigned to each county in the
weather zone. Population normalized electricity use was estimated for Texas and New York State
zones for 2007 through 2015. Similarly, WWTP locations were mapped using ArcGIS and then
grouped both by county and by load/weather zone, to assemble estimates of county wide and zonal
water use/wastewater flow. 2010 U.S. Census county population data was used to estimate county
wide per capita wastewater generation and zonal population estimates were used to calculate zonal
population normalized wastewater flows. Organizing electric use and WWTP flows by county
facilitated use of demographic data for both states.
How consistent are these estimates with actual per capita water and electric use? Assuming the
largest number of off-grid electric users are in rural counties, (National Academies of Sciences,
2016) estimates of per capita electricity use are likely to be the most correct for high
density/urbanized regions. Similarly, water users not connected to water supply and wastewater
disposal systems are more numerous in rural, exurban and suburban regions (APA, 2016).
Therefore, estimates of per capita water use as wastewater generation are likely to be most accurate
in urban areas. The potential for missed water use in low density/rural counties, potentially lowquality per capita water and electric use estimates and a dearth of demographic data lead me to
focus my analysis on higher density counties in both states.
Data Cleansing
some extenuating circumstances well-informed estimates are allowable. A review of WWTP
discharge data suggests that in some cases monthly flows are estimated to be the “design flow”
of the treatment facility.
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As discussed earlier, electric load data for both Texas and New York State is very consistent and
apparently noise free (NYISO, n.d.) (ERCOT, n.d.). WWTP data is not (USEPA, n.d.). The primary
differences in data quality between WWTP flow data and all the other data sets used are data
collection methods and data quality review. Electric load data is generated electronically. It is used
for system maintenance and upgrade planning as well as for billing and international business
purposes. Energy utilities and the independent systems operators have internal methods of
ensuring high quality data. ACS data is used extensively for urban planning, economic and
business planning and is rigorously reviewed prior to publication. National Climate Data Center
information is similarly used for economic and business planning for sectors vulnerable to
climactic inputs. The data sets are rigorously reviewed, and weaknesses are clearly identified
(NCDC, 2014).
WWTP data is part of the regulatory process (USEPA, n.d.).As noted on the echo.epa website data
available through ECHO is “as reported to the original source databases” (ibid.) The migration of
data from many jurisdictions to multiple national program databases is a challenging task. Some
state and local jurisdictions directly enter data to national databases, while others maintain their
own databases and transfer data to EPA through batch processing (ibid.). Scholars note that budget
cuts and staff reductions at the EPA can reduce enforcement actions and the quality of reported
data (Ringquist, 1995). In 2007, Rest and Halpern (2007) noted “suppression, manipulation,
disrespect, and disregard of our federal science and scientists has become widespread and
pervasive “. The impact of the Trump administration on environmental quality data had been
widely documented (Fredrickson et al., 2018), (leBel, 2018). Varying political support of public
health and environmental regulations hampers collection of complete data sets. Currently,
regulatory oversight is egregiously underfunded and understaffed (McNabb, 2018). Inconsistent
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funding of public health and environmental data collection and enforcement creates “a data rich
but information poor regulatory environment” (Ward et al., 1986). Collection of DMR data from
the USEPA ECHO website resulted in data sets not only are large segments of individual facility
data missing but flow numbers often varied by several orders of magnitude from year to year.
There is some disagreement as to how to best “cleanse” a large data set. Computer science scholars
Maletic and Marcus (2000) maintain that manual data cleansing can introduce more errors that it
removes. Others insist that some manual data cleansing is required in most cases (Rahm & Do,
2000). Data quality issues can be sorted into two bins; single-source problems and multi-source
problems; redundant data entries and differ labels for the same piece of information (ibid.). Single
source problems include ‘illegal,’ missing values and non-unique values. I cleansed the 2007-2015
New York State and I Texas DMR data sets manually to resolve two types of errors; 1, incorrect
transcription of plant flow records, and 2, missing plant flow records. Plant flow records in excess
of 3 times plant design flow were considered suspect and either removed or verified. Plants with
missing flow data for the entire 2007-2015 sample period were removed. Plants with design flows
less than 1 million gallons daily (MGD) and with missing data were removed entirely from the data
set. Data for plants with design flows greater than 1 MGD but less than 10 MGD were compared to
the sum of monthly design flows for the county. Facilities with missing data that account for less
than 1% of the total county design flow were also removed for the entire year. Missing data for
facilities that made up a significant portion of the countywide design flow resulted in removal of
the entire county flow calculation for those months.
Analytical Methods
Predicting resource use and demand forecasting is a fundamental business problem (Hong & Fan
2016). The electric industry employs statistical methods to predict electric use/load for a range of
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time scales. Hong (2016) evaluated three different types of techniques using data from a medium
sized midwestern utility. Hong’s results show multiple linear regression models outperforming
other methods within that specific context (Hong & Fan, 2016). While wastewater generation and
water use data are gathered at a much less granular time scale similar factors impact water use
behavior. Water use modelers in the American arid west test a similar range of techniques.
Gentzler and Nims (2005) used a “straightforward linear regression model to consider the
differences in total summertime residential water demand across several years. In my analysis I
used multivariate linear regressions to estimate relationships between wastewater generation,
temperature and demographics.
An open access cross platform statistical platform for econometric analysis called “Gretl” was
used for data analysis (Cottrell et al., 2019). “Gretl is a cross-platform software package for
econometric analysis, written in the C programming language. It is free, open-source software”
(ibid.). GRETL stands for GNU regression, econometrics and time series library. Gretl can be us
to compute least-squares, weighted least squares, nonlinear least squares, instrumental variables
least squares, logit, probit, tobit and several time series estimators. For these analyses, the
Ordinary Least Squares mode was used.

Chapter 1.3 - Results & Conclusion
What are the relationships between electricity use, water consumption, weather and climate?
The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship. My analysis attempts to disprove the null
hypothesis.
Current and Future Vulnerabilities
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In high population density parts of Texas and New York State, high electric demand is associated
with hot weather. In Texas, the nexus of electricity generation, agricultural and municipal water
demand can impact electricity availability in hot dry weather. The primary conflict in Texas is
between agriculture/irrigation and all other uses (LCRA,2016). In New York state, residential and
commercial electric demand and water supply/wastewater treatment electric demand can intersect
in a hot weather feedback loop leading to localized grid failures. In extreme circumstances this
feedback loop can threaten water supply and wastewater treatment (Pate et al, 2007). While New
York State power generation and water treatment facilities have not co-failed yet, this is no
guarantee for the future. For Texas, energy intensive water treatment may worsen overlapping
water demand. In this chapter, I discuss the results of my analysis of electric use and domestic
water use (WWTPQ) patterns and consider the impact of evolving patterns of land use, regional
climate and evolving populations.
Temperatures in Texas run from moderate to extremely hot. In New York state, the upstate winter
to downstate summer temperature differential can be as much as 100 degrees F. The figures below
show how electric use varies with seasons and by extension with temperature.
Air conditioning consumes a huge amount of electricity in both states; however, electricity is used
for indoor climate control in both hot and cold weather. Winter months, December and January
of both states see a secondary electric use peak in higher density regions. These wintertime peaks
reflect increased lighting load in all counties. There are also wintertime electric heating load peaks
in Texas and in counties in western New York.8. Temperature is not the entire story of electric use.

8Some

New Yorkers in the service territory of the FitzPatrick and Ginna nuclear power plants in
western New York heat with electricity in winter months.
(www.nyshcr.org/Programs/WeatherizationAssistance/2018-Wx-State-Plan.pdf)
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In both states a range of demographic and land use parameters also influence electricity use. High
density areas are described as “load pockets” in the electric industry.
Figure 1.4a (ERCOT.com)

9

Figure 1.4b (Data from NYISO.com)

The scale of these graphs obscures the details of rural/low density load zones in both Texas and
New York state. These zones have less reliable WWTPQ data and as such are less important than
the top 3 zones which are population centers.
9
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Figure 1.5a

Figure 1.5b
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Flow to wastewater treatment plants (WWTPQ) also follows density patterns (US EPA, 2016).
There are more WWTPs in higher density regions. Lack of consistently available WWTPQ data for
rural counties limits the value of comparing NYISO or ERCOT load zone electric use with zone
aggregated wastewater flows (US EPA, n.d.). It is possible however to compare estimated county
wide electric use with county wide WWTPQ. It is also possible to compare zone wide per person
electric use to county wide per person WWTPQ.
My review of scholarship on the energy water nexus, has uncovered scant research on the
intersection between user behavior and high- temperature stress on electricity and water systems.
This analysis focuses on non-heating/air conditioning seasons. The Texas non-heating season runs
from February to November (ERCOT, 2016). In New York state air conditioning season is May 1 st
through October 1st (NYISO, n.d.). As discussed earlier, wastewater flow data includes a smaller
portion of the population in low density counties than in high density10 counties. To evaluate the
extent of this problem, I modeled wastewater generation vs electric use in counties with
populations greater than 320 persons/sq. mi.11 the national average metropolitan area population
density in 2000. I also modeled wastewater generation in South Eastern New York (SENY), a set of
8 very high-density counties that correspond very closely to New York Independent system
Operator (NYISO) load zones. These counties also constitute a coastal high-density mega-region.
Questions & Analysis
The question to be answered in this set of analyses is “What are the relationships between water
use, electricity use, weather and climate?” The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship. My
“Statewide” in this case means counties within the electricity independent system operator
territory, ERCOT in Texas and NYISO in New York state that had enough good quality WWTPQ
data to be statistically analyzed.
11 US census: average US urban density calculated from the 2000 census=> total population in
metropolitan areas/total land area
10
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goal in asking this question is to understand the vulnerability of linked electricity and water
systems in hot weather specifically in urban centers. Correlations between electricity use,
wastewater generation (as a proxy for water use) and heat would suggest critical service delivery
vulnerability that could spin out of control during heatwaves. Regional scale water shortages
have reduced cooling water availability for power plants and signaled municipal water rationing
in the arid west (Pate et al., 2007). How does user behavior could drive this outcome? Are
relationships and vulnerability different in different climates?
Explanatory Variables
Demographic variables were included in these analyses to capture the impact of patterns of
habitation and affluence on water and electricity use. Population density was calculated using
population and geographic area data taken from the 2010 census. The impact of patterns of
habitation were investigated comparing housing data to wastewater generation and electric load.
Housing data was taken from the 2010 census also. Several variables initially included in the data
gathering process had little or no statistically significant impact on the variation of collected water
and electric use data; Number of housing units proved to have less descriptive power than
population density. Different demographic variables had statistically significant impacts on water
and electricity use in each state. People per household and the number of rooms in the house were
included in both states to reveal the influence of crowding. In both Texas and New York State,
building age was correlated to increased resource use, suggesting a relationship to mechanical
efficiency. the older the building the more likely higher water and electricity use suggesting waste
through leaking plumbing and poor insulation. Affluence was measured as median household
income in both states. In New York State, the value of owner-occupied housing and % rent
burdened households were affluence indicators. In Texas, the percentage of owner-occupied
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housing units and the percent of population living at or below the poverty line were indicators of
affluence. These data were taken from American Community Survey (ACS) 2009-2013 quick facts.
Climate impact on water and electricity use are assessed using data from Texas in the arid
southwestern US and New York State in the cooler wetter north-east. There are many factors in
addition to climate that can influence resource consumption. As noted earlier, affluence and
patterns of habitation can impact consumption. Previous research suggests that hot weather
electricity use does not increase with wealth in all circumstances (Link, Klein et al.,2015). Very
affluent users living in smaller residences in very high-density areas may use the same or less
electricity per person than moderately affluent users in large residences in lower density areas
(Link, Klein et al 2015). I included demographic variables to capture the impact of wealth,
density and residence size and building age on water and electric use. Energy and water efficiency
initiatives in the US focus attention on old and leaking systems (NYSERDA, 2019, 2010). I
included building age as an indicator of inefficient building systems. I examined county wide use
as well as per person use to understand how individual behavior diverges from regional water
and electric demand. I expected to find that water use tracks with electric use and affluent
residents in larger residences in lower density counties would use more water and electricity per
person than residents in higher density areas living in smaller residences. I also expected to find
county wide water use increases with population and population density. Variables included in
this analysis are as follows.
Dependent variables modeled are;
WWTP
Q

Monthly wastewater generation by county (million gallons)
Monthly per capita wastewater generation (gallons)
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Demographic variables included in statistical modeling included:
County population density
Median household income
Affluence/
Poverty

% of population rent burdened
% of population at or below the poverty line
Average value of owner-occupied residences

Patterns of

Average number of rooms per residence

Habitation

% owner occupied residences
Persons per household

Efficiency

Average building age

Electric Use/Cascading Per person monthly electric use (megawatt hours)
Failure Risk

Per county monthly electric use (megawatt hours)
Per NYISO load zone electric use (megawatt hours)

Weather variables used are:
Average Temperature-average of county weather stations (degrees F)
Average Precipitation- average of county weather stations(inches)
Cooling Degree Days (degree days)
With the goals and limitations discussed in mind here are the results of my analysis;
New York
There are 62 counties in New York state, 21 of those counties, mostly rural and low density did not
have enough consistently good quality WWTPQ data to be used in statistical analysis. The
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modeling discussed here included demographic, WWTPQ, weather and electric use data for 41
counties in the state as well as for counties with population density greater than or equal to 320
persons per square mile and the very high-density counties of South Eastern New York. In the
following discussion the phrase statewide will refer to the 41 counties with useable data.
What are the relationships between water use, electricity use, weather in New York State? Based on
the Gretl OLS model outputs, the figures below suggest that some correlations do exist.
Figures X.a and X.b show the results of Ordinary Least Squares analysis of correlations between
temperature and summertime water use as wastewater generation in New York State by county and
per person. The question answered by this set of analyses is,” What is the relationship between
average monthly temperature and monthly wastewater generation?”. The null hypothesis is that
there is no discernable relationship.
Table 1.a New York State wastewater generation by county compared to summertime average
monthly temperature.

Dependent variable: Million Gallons of Wastewater per county per month

all counties
population
density > 320
SENY

Constant
average temperature
R-squared
Constant
cooling degree days
R-squared
Constant
cooling degree days
R-squared

coefficient
−3338.93
79.6923
0.032582
2950.85
11.6771
0.069366

std. error
585.313
9.26227

p-value
1.32e-08***
1.44e-017***

285.601
1.56491

1.76e-023***
2.38e-013***

5714.37
9.21163
0.042288

506.745
2.28209

1.53e-025***
6.60e-05***
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Table 1.a suggests that summertime temperatures can explain a small but statistically significant
portion of the variation in county wastewater generation in all counties evaluated as well as in the
high and very high-density counties containing the urban centers of northern and central New York
State as well as super dense New York City urban mega-region. For urban population density > 320
and SENY counties increases of a single cooling degree day correspond to 11 and 9 million gallons
increases in monthly wastewater generated county wide. The largest R values are also for New York
State Urban counties.

Table 1.b New York State per person wastewater generation compared to summertime average
monthly temperature
Dependent variable: Gallons of Wastewater per county per person

all counties
population
density
> 320
SENY

Constant
cooling degree days
R-squared
Constant
cooling degree days
R-squared
Constant
cooling degree days
R-squared

coefficient
2808.65
3.32957
0.017243

std. error
71.5758
0.533373

p-value
2.61e-256***
5.14e-010***

4083.23

139.683

7.84e-126***

1.81612
0.007481

0.765375

0.0179**

4131.34
2.68403
0.020092

216.675
0.975781

6.65e057***
0.0062***

Table 1.b suggests that summertime temperatures can explain a small but statistically significant
portion of the variation in per person wastewater generation in all counties evaluated as well as in
the high and very high-density counties containing the urban centers of northern and central New
York State as well as super dense New York City urban mega-region. In SENY an increase of 2
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cooling degree days can correlate to a 1 gallon per month increase in per person monthly
wastewater generation.
Table 1.c shows the results of Ordinary Least Squares analysis of correlations between precipitation
and summertime water use as wastewater generation in New York State by county. The question
answered by this set of analyses is” What is the relationship between summertime monthly
precipitation and monthly wastewater generation?”. The null hypothesis is that there is no
discernable relationship. I included precipitation in the analysis to understand the impact of storm
runoff and storm water infiltration on wastewater generation as a proxy for water use.
Precipitation correlation coefficients range from -18 to 64. P values for precipitation are all greater
than 5% and as such suggest that variations in precipitation are not linked to variations in
wastewater generation. The outcome of these analysis does not allow me to reject the null
hypothesis. Precipitation alone does not have a statistically significant relationship to wastewater
generation by county. This result suggests that storm water flow to wastewater treatment plants
will not significantly impact monthly wastewater generation averages. This outcome supports the
use of wastewater generation as a proxy for water use in New York State.
Table 1.c - New York State per county wastewater generation compared to precipitation in inches

Dependent variable: Million Gallons of Wastewater per county per month
coefficient
std. error
all counties
population density
> 320
SENY

p-value

constant

1707.13

175.283

5.47e-022***

average precipitation
constant

−18.1534
4594.99

37.3979
399.583

0.6274
2.83e-028***

average precipitation

−17.8094

83.2005

0.8306

constant

7033.95

641.726

average precipitation

64.5001

134.641

2.37e-024***
0.6322
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Table 1.d.and 1.e shows the results of Ordinary Least Squares analysis of correlations between a
range of demographic variables and summertime water use as wastewater generation in New York
State. The question answered by this set of analyses is “What is the relationship between affluence
and patterns of habitation and summertime water use as wastewater generation?” The null
hypothesis is that there is no discernable relationship.
Table 1.d compares per county wastewater generation to demographics for the 41 counties with
adequate data, all high-density counties with population density greater than 320 persons per
square mile and the super dense counties of the South-Eastern New York urban mega-region
(SENY). The models constructed with these variables explained over 75% of the variation in county
wide wastewater generation in all groupings. Average building age and the average number of
rooms per residence had large positive correlations to county wastewater generation in all three
groupings. The average number of rooms per residence had the largest coefficients of correlation,
ranging from 6155.7 to 15886.4. This result confirms previous analyses of patterns of habitation
and electric use (Link, Klein et al, 2015). The average value of owner-occupied residences had a
very small positive but statistically significant correlation to county wastewater generation. % of
population at or below the poverty line had a strong negative correlation to county wastewater
generation in all groupings. Interestingly, median household income had a small negative
correlation with county wastewater generation in all groupings with the largest negative correlation
coefficient of -1.12 in SENY. The average number of persons per household only had a statistically
significant contribution to wastewater generation variability in SENY. In SENY, the average
number of persons per household had a very large negative correlation to county wastewater
generation.
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Table 1.d New York State per county wastewater generation compared to demographics.
Dependent variable: Million Gallons of Wastewater per county per
month
coefficient
std. error
constant
−24390.6
2076.77
average value of owner0.0479533 0.00201332
occupied residences
% of population at or
−111.933
23.9784
below the poverty line
all
median household income
−0.446671
0.0211899
counties
average building age
90.6768
14.2995
average number of rooms
6155.67
429.378
per residence
county population density
0.0473613
0.0109203
R-squared
0.773729
constant
−29472.9
2893.49
average value of owner0.0702545 0.00279084
occupied residences
% of population at or
−356.238
40.7029
population
below the poverty line
density >
median household income
−0.760191
0.0332037
320
average building age
79.6308
23.5959
average number of rooms
9957.66
568.468
per residence
R-squared
0.805506
constant
−32281.9
7980.25
average value of owner0.0850133 0.00315706
occupied residences
% of population at or
−854.267
66.9216
below the poverty line
SENY
median household income
−1.15554
0.0496847
average building age
364.632
25.4133
average number of rooms
15886.4
1037.38
per residence
persons per household
−8299.02
3416.3
R-squared
0.906793
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p-value
1.58e-030***
1.45e-106***
3.31e-06***
1.43e-086***
3.01e-010***
9.00e-044***
1.54e-05***
5.62e-023***
4.19e-103***
1.26e-017***
2.35e-089***
0.0008***
2.79e-058***
6.31e-05***
8.02e-091***
2.12e-031***
1.48e-075***
9.39e-038***
9.67e-042***
0.0156**

These results paint a picture of large older residences in counties with fewer people living in
poverty generating more wastewater in the summer. In SENY counties increased summertime
wastewater generation also correlates to households with fewer residents!
Table 1.e New York State per county wastewater generation compared to demographics.
Dependent variable: Gallons of Wastewater per person per
month
coefficient

all counties

population
density > 320

SENY

constant
average value of owneroccupied residences
% of population at or
below the poverty line
median household income
average building age
average number of rooms
per residence
county population density
R-squared
constant
average value of owneroccupied residences
% of population rent
burdened
median household income
average building age
average number of rooms
per residence
county population density
R-squared
constant
average value of owneroccupied residences
median household income
average building age
persons per household
R-squared

std. error

p-value

−4778.30

2161.09

0.0272**

0.00987511

0.00209506

2.66e-06***

−122.123

24.952

1.09e-06***

−0.135673
102.653

0.0220503
14.8801

9.75e-010***
7.72e-012***

1541.02

446.812

0.0006***

0.0476447
0.280709
−3629.49

0.0113637

2.92e-05***

1472.96

0.0139 **

0.027552

0.00135511

3.31e-074***

−41576.9

1362.11

1.12e-135***

−0.288278
57.2753

0.0137826
11.061

1.30e-077***
2.85e-07 ***

4126.19

291.212

9.18e-04***

0.014238
0.786836
−45620.9

0.00728971

0.0512*

2507.54

5.42e-054***

0.0384169

0.00149953

1.34e-085***

−0.103158
22.8824
14723
0.860587

0.00529496
12.2263
864.864

1.58e-059***
0.0620*
5.41e-049***
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Table 1.e compares per person summertime wastewater generation to demographics for the 41
counties with adequate data, all high-density counties with population density greater than 320
persons per square mile and the super dense counties of the South-Eastern New York urban megaregion (SENY). The OLS models constructed with these variables explained over 25% of the
variation in per person wastewater generation in all groupings. OLS modeling in high density
counties was the most successful.
The results of OLS modeling of per person summertime wastewater generation are consistent with
per county modeling. Correlation coefficients for % of population rent burdened12 or % of
population living in poverty are large and negative. Correlation coefficients for building age and the
number of rooms per residence are large and positive. Average household income has very small
positive correlation coefficients in all groupings as does the average value of owner-occupied
residences and county population density. The correlation coefficient for persons per household
flipped from strongly negative in OLS models of SENY per county wastewater generation to
strongly positive in SENY per person wastewater generation. In SENY, the average number of
rooms did not make a statistically significant contribution to model explanatory value and was not
included. These outcomes suggest that persons per residence may be an alternate for rooms per
residence in SENY. The Correlation between old residences in low poverty areas and wastewater
generation in summer appears in per person wastewater analyses also.
Table 1.f, 1.g, and 1.h show the results of OLS modeling of relationships between summertime
water use as wastewater generation and electricity use. The question answered by this set of
analyses is “What is the relationship between summertime electricity use and summertime water
use/wastewater generation in New York State?”. The null hypothesis is that there is no
12

Rent burdened populations spend in excess of 1/3 of household income on rent
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relationship. The unit of electric use in these analyses is megawatt hour; 1 megawatt hour is 1,000
kilowatt hours. A megawatt hour per county per month correlation coefficient of 1 in the all
counties model in table W.a would suggest that a 1000-kilowatt hour increase in county wide
electric use would correlate to a 1 million gallon per county per month increase in wastewater
generation. The average American generates between 3,000 and 6,000 gallons of wastewater
monthly. A community of 200 water users could easily generate 1 million gallons of wastewater per
month.
Table 1.f below shows relationships in all three geographic groupings are statistically significant.
Monthly electric use can explain as much as 39% of wastewater generation in 41 counties of New
York State. Correlation between county wastewater generation and electricity use has less
explanatory power in all New York state counties with population density greater than or equal
to 320 people per square miles.
Table 1.f New York State per county wastewater generation compared to electricity use
Dependent variable: Million Gallons of Wastewater per county per month
coefficient
std. error p-value
constant
484.525
58.4234 1.12e-015 ***
all counties mega Watt hr. per
0.002278 0.000129 3.44e-054 ***
county per month
R-squared
0.394111
constant
3167.13
143.963 1.66e-041 ***
population
density > mega Watt hr. per
0.000451
0.000154 0.0043 ***
county per month
320
R-squared
0.073776
constant
2686.11
726.073 0.0003 ***
mega Watt hr. per Load
SENY
0.001326 0.000166 2.03e-014 ***
Zone per month
R-squared 0.1566
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County summertime wastewater generation in SENY did not have a statistically significant
correlation to county electricity use, so the OLS model was generated using NYISO Load
zone electricity use. Across the state load zones can cover several counties and a range of
demographics. In SENY however load zones are smaller and aggregate counties with similar
density and demographic characteristics (see Figure 1.5 a & b).

Table 1.g New York State per person wastewater generation compared to per person
electricity use
Dependent variable: Gallons of Wastewater per person per month

all
counties

populatio
n density
> 320
SENY

constant
mega Watt hr. per
person per month
R-squared
constant
mega Watt hr. per
person per month
R-squared
constant
mega Watt hr. per
person per month
R-squared

coefficient
3116.67

std. error
49.6308

p-value
0 ***

0.005979

0.002131

0.0051 ***

0.003291
4318.73

100.28

2.97e-204 ***

-9.81E-04

2.41E-03

0.6838

0.000223
4707.22

168.645

2.14e-090 ***

−0.0032299

0.002756

0.2421

0.003976

Table 1.g above shows only the OLS model for all counties generates a statistically significant
coefficient of correlation for per person monthly electric use and per person monthly wastewater
generation. This model suggests that a 6 kilo Watt hour increase in per person monthly electric use
correlates to a 1gallon increase in monthly wastewater generation. A standard American toilet
flushes between 1.6 for ultra-low flow models and 3.6 gallons for older models. The average
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American shower generates more than 17 gallons of wastewater (home water works, n.d.). Three
ceiling fans left on for 24 hours could use 6 kilo Watt hours of electricity (Silicon Valley Power,
n.d.) It is certainly likely that an increase in ceiling fan use could correlate to an increase in
showers!
Relationships between personal water use as wastewater generation and personal monthly
electricity use were more difficult to model. No high-density county correlation coefficients for per
person monthly electric use and per person monthly wastewater generation were statistically
significant. Because individual user summertime behavior is particularly important in high density
counties with extreme grid vulnerability an additional set of OLS models were tested. Table 1.h
below show the results of those modeling runs.
Table 1.h New York State per person wastewater generation compared to alternate electricity use
variables
Dependent variable: Gallons of Wastewater per person per month
coefficient
std. error p-value
3462.82
147.424 4.96e-044 ***
constant
populatio mega Watt hr. per
0.00015
0.0005409
0.0009 ***
n density county per month
81
> 320
R-squared
0.098646
SENY

SENY

2804.52
115.518 2.98E-40 ***
constant
0.000112
mega Watt hr. per
0.0009151
2.48e-012***
1
county per month
R-squared
0.436522
2551.74 302.605 9.44e-016 ***
constant
mega Watt hr. per
Load Zone per
0.0005437 6.92E-05 4.99e-014***
month
0.152246
R-squared
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All relationships between individual monthly wastewater generation and either county wide or
NYISO load zone wide energy use were statistically significant. OLS models of per person
wastewater generation correlation with electricity use in all New York State counties with
population density greater than 320 people per square mile. In the medium high-density areas in
western New York load zones can include both very rural and higher density areas. Rural water
users are much more likely to dispose of wastewater on site (APA, 2016). For this reason,
wastewater is not a good proxy for water use in rural counties. Wastewater DMR report discharge
data will not capture water use or wastewater generation for all rural households Modeling for
counties with high rural to urban diversity will not accurately describe relationships between
wastewater generation and electricity use. Furthermore, on site, gravity flow-based wastewater
disposal removes wastewater treatment from the electric grid. For this reason, rural and exurban
counties are also less likely to suffer from cascading essential service delivery failures. In SENY,
counties are high to very high density limiting the use of on-site sewage disposal. SENY NYISO
load zones combine from 1 to 5 counties each, all with similar densities and on-site sewage disposal
profiles. This makes wastewater generation a better proxy for SENY water use. It also means
correlations between wastewater generation and electric use easier to capture
Texas
195 counties in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) service territory had enough
consistently good wastewater treatment plant flow (WWTPQ) data for statistical analysis. The
counties left out of the analysis were rural, very low density and mostly in the western part of the
state. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) modeling discussed here included demographic, WWTPQ,
weather and electric use data for 195 counties in the state as well as for counties with population
density greater than or equal to 320 people per square. In the following discussion the phrase
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statewide will refer to the 195 counties with useable data. High density counties were examined for
2 reasons.
1- high density regions have tightly linked resource delivery systems (Zimmerman 2004).
and linked vulnerabilities.
2- differences in habitation patterns and in wastewater disposal methods across Texas,
increases likelihood that WWTP DMR data does not capture the extent of wastewater
generation and water use in low density counties (APA 2016).
What are the relationships between water use, electricity use, weather in Texas? Based on the Gretl
OLS model outputs, the tables below suggest that some correlations do exist.
Tables 1.j and 1.k show the results of OLS analysis of correlations between temperature and
summertime water use as wastewater generation in Texas by county and per person. The question
answered by this set of analyses is,” What is the relationship between average monthly temperature
and monthly wastewater generation?”. The null hypothesis is that there is no discernable
relationship.
Table 1.j Texas monthly wastewater generation by county compared to summertime average
monthly temperature
Dependent variable: Million Gallons of Wastewater per county per month
std.
coefficient error
p-value
226.984
13.864
constant
1.92E-59***
all
average
0.87629
9.51E-02
3.69e-020 ***
counties temperature
0.008755
R-squared
7663.91
730.4
2.76e-021 ***
constant
urban
average
9.57E+00
0.3682
counties temperature
8.63E+00
R-squared
0.00354
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Tables 1.j and 1.k both suggest that there is a very small but statistically significant correlation
between temperature and wastewater generation both on a per county basis and on a per person
basis across all 195 counties.
Table 1.k Texas per person monthly wastewater generation compared to summertime average
monthly temperature
Dependent variable: Gallons of Wastewater per person per month
std.
coefficient
error
p-value
1559.39
10.932
0.000***
constant
all
1.23e-026
8.03E-01
7.50E-02
counties average temperature
***
R-squared
0.01179
4.07e-031
3605.45
266.04
constant
***
urban
-4.59E+00 3.49E+00
0.189
counties average temperature

Conversely OLS models of temperature and wastewater generation were inconclusive for the higher
density counties at both the individual user scale and the county scale.
Table 1.l below shows the results of OLS analysis of correlations between precipitation wastewater
generation in Texas by county. The question answered by this set of analyses is,” What is the
relationship between summertime monthly precipitation and monthly wastewater generation?”.
The null hypothesis is that there is no discernable relationship. I included precipitation in the
analysis to understand the impact of storm runoff and storm water infiltration on wastewater
generation.
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Precipitation correlation coefficients range from -15.9 to .734. The P value for statewide OLS
models indicate that the correlation between precipitation and per county wastewater generation is
statistically significant. The R value however is less than 1%. The P value for the high-density
county is not, suggesting that variations in precipitation are not linked to variations in wastewater
generation in high density counties. This result may suggest that the impact of storm water flow on
wastewater treatment plants varies significantly from high density counties to medium density
counties. It suggests that wastewater generation is a better proxy for water use in urban counties
than in the rest of the state. This outcome may be the result of the impact of flooding on
wastewater treatment plants in non-urban and exurban parts of the state.
Table 1.l- Texas per county wastewater generation compared to precipitation in inches
Dependent variable: Million Gallons of Wastewater per county per month

all
counties

urban
counties

constant
average
precipitation
R-squared
constant
average
precipitation

coefficient
274.1

std. error
12.787

p-value
1.28e-099 ***

0.734

9.70E-02

5.04e-014 ***

0.00588
7125.22

269.08

1.21e-071 ***

-15.9

10.1

0.118

Tables 1.m and 1.n below show the results of OLS analysis of correlations between a range of
demographic variables and summertime wastewater generation in Texas. The question answered
by this set of analyses is “What is the relationship between affluence and patterns of habitation and
summertime wastewater generation?” The null hypothesis is that there is no discernable
relationship.
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Table 1.m compares per county wastewater generation to demographics for the 195 counties with
adequate data and to all high-density counties with population density greater than 320 persons
per square mile. An interesting pattern emerged. Several patterns that appeared in the 191 counties
analysis reappeared in analysis of high-density counties with larger correlation coefficients.
Table 1.m Texas per county monthly wastewater generation compared to demographics.
Dependent variable: Million Gallons of Wastewater per County
per Month
coefficient
std. error
constant
633.875
91.4702
average number of rooms
−151.889
14.1594
per residence

all counties

urban
counties –
population
density
>320

average building age

8.43449

median household income

−0.0178631

p-value
4.49E12***
1.08E-26***

0.660241
0.00089269
6

4.56E-37***

4.16396

0.748937

2.77E-08***

144.081

14.3406

−14.7433

1.32683

1.24E-23***
1.65E-28***

2.73E-87***

% owner occupied
residences
persons per household
% of population at or
below the poverty line
county population
density
R-Squared
constant
average number of rooms
per residence
average building age
median household income
% owner occupied
residences

9.77792

0.0433514

0.875826
−581702

75802.6

4.96e-013 ***

−6119.78

728.486

4.94e-015 ***

6156.75
5.42172

711.337
0.731771

9.36e-016 ***
2.51e-012 ***

1412.44

213.347

2.58e-010 ***

R-squared

0.673217

0.00***

For all 191 counties, Table 1.m reveals large positive correlation between county wide wastewater
generation and building age, and % owner occupied residences. Statewide population density has
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an unsurprising positive correlation to county wide wastewater generation. Correlations are large
and negative between county wide wastewater generation and the average number of rooms per
residence. A large negative correlation between county wide wastewater generation and % of
population living at or below the poverty line was calculated.
The model suggests that wastewater generation is higher in older, smaller, low occupancy, owner
occupied residences in less impoverished areas. The OLS model accounted for 87% of variation in
county wide wastewater generation.
In high-density counties, the OLS model accounted for 67% of wastewater generation variation.
Table 1.m reveals large positive correlation between county wide wastewater generation and
building age, and % owner occupied residences. Correlations are large and negative between
county wide wastewater generation and the average number of rooms per residence for highdensity counties. The OLS model for high density counties suggests that wastewater generation is
higher in older, smaller, owner occupied residences in moderately affluent areas. Table 1.n
compares per person wastewater generation to demographics for the 195 counties with adequate
data and to all high-density counties with population density greater than 320 persons per
square mile.
For the 191 counties, Table 1.n shows negative correlation between per person wastewater
generation and the average number of rooms per residence, % owner occupied residences, % of
population at or below the poverty line and to a much lesser extent median value of owneroccupied residences. Positive correlation coefficients were calculated for persons per household,
average building age, population density and median household income. This model suggests that
per person wastewater generation is greater in high occupancy, smaller, older, owner occupied
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residences in higher density, less impoverished areas. The OLS model accounted for 28% of
variation in per person wastewater generation.
For urban counties with population density greater than 320 people per square mile, table 1.n
shows negative correlations coefficients for average building age, % owner occupied residences,
and median household income. Only the average number of rooms per residence has a positive
coefficient of correlation and a large one at that. This OLS model suggests that in newer, larger
rented residences in less affluent regions per person wastewater treatment is larger. The OLS
model accounted for 48% of variation in per person wastewater generation.
Table 1.n Texas per person monthly wastewater generation compared to demographics
Dependent variable: Gallons of Wastewater per Person per Month
coefficient
std. error
constant
6067.21
183.377
average number of rooms per
−290.349
28.389
residence
average building age
3.82701
1.50786
median household income
0.0305206
0.00181346
% owner occupied residences
−63.8784
1.47735
all
persons per household
356.55
28.2941
counties
median value of owner−0.0071889 0.00045106
occupied residences
9
4

urban
counties
–
populatio
n density
>320

p-value
2.41E-227***
2E-24***
0.0112**
1.17E-62***
0.00***
4.01E-36***
1.85E-56***

% of population at or below
the poverty line

−8.73166

2.52316

0.0005***

county population density
R-Squared

1.05555
0.281347

0.0824495

3.22E-37***

constant

227219

34797.5

4.29e-010***

2122.61

334.414

1.19e-09***

−1838.11
−2.11595
−849.860
0.483002

326.542
0.335922
97.9377

5.34e-08***
1.55e-09***
8.08e-016***

average number of rooms per
residence
average building age
median household income
% owner occupied residences
R-squared
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Table 1.o and 1.p show the results of OLS modeling of relationships between summertime
wastewater generation and electricity use. The question answered by this set of analyses is “What is
the relationship between summertime electricity use and summertime water use/wastewater
generation in Texas?”. The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship. The unit of electric use
in these analyses is megawatt hour; 1 megawatt hour is 1,000 kilowatt hours.
Table 1.o Texas per county monthly wastewater generation and electricity consumption
Dependent variable: Million Gallons of Wastewater per county per
month
std.
coefficient
error
p-value
3.38458
6.954
0.627
constant
all
mega Watt hr. per
0.0020542
1.29E-05
0.00 ***
counties county per month
8
0.724
R-squared
4005.81
444.85
8.59e-017 ***
constant
mega Watt hr. per
4.19e-014 ***
urban
0.0001066
0.00013
county
per
month
counties
R-squared

0.221034

Table 1.p Texas per person monthly wastewater generation and electricity consumption
Dependent variable: Gallons of Wastewater per person per month
std.
coefficient
error
p-value
1546.18
1546.18
0.00000***
constant
all
mega Watt hr. per person per
0.00044288 1.89E-05
5.31e-118 ***
counties month
0.05394
R-squared
3884.81
177.811
6.24e-058 ***
constant
urban
mega Watt hr. per person per −0.00021217
5.29E-05
8.18e-05 ***
counties month
5
R-squared
0.06565
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Discussion
OLS models including both temperature and demographic explanatory variables from the Texas
statewide dataset offered no increase in explanatory power over the models using demographic
data alone. OLS Models including temperature data and demographic data for higher density
counties had no statistically significant outcomes. The statewide OLS model for New York State
generated statistically significant relationships between county wide wastewater production,
demographics and temperature variables but had less explanatory power than demographics alone.
OLS modeling for higher density New York State counties using both temperature and
demographic variables generated conflicting results and were not included in this analysis.
No statistically significant correlations were found between monthly precipitation and monthly
wastewater generation in any of the New York State geographic sectors during the summer. Other
OLS models for New York State were more decisive. The null hypotheses; that there are no
relationships between temperature, electricity use, patterns of habitation and affluence and
wastewater generation can be rejected. In South Eastern New York (SENY) explanatory
demographic variables accounted for over 86% of per person and per-county monthly wastewater
generation in summer. In all sample groups, demographics and population density were more
important than weather; temperature and precipitation. Ordinary least squares (OLS) modeling
was able to simulate some wastewater generation variability for both Texas and New York state, at
both the county wide and per capita scales. Increasing New York state population density resulted
in more explanatory power of the OLS models using demographic variables.
Temperature or temperature as cooling degree days exhibited positive correlation to wastewater
generation in all New York State OLS models as well. All correlations were statistically significant.
The most powerful OLS model calculated the correlation between county wide wastewater
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generation in 41 of the 62 New York State counties and average monthly temperature. While the
OLS model accounted for only 3 % of the variation in wastewater generation, the correlation
coefficient was large 79, for every degree increase in monthly average temperature 79 million
gallons of additional wastewater may be generated in every county. 79 million gallons/month or
2.6 million gallons/day is comparable to water use and wastewater flows in small cities. The water
treatment facility in Lake George, New York is designed to treat 2.0 million gallons/day (US EPA,
echo). Cooling degree days had the closest correlation to wastewater generation in the higher
density New York State counties.
Summertime electric use and wastewater generation also tracked together in analyses of New York
state per county user behavior. Summertime electricity use in all New York state counties explained
as much as 39 % of variation in wastewater generation. In SENY, load zone electricity use
explained as much as 15 % of summer wastewater generation (see table Z below). Correlation
coefficients in all OLS models comparing electric use to wastewater generation were deceptively
small. The unit of measure for electric use is Megawatt hrs.; 1000 kilowatt hours. New York State
per person electricity and wastewater use modeling was less successful. Only the statewide per
person water and electric use OLS modeling generated a statistically significant result.
As discussed earlier, summertime electric grid stability is a primary concern for electric
transmission system operators. The inverse of the equation for electricity use and wastewater
generation in SENY has important implications. Table 1.q below shows the outcome of OLS
comparison of SENY summertime wastewater generation to load zone electric use. The
relationship remains, wastewater generation can explain as much as 15 % of the variation in
electric use. This relationship is significant and worth considering in the context of demand
management and critical SENY infrastructure management in hot weather.
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Table 1.q South Eastern New York summertime load zone electric use compared to county wide
monthly wastewater generation

OLS modeling for Texas was less successful in rejecting null hypotheses. Statewide, temperature
and precipitation OLS correlations with wastewater generation were statistically significant. OLS
models explained 1% or less of wastewater generation variability. Correlation coefficients for
temperature and precipitation were less than 1. OLS analyses of demographics: patterns of
habitation and affluence were more successful. 87% of statewide county wastewater generation
variability was explained by the OLS model using demographic variables. 67% of high-density
county wastewater generation was explained by OLS modeling. 28% of variation in per person
wastewater generation was explained by OLS modeling using demographic variables. 48% of highdensity county per person summertime wastewater generation was explained by demography
based OLS modeling. Only 28 % of statewide per person wastewater generation variation was
explained by demographic variables.
Across all Texas sectors for both by county and per person wastewater generation, building age,
residence size and poverty figured prominently in modeling outcomes. In all cases but per person
wastewater generation in high density counties, wastewater generation increased as building age
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increased, and as poverty and residence size decreased. Per person summertime wastewater
generation in high-density counties OLS models had the opposite results. Newer, larger, rental
residences with decreasing mean household incomes correlate to more wastewater generation. This
outcome may be inferred to describe the surge of sunbelt construction in Texas.
OLS modeling of Texas electricity use signaled correlations with wastewater generation. OLS
models explained 74% and 22% of per county wastewater generation and 5% and 6% of per person
wastewater generation in statewide and in high density counties respectively. Correlation
coefficients however were vanishingly small.
The two dependent variables considered in this analysis; per person wastewater generation and
county wide wastewater generation, speak to different questions in the resilience discourse. Per
person wastewater use addresses the question of resource use efficiency (USEPA, 2016). Many of
the models developed here suggest that both temperature and building characteristics correlate to
wastewater generation. Older buildings give rise to greater wastewater generation as do increasing
temperatures either as degrees F or as cooling degree days. This result suggests that reducing
wastewater use, water use and the associated electricity for treatment may be achieved by
upgrading plumbing and eliminating leaks. In SENY, household income correlates negatively to
wastewater use. Taken together this may suggest that increased household income enables
installation of water efficient plumbing and fixtures. More frequently however % of population
living in poverty increases with decreasing wastewater generation. In New York State, the average
number of rooms per residence has a large positive and statistically significant correlation
coefficient in all but one OLS model; per person wastewater generation in SENY. In Texas, a
similar pattern appeared, old residences in more affluent areas correlated to more wastewater
generation. In Texas smaller residence size correlated to more wastewater generation in all but 1
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model as discussed above. This result suggests that per person wastewater generation can provide
inputs to efficiency programs.
Modeling the county wide wastewater generation variable may offer insight into utility operation
during heat waves. These models offer insight into resilience at the public scale (USEPA, 2017)
(Goldstein, 2019) Several models suggest that temperature correlates with wastewater generation
in both Texas and New York state. Other explanatory variables that appear in most of the models
for county wide wastewater generation are building age, the number of rooms per residence and
affluence, either as median household income or as % of population living in poverty. Population
density correlates with wastewater generation in some models emphasizing the obvious; counties
with more people generate more wastewater than low density counties. The temperature signal is
strongest in the SENY models. As noted, the reciprocal relationship between summertime
electricity use and wastewater generation offers clues into critical infrastructure vulnerability. The
importance of residence size and building age particularly in SENY suggests a direction to be taken
in city planning, zoning policy and building codes. Currently, New York City planning constrains
building shape and size. New York City building code requires energy efficiency measures and onsite storm water management in new construction. Requiring high water efficiency appliances in
new construction and including water conservation measures as demand management strategies
could offer additional relief to electric grid stress in very hot weather.
Conclusion
Poverty emerged as a key determinant in wastewater generation in this set of analyses and had a
large negative coefficient of variation in almost all the OLS models tested. What do these
outcomes do for utility and regional planners? Data analysis indicates building age and residence
size have the most consistently significant and positive correlations to wastewater generation.
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There is an unexpectedly non-significant precipitation signal in New York State. This is an
unexpected outcome because SENY New York City counties all have combined sewers. Rainwater
and storm flow would have been expected to have impact on New York City WWTP flows. The
Texas precipitation signal is larger suggesting storm water infiltration problems. In both SENY
and high-density New York State counties smaller housing units are more resource conservative
per unit. Urban centers are still load pockets and wastewater generation hubs. While the scale of
electric load data may have obscured correlation with wastewater generation behavior both track
with temperature in the summer. In SENY, a region where an 8% change in electric use can be
worth millions of dollars (NYC CAS, n.d.) small increases (or decreases) in energy using
behaviors like wastewater generation may have important impacts on the electrical grid.
The limitations of this study are the available data. While wastewater generation data are
collected on an hourly basis in the large wastewater treatment plants in SENY and high-density
counties across New York State and Texas only monthly discharge data is available through
federal data sources. Electric use data is available through the regional independent system
operators at a very low granularity scale. The spatial and temporal disconnect of publicly
available data makes definitive statements impossible. What this analysis does suggest is that a
closer look at hourly wastewater flows in high density load zones coupled with more
geographically granular electric load data would enable a more definitive assessment of
infrastructure system overload vulnerabilities. Further work in this area requires freedom of
information act requests for data from the wastewater treatment plants in the high-density
counties of New York state and Texas.
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Q2- The Water Energy Nexus and Ecosystems Services: Potential Impacts
of IPCC Climate Projections on Water Supply and Electricity Generation - a
comparison of the Arid West and Northeastern United States.
Chapter 2.1 Background
Design and policy solutions to the Water/Energy Nexus will be different in different
geographies. Meaningful national public policy must evolve to address the range of
vulnerabilities across the U.S. (Scott et al., 2011). In this inquiry, I examined the ecosystems
services necessary to water provision for municipal supply and electricity generation in two
extremely different climates in the continental US; the arid west and the boreal northeast. I also
considered the impact of temperature and precipitation changes projected by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on water provisioning ecosystems services.
The cities considered are; a global metropolis, New York City and a regional cultural hub,
Austin, Texas. Environment, demographics and economics are all different at these two
locations. Climate projections are also different. This simplified view of present ecosystems
services and projected ecosystems services offers a basis for evolving national policy on the
Water/Energy nexus.

Water Systems of Austin, Texas and New York City
Austin, Texas and the Colorado River
The Colorado River in Texas extends from Dawson County on the Texas/New Mexico border
approximately 900 miles to the Gulf of Mexico in Matagorda Bay. “The Colorado River basin
includes 55 counties. It covers approximately 40,000 square miles. It flows from an elevation of
almost 3,000 ft. above sea level in the semi-arid west,
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Figure 2.1 The Colorado River in Texas

(LCRA, n.d.)
through the rugged canyons of the Texas Hill Country before crossing the Coastal Plains to
empty in the Gulf. Major community centers include Austin, San Angelo, Bay City, Big Spring,
Brownwood, and El Campo. Important tributaries to the Colorado include the North and South
Concho River near San Angelo; San Saba River near San Saba; Pecan Bayou near Brownwood;
Llano River near Llano; Pedernales River near Johnson City; and Barton Creek and Onion Creek
near Austin.” (TCEQ, Basin 14: Colorado River, n.d.). The management of the Colorado river
waters is divided between two regional authorities; the Upper and Lower Colorado River
Authorities.
The upper Colorado River runs through the semi-arid counties of Coke, Concho,
Crockett, Glasscock, Irion, Menard, Mitchell, Nolan, Reagan, Runnels, Schleicher, Sterling,
Taylor and Tom Green. “The Upper Colorado River Authority (UCRA) was created in 1935 to
protect the watershed of Tom Green, Coke and other contiguous counties. Prior to the 1990's,
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UCRA served primarily as a lending institution for local municipalities seeking to make
infrastructure improvements. While this continues to be a function of the Authority, UCRA has
taken the lead role in the community through involvement and participation in the Clean Rivers
Program, EPA Nonpoint Source Pollution (NPS) programming, special brush control projects,
bank stabilization efforts, the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program, storm water
management, rural water supply and education and outreach programming. Due to the success
of these endeavors, the UCRA has moved to the forefront as a leader in water quality
enhancement and preservation projects.” (Upper Colorado River Authority, n.d.) The UCRA
does not directly operate any dams or reservoirs but purchases raw water for resale to
municipalities in the service territory.
The Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA) is a conservation and reclamation district created
by the Texas Legislature in 1934, tasked with protecting the waters of the lower Colorado River
basin. LCRA manages water supplies for cities, farmers, industries and recreation along a 600mile stretch of the Texas Colorado River between San Saba County and the Gulf Coast. Colorado
River basin water is captured and stored in a series of lakes and reservoirs (LCRA About. n.d.).
The 2002 305 (b) assessment13 lists water quality in all but one Colorado river lake/reservoir as
meeting public water supply standards (TCEQ, Colorado River Basin Assessment)
The LCRA is a water utility and the regional electric utility. The LCRA operates six dams on the
reach of the Colorado River that form the Highland Lakes: Buchanan, Inks, LBJ, Marble Falls,
Travis, and Lake Austin. LCRA also operates natural gas and coal fired electricity generating
plants. Downstream of the Highland Lakes, the Colorado River winds through several counties
and eventually feeds into Matagorda Bay (LCRA, n.d.)
LCRA regulates water discharges to manage floods, and releases water for sale. It works with
communities to plan and coordinate their water and wastewater needs. LCRA also operates an
The Clean Water Act requires states to provide every two years an assessment of the quality of
all their waters (section 305(b)) and a list of those that are impaired or threatened (section
303(d)).305(b) assessment is the integrated report intended to satisfy the listing requirements
of sections 305(b) and 314 of the Clean Water Act (CWA).
13
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environmental laboratory and monitors the water quality of the lower Colorado River. It
enforces illegal dumping ordinances and regulates on-site sewage facilities. LCRA is also
responsible for managing the impact of Non-Point-source pollution from major new
construction along and near the lakes (TX State Soil & Water Conservation Board, n.d.).
In the LCRA service territory and across Texas, water is allocated through “rights”14 (TX Water,
n.d.). Water rights are apportioned to electric generating facilities, hydro-electric, fossil power
and nuclear, agriculture, public water supply and industry (LCRA, n.d.). Texas Colorado river
water rights are designated as “firm” or “interruptible”. Many of the firm water rights are
allocated to essential resource provision; domestic water supply and electric generation. A large
segment of agricultural water rights is “interruptible” (LCRA, 2010 and 2011). Currently, the
largest volume of water withdrawals from the Lower Colorado River basin is for agriculture
(Lower Colorado River Authority. About). As population grows however demand for water
supply and water for electricity generation will increase also. In LCRA territory, treated
wastewater is frequently returned to the reservoirs. Water for electricity generation and for
domestic water supply is deemed non-consumptive, that is the majority of the water withdrawn
is treated and returned to the reservoir (LCRA, n.d.).
Water in the Colorado river basin is distributed by several utilities, either treated or untreated.
The LCRA delivers both treated and untreated water at different rates for different uses (LCRA,
2019). The City of Austin’s water utility; Austin Water, buys some of their water from LCRA and
takes some of it from Lake Austin. Austin Water buys at a wholesale rate. Austin Water sells at a
wholesale rate to nearby municipal utilities districts and sells treated water at an increasing
block rate.ie a rate that increases with increasing volumes of water used (Austin Water, 2018)￼.
Persistent multi-year droughts necessitate reconsidering water rights and “environmental
flows” to maintain down-stream businesses, fisheries and recreation.

14

In 1967 the Texas legislature merged the riparian rights system into the prior appropriation system. This requires anyone claiming a riparian
right to water to file a claim for the right with the Texas water commission (https://texaswater.tamu.edu/water-law)
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Figure 2.2

(AustinWater, 2018 )
The 2015 highland lakes water management study realigned water distribution based on
reservoir elevation and drought duration (LCRA, 2014).In some locations even non consumptive
water use can deplete donor surface waters. Water is used and disposed of, often far from the
source of the water (Gleik and Palaniappan, 2010). In the arid LCRA watershed used water is
returned treated to the river or reservoir (LCRA, n.d.). Lake and reservoir water quality is
maintained at federal contact recreation standards (TCEQ, n.d.). Near shore property is
developed and water sports abound from swimming to waterskiing and jet skiing.

New York City and the Catskill-Delaware Watershed
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New York State is a well-watered region with more than 7,600 freshwater lakes, ponds and
reservoirs, as well as portions of two of the five Great Lakes and over 70,000 miles of rivers and
streams.15 New York State receives precipitation as both rain and snow. Rainfall averages range
from 50+ inches in the Adirondacks to 30+ inches in the far western counties. 16 The City of New
York has designated five counties in south central New York for water collection. Schoharie,
Ulster, Sullivan, Delaware and Green counties comprise the New York City Catskill-Delaware
watershed. Waters from Schoharie creek, the east and west branches of the Delaware river,
Rondout Creek and Neversink river are managed through the New York City Filtration
Avoidance Determination (FAD) (NYC DEP, 2017).

Figure 2.3

(NYC DEP, 2010)
“The New York City FAD is part of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
partnership with the State of New York, the City of New York, watershed towns, villages and
counties, certain environmental and agricultural organizations, and other interested parties. It
15
16

https://www.dec.ny.gov/lands/95817.html
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/climatenormals/clim60/states/Clim_NY_01.pdf
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was codified in the January 21, 1997 New York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement,
establishing NYC land acquisition requirements, setting more stringent New York City
Watershed Rules and Regulations activating the NYC Watershed Protection and Partnership
Council and other partnership committees, initiating NYC watershed protection and partnership
program, and detailing other watershed protection provisions.” (US EPA Web Archive, 2016). As
a result of this agreement, EPA issued an interim FAD which allowed the City of New York to
avoid filtering its Catskill/Delaware drinking water provided certain preconditions were met.
Upon meeting those conditions, it was understood by the parties that EPA would issue a fiveyear Filtration Avoidance Determination. The Watershed Rules and Regulations became
effective on May 1, 1997 and on May 6, 1997, EPA issued a five-year FAD (ibid.). The New York
City government agency tasked with managing the Catskill-Delaware watershed is the New York
City Department of Environmental Protection (NYC DEP, 2017).
Since 1993, New York City has met the requirements of the1989 Surface Water Treatment Rule
and, the 1998 Interim Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule (NYSDOH and USEPA, 2017)
This has allowed NYC to avoid filtering its Catskill/Delaware (Cat-Del) water supply. The
conditions that NYC must meet to maintain filtration avoidance are described in the FAD. The
first FAD was issued by the EPA in 1993, with subsequent FADs in 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2017.
The 2007 FAD required the NYC to undertake a ten-year land acquisition program and included
specific commitments to activities in other programs for the first five years. The next FAD
determination is currently scheduled for July 2027 (ibid.). While NYCDEP manages the NYC
Cat-Del and Croton water systems, as the primary oversight agency, New York State Department
of Health (NYSDOH) has authority to determine whether the City’s watershed program provides
adequate protection of the City’s water supply, pursuant to the Interim Enhanced Surface Water
Treatment Rule and/or other avoidance criteria in the Interim Enhanced Surface Water
Treatment Rule. If NYSDOH were to determine that the City was not adequately protecting the
Catskill/Delaware water supply, NYSDOH also has authority to require the City to filter the
water from that water supply (ibid.). As part of the FAD, land use in Cat-Del watershed counties
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is very strictly controlled. NYC DEP maintains a police force to ensure safety of reservoir water.
Access to surface waters for any reason is by permit only. Watershed lands are divided into
public access areas, where recreationists may go without a permit and permitted access areas
(Wisnieski, 2015). More than half of NYC lands are public access areas. “All persons 16 years of
age and older must complete an application for and receive, maintain and carry a valid Access
Permit in order to access Hiking Areas, Fishing Areas, Hunting Areas and Recreational Boating
Areas for recreational purposes … Entry onto City Property, other than Public Access Areas and
Designated Use Areas, without a valid Access Permit, Guest Pass, or without appropriate
accompaniment as described herein, is prohibited and shall be considered a trespass.” (NYC
DEP, Rules for the Recreational Use of Water Supply Lands and Waters, 2010) “Commercial
Activities. The use of City Property for any commercial activity or as part of any commercial
enterprise is prohibited unless NYCDEP grants express written permission for a specified
commercial activity on a case-by-case basis, when considering, among other factors,
compatibility with water quality protection, site constraints, site management considerations
and whether the commercial activity will serve a significant public purpose.”(ibid.) The
permitting process requires applicants to submit personal information and can take several
weeks to complete.
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Watershed lands include towns, farms and in rare cases light industry (Wisnieski, 2015). The
surface waters in the five counties of the NYC watershed are managed to minimize a range of
contaminants listed in the NYCDEP annual drinking water report. Watershed agriculture is not
irrigated. The Watershed Agricultural Council provides guidance and oversight to minimize
nutrient and pesticide laden runoff. Watershed residents draw their water from groundwater.
Municipal wastewater in the watershed is managed by NYCDEP, in ground on site disposal of
wastewater (septic tanks) is closely monitored. While further north, multiple small hydroelectric plants on the Hudson contribute power to the electric grid, a proposal a to construct a
hydroelectric facility on the Cannonsville reservoir was only approved in 2016. Water collected
in the Cat-Del reservoirs is for down state municipal water supply only.
Figure 2.4 New York City Water Board: Rates and Regulations – Rate History (NYCWB, 2016).

NYC charges users for water at a flat rate; the price is the same regardless of the volume of water
used. The New York City water board publishes water prices annually and prices are set via rate
case (ibid).
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The price of water from the Cat-Del watershed is different for different customers. Communities
in south-eastern New York purchase New York City water on a case by case basis at a wholesale
rate and resell it. Upstate municipal users pay less for their water than average New York City
prices. The NYCDEP in city water rate schedule, varies by customer type and meter type. The
oldest and most perplexing rate in NYC is based on street frontage for multi-unit buildings with
no meters (NYCWB, 2016).

Ecosystems Services Valuation Paradigms
With these water-use and water pricing frameworks in mind, I used ecosystems services (ES)
modeling to examine the current value of water abstraction to water and electric utilities and to
consider the economic impact of various climate change scenarios on water and electric
procurement. ES valuation was based on water prices and the cost of contaminant removal.

The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment identifies different categories of Ecosystems Services:
●

provisioning services,

●

supporting services,

●

regulating services

●

cultural services.

(The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003)
The services evaluated in this analysis are provisioning services– water provision and regulating
services – water purification. While other services can be generated by the watersheds under
consideration, they are beyond the scope of this study. The core concern of the Water/Energy
Nexus is apportioning water for municipal water supply and water for power generation. While
cultural and supporting services are important, the focus of this work is the Water/Energy
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Nexus in critical resource delivery systems; - water supply and electric system vulnerability to
the variation of water volume and varying water quality.

Value can be assigned to ecosystems services using one or more measures. The figure below
shows valuation methods currently accepted by practitioners and scholars (Pascual et al, 2010).

Figure 2.5 Dollar Based Ecosystem Services Valuation Methods

(Bolotina et al, 2011)
The methods in the brown circles are methods based on valuation using existing measurable
costs or prices. The methods in the grey circles are based on reported choices of a target
population typically gathered using a survey or questionnaire. The damage avoided method in
the orange circle is an amalgam of measurable replacement costs and a target population’s
reported willingness to pay.
Existing Measurable Costs & Prices Based Methods
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The market price method is based on the price of a service on the open market. This method
estimates economic values for ecosystem products or services that are bought and sold in
commercial markets (Pittini et al., 2011). If the ecosystem produces water, then the value of the
water provisioning service can be evaluated based on the market price of water.
“The hedonic pricing method is used to estimate economic values services that directly affect
market prices. It is most commonly applied to variations in housing prices that reflect the value
of local environmental attributes (Liu et al., 2010).
It can be used to estimate economic benefits or costs associated with:
●

environmental quality, including air pollution, water pollution, or noise

●

environmental amenities, such as aesthetic views or proximity to recreational sites

The premise of the hedonic pricing method is that the price of a marketed good is related to its
characteristics, or the services it provides. “For example, the price of a car reflects the
characteristics of that car—transportation, comfort, style, luxury, fuel economy, etc. The
individual characteristics of a car or other good can be valued by looking at how the price people
are willing to pay for it changes when the characteristics change. The hedonic pricing method is
most often used to value environmental amenities that affect the price of residential properties”
(King et al, 2000).
“The travel cost method estimates economic values associated with ecosystems or sites that are
used for recreation. It assumes that the value of a site is reflected in how much people are willing
to pay to travel to visit the site (Pascual at al., 2010). The premise of the travel cost method is
that the time and travel cost expenses that people incur to visit a site represent the “price” of
access to the site, and the lower bound on the economic value of access Peoples’ willingness to
pay to visit the site can be estimated based on the number of trips that they make at different
travel costs (Liu et al 2010). This is analogous to estimating peoples’ willingness to pay for a
marketed good based on the quantity demanded at different prices” (King et al, 2000).
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The productivity method (or avoided cost method) is used to estimate the economic value of
ecosystem products or services that contribute to the production of commercially marketed
goods (Liu et al, 2010). “It is applied in cases where the products or services of an ecosystem are
used, along with other inputs, to produce a marketed good. It is applicable in cases where the
resource in question is a perfect substitute for other inputs. For example, increased water
quality in a reservoir means that less chlorine is needed for treating the water. In this case, an
increase in quantity or quality of the resource will result in decreased costs for the other inputs.
Thus, in this example, the benefits of increased water quality can be directly measured by the
decreased chlorination costs.” (King et al, 2000).
“The damage cost avoided, replacement cost, and substitute cost methods are related methods
that estimate values of ecosystem services based on either the costs of avoiding damages due to
lost services, the cost of replacing ecosystem services, or the cost of providing substitute services
(Liu et al., 2010). These methods do not provide strict measures of economic values, which are
based on peoples’ willingness to pay for a product or service. Instead, they assume that the costs
of avoiding damages or replacing ecosystems or their services provide useful estimates of the
value of these ecosystems or services. These methods assume that, if people incur costs to avoid
damages caused by lost ecosystem services, or to replace the services of ecosystems, then those
services must be worth at least what people paid to replace them. These methods are most
appropriately applied in cases where damage avoidance or replacement expenditures have been
or will actually be made.” (King et al, 2000).
Reported Population Choice Based Methods
The contingent valuation (CV) method estimates economic values for virtually any
ecosystem or environmental service. It is the most widely used method for estimating nonuse, or “passive use” values. This method asks people to directly state their willingness to pay
for specific environmental services, based on a hypothetical scenario. (Liu et al, 2010) In some
cases, people are asked for the compensation they would be willing to accept to give up
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specific environmental services. It is called “contingent” valuation, because people are asked
to state their willingness to pay, contingent on a specific hypothetical scenario and description
of the environmental service (King et al 2000).
The contingent valuation method is referred to as a “stated preference” method because it
asks people to directly state their values, rather than inferring values from actual choices, as
the “revealed preference” methods do. The fact that CV is based on what people say they
would do, as opposed to what people are observed to do, is the source of its greatest strengths
and its greatest weaknesses (Liu et al., 2010).
“Contingent valuation is one of the only ways to assign dollar values to non-use values of the
environment—values that do not involve market purchases and may not involve direct
participation. These values are sometimes referred to as “passive use” values. They include
everything from the basic life support functions associated with ecosystem health or
biodiversity, to the enjoyment of a scenic vista or a wilderness experience, to appreciating the
option to fish or bird watch in the future, or the right to bequest those options to your
grandchildren. It also includes the value people place on simply knowing that giant pandas or
whales exist” (King et al, 2000). The fact that the contingent valuation method is based on
asking people questions, as opposed to observing their actual behavior, is the source of
controversy (Loomis et al, 2000). King and Mazzotta claim “Many jurists and policy-makers
will not accept the results of CV. Because of its controversial nature, users must be extremely
cautious about spending money on CV studies and about using the results of CV studies (King
et al, 2000).
The contingent choice method can also estimate economic values for virtually any ecosystem
or environmental service. This method is based on asking people to make tradeoffs among
sets of ecosystem or environmental services or characteristics. The method does not directly
ask for willingness to pay. It is inferred from tradeoffs that include cost as an attribute
(Hanley et al., 1998). Like contingent valuation, it is a hypothetical method. It asks people to

145

make choices based on a hypothetical scenario. However, it differs from contingent
valuation because it does not directly ask people to state their values in dollars. Instead,
values are inferred from the hypothetical choices or tradeoffs that people make (King et al,
2000). This method can be described as inferring values from “revealed preferences”.
The contingent choice method asks the respondent to state a preference between one group
of environmental services or characteristics, at a given price or cost to the individual, and
another group of environmental characteristics at a different price or cost. Because it
focuses on tradeoffs among scenarios with different characteristics, contingent choice is
especially suited to policy decisions where a set of possible actions might result in different
impacts on natural resources or environmental services (Hanley et al, 1998). For example,
improved water quality in a lake will improve the quality of several services provided by the
lake, such as drinking water supply, fishing, swimming, and biodiversity. In addition, while
contingent choice can be used to estimate dollar values, the results may also be used to
simply rank options, without focusing on dollar values. The contingent choice is widely used
in the field of market research, its validity and reliability for valuing non-market
commodities however is largely untested (King et al, 2000).

The benefit transfer method is used to estimate economic values for ecosystem services by
transferring available information from studies already completed in another location and/or
context. For example, values for recreational fishing in one state may be estimated by applying
measures of recreational fishing values from a study conducted in another state. The goal of
benefit transfer is to estimate benefits for one context by adapting an estimate of benefits from
some other context (Johnston and Rosenberger, 2009). Benefit transfer is often used when it is
too expensive and/or there is too little time available to conduct an original valuation study, yet
some measure of benefits is needed. It is important to note that benefit transfers can only be as
accurate as the initial study (King et al, 2000)
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Applying the Ecosystems Services Framework
Ecosystems services valuation assessment evolved out of concern for habitat, open-space and
watershed conservation. Much of the literature is concerned with assigning value to non-market
goods and non-use values; supporting services and cultural services. Ecosystems services
assessments generally focus on land use changes (Gomez-Baggethun et al., 2010). Published
case studies reviewed for this work often share strategies and outcomes associated with
conservation or rural landscapes in non-G8 countries as governments grapple with the pressure
to “develop under-utilized land”.
The literature consistently supports the use of costs accumulated and prices paid for ecosystems
services valuation when available (Pandeya et al 2016). Scholarship also notes that costs and
prices often fail to monetize the full range of ecosystems services derived from any landscape
(Pandeya et al 2016). Natural Capital Project Scholars Shan Ma and Robert Griffin divide
services value into two categories; Use and non-use values. They recommend “market-based
valuation” for direct and indirect use value i.e. provisioning and regulating ecosystems services
(Ma and Griffin, 2015). In their review of ecosystems services modeling software. Pandeya et al
also note the importance of distinguishing between services, benefits and functions as a way of
making ecosystems service valuation relevant and readily useable to policy makers.
Many case studies in the reviewed for this study strive to assess either the value of farmland vs
residential development or the value of estuarine habitats vs waterfront development (Schagner,
2013) (naturalcapitalproject.stanford.edu) (aries.integratedmodeling.org). A study in the
American west evaluated the economic impact of converting forest to graze land with a
surprising outcome; grassland, oak savannah and forest in combination could generate a broad
range of ecosystems services neither system could accomplish alone (Eastburn et al, 2017). The
Eastburn study placed emphasis on expressing the value of ecosystems services in a context that
policy makers could use. The indicators used were agricultural production, soil health and
invasive species management. The services with clear “market prices” were agricultural
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production and soil health measured as carbon sequestration potential. This state and transition
model framework evaluates changes in land use using existing market prices.

The market price of critical resources like water and electricity, is generally treated in the
literature of resource economics and the economics of government. Economics scholars have
been plumbing the murky waters of public utility rate setting for as long as public utilities have
existed. Factors that come into play in public utility rate setting and particularly water rate
setting are issues like political expediency, economic efficiency and equity (Komives et al, 2005).
In some cases water utilities charge different rates for different classes of customers. In some
cases, water utilities charge different per unit volume rates for different volume users. Water
utilities in the arid US and arid countries around the globe often use an “increasing block”
strategy to subsidize subsistence level water consumption and to encourage conservation for
larger users of water (AustinWater, 2019). This approach to water billing can prove politically
challenging (Howe, 2005). In regions with abundant rainfall, water managers may use a
decreasing block structure to subsidize large users and encourage economic growth.17 The
American Water Works Association has been very instrumental in laying out guidelines for
water rate setting in the U.S. (American Water Works Association, 2017).
Using “Market Prices” for water as an indicator of the value of provisioning ecosystem services
offers a unique challenge. Prices for water (and electricity) are promulgated in the context of
rate setting (Jarvis and Sovacool, 2011). The “rate case” is presented by the petitioning entity,
laying out the basis for the requested rates (Knotts, 2000). The first step to rate setting is called
a “cost of service” study. Cost of service studies are undertaken periodically to ensure that the
water utilities, often not for profit agencies, are covering costs and not accumulating large
surpluses. The cost of service includes all the expenses; operations, maintenance, long term
planning and debt service (Beecher et al., 1990). The value of contributing ecosystems services

Or perhaps decreasing block pricing more accurately reflects the cost of service delivery in
regions that do not experience supply constraints
17

148

may or may not be included in the analysis. The conundrum associated with using a market
price to assign value to ecosystem services is that the market price or assigned price may or may
not include the value of the ecosystem water is derived from.
One of the goals of considering ecosystems services in water systems management is
maintaining systems sustainability. Grizzetti et al. propose the following framework for using
ecosystem services valuation analysis as a sustainable water systems management tool.
Figure 2.6 Ecosystem Services Classification Framework (Grizzetti et al 2017)

Ecosystems services related to water systems management proposed are provisioning and
regulating/purification (i.e., water quantity and water quality). The steps in this framework are:
1-identify available renewable water,
2-consider water abstraction by user sector,
3-identify the benefit and beneficiaries; the cost of water by sector,
4- consider sustainability indicators
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(Grizzetti et al 2017)
After extensive review of a published ecosystems services case studies, I selected this framework,
because it seemed to be the most relevant to valuing ecosystems services associated with the
Water/Energy Nexus.

Chapter 2.2 - Methods & Materials
Ecosystems services and valuation indicators were chosen considering the European
Commission Joint Research Centre (ECJRC) approach for assessing and valuing ecosystem
services in the context of water management (Grizzetti et al, 2017). The value of water in the
context of electrical power generation and potable water supply lies in quantity and quality. As
discussed, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2003) identifies these as provisioning
services; water quantity and regulating services; water quality (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, 2003). Ecosystems services scholarship and practice identify these services as
direct use services (King-Okumu et al.,2016).
The ECJRC guidance on structuring ecosystems services assessments for use in active planning
practice, Grizzetti et al recommend identifying the capacity of the ecosystem to deliver the
service, the actual flow of the service and the benefits of the service. In a test case the structure
was applied to water resource management;
●

Capacity – The potential of the ecosystem to deliver quantities of clean water, based on
biophysical data

●

Flow – The actual use of the water, based on socio-economic data

●

Benefits – Beneficiaries of the water and the cost of water, and water treatment

Capacity
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The potential of the ecosystem to deliver quantities of clean water can be assessed using
hydrologic modeling. In this inquiry, I used the open access InVest software suite of modeling
packages published by the Natural Capital Project at Stanford University to estimate landscape
water production and nutrient loadings to reservoirs. The InVest ecosystems services project
offers models to assess several ecosystems services (Natural Capital Project. Invest, n.d.).
InVest Ecosystem Services Models:
▪ Marine Water Quality

▪ Coastal Exposure and Vulnerability

▪ Habitat Risk Assessment

▪ Wave Attenuation & Erosion Reduction:

▪ Habitat Quality
▪ Carbon Storage and Sequestration:
Climate Regulation
▪ Blue Carbon Storage and Sequestration:

Coastal Protection
▪ Unobstructed Views: Scenic Quality
Provision
▪ Nature-based Recreation and Tourism

Climate Regulation

▪ Managed Timber Production

▪ Water Yield: Reservoir Hydropower

▪ Wave Energy Production

Production
▪ Nutrient Retention: Water

▪ Offshore Wind Energy Production
▪ Marine Finfish Aqua-cultural Production

Purification
▪ Marine Fisheries Production
▪ Sediment Retention: Avoided
Dredging and Water Purification

(ibid)

▪ Pollinator Abundance: Crop Pollination

The annual water yield and nutrient delivery models were used for assessing the water provision
capacity of the ecosystems of interest; the New York City Catskill-Delaware (NYC Cat-Del)

151

watershed and the Texas Colorado River watershed. Other InVest models are potentially
relevant to broader swath of ecosystems services however the focus of this study is water
provision for municipal water supply and electricity generation in the context of climate change.
The annual water yield model was selected over the seasonal water yield model because water
supply reservoirs in both the NYC Cat-Del watershed and the Texas Colorado River watershed
are designed for multiyear storage capacity (Kracman, et al., 2006). Water quality modeling was
limited to the nutrient retention/water purification NDR model. The sediment delivery ratio
model was not used. While relevant to the question of water quality, sediments are relatively
easily removed by slowing the movement of water to allow suspended material to settle by
gravity. Furthermore, the InVest sediment loading module estimates sediment loss from crop
rows in cultivated land and leaves out some sources of sediment critical to water abstraction in
the NYC Cat-Del and Colorado river watersheds such as gully erosion, stream bank erosion, and
mass erosion (Natural Capital Project, 2017) Most of the agricultural land in the Texas Colorado
River watershed is graze land (LCRA, n.d.). As such sediment loss from crop rows does not
describe the dominant sediment loss mechanism. In the NYC Cat-Del Watershed, farm practices
are very carefully managed to eliminate cultivation-based soil loss (Watershed Agricultural
Council, n.d.), most sediment loss occurs via gully and streambank erosion.
Flow
The actual use of the water based on socio-economic data was derived from annual reports from
water utilities (LCRA, 2019) (NYCDEP, 2017). The Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA)and
the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP) publish annual reports
on water supply. The LCRA publishes data on volumes of water used by customers annually. It
also attempts to estimate water released for “Environmental Flow” and water lost to either direct
evaporation from reservoirs or riverbank evapotranspiration. Water quality data in the LCRA
service territory is published by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)
(TCEQ, n.d.). A series of USEPA mandated water quality reports identify water as being of
concern or in total compliance with water quality standards for all the waterbodies in the state
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(ibid.). Actual hard numbers; nutrient loadings or concentrations are elusive and for the most
part must be derived based on reported water quality standards, i.e. national drinking water
quality standards, primary contact recreation standards or secondary contact recreation.
The NYCDEP annual water supply report is focused on water quality. Annual reports contain
results of sampling both in the watershed and in the city distribution system (NYCDEP, 2017).
“In 2017, DEP performed approximately 401,200 analyses on 36,120 samples from the
distribution system, meeting all state and federal monitoring requirements. Additionally, DEP
performed approximately 213,600 analyses on 14,170 samples from the upstate reservoir
watersheds and took close to 1.2 million robotic monitoring measurements to support FAD
watershed protection programs and to optimize water quality.“ (NYCDEP, 2017). The NYCDEP
publishes estimates of water volumes sold based on estimates of per capita water use. “The New
York City Water Supply System provides approximately one billion gallons of safe drinking
water daily to more than 8.5 million residents of New York City, and to the millions of tourists
and commuters who visit the City throughout the year. The water supply system also provides
about 110 million gallons a day to approximately one million people living in the counties of
Westchester, Putnam, Orange, and Ulster. In all, the New York City Water Supply System
provides nearly half the population of New York State with high-quality drinking water. “(ibid.)
Relationships developed in the modeling section of this document will be applied to the water
volumes reported by the various water users.

Benefits
Beneficiaries of the water and the cost of water, and water treatment are taken from publicly
available information. The “benefits” module aligns with the market price method of valuing
ecosystems services discussed earlier. Water rates are published for the New York City DEP, the
Texas LCRA and Austin water. All three water utilities identify user sectors to some extent. The
Texas water utilities publish detailed information on water use based on regional water rights.
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Categories for LCRA water users are; Municipal, Recreational, Irrigation, Industrial, Domestic,
and Varied (LCRA, 2019).

NYDEP gathers and publishes in city water use data based on the USEPA portfolio manager data
base and NYC Local Law 84: Benchmarking Energy & Water Use. New York City Local Law 84
requires buildings over 50,000 square feet to benchmark their energy and water use by May 1 of
every year (Urban Green Council, 2017). The New York City Energy and Water Use 2017 Report
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(New York City’s Energy and Water Use, 2014 and 2015)
Comparing water use in New York city and the Austin, Texas/LCRA region highlights the
regional differences in hydro-social systems. NYCDEP water user sectors describe
building/occupancy type and do not fall into the same classifications as LCRA water users
(ibid.). The largest water use sector in the Austin/LCRA region, irrigation, is rarely mentioned in
NYCDEP published data (ibid.). Urban water use categories of residential, multifamily,
commercial and large volume appear in both Austin water and NYCDEP rate schedules.
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Figure 2.7 Total 2015 New York City Large Building Water Use & Intensity by Sector
(Hospitals consumed the most water per square foot. Offices and Multifamily buildings
consumed the largest amount of water in total)

(New York City’s Energy and Water Use 2014 and 2015-Report-October 2017)Larger regional Texas user categories of municipal, agricultural/irrigation, recreation and
industrial have no comparable categories in the NYCDEP published water user data. Scarcity
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and the water rights allocation paradigm of the arid west drives detailed accounting of
individual water use. This allocation schema enables publication of not only water use categories
but volume consumption of individual users. Water use purpose is not identified in the NYC
Energy and Water Use report. The broader categories of consumptive and non-consumptive can
only be extrapolated based on use categories in published Texas and New York data.
As discussed, water rates in both geographies are different for different users. Texas water
utilities also have different rates for different purposes. Assigning a single dollar value to water
in the Austin, Texas/LCRA or NYC DEP Cat-Del service territories based on published data was
an arbitrary choice. The dollar value assigned to Texas water in this study is the average
residential water price for Austin Texas taken from the on-going University of North Carolina
water dashboard study (TX Water and Wastewater Dashboard, 2016). This price was used
because water users in the Austin/ Hill country region purchase water from either the city of
Austin water or the LCRA. These 2 water utilities charge different prices for treated water. The
LCRA has different prices for residential water used for inhouse purposes and for irrigation
purposes. LCRA is funded by the revenue it generates, the majority of which comes from
producing and transmitting electricity. A very small portion of LCRA's revenue comes from
selling water (lcra.org/about). The dollar value of New York City Watershed water was taken
from NYC Water Board published rate schedule (NYC DEP, 2016). The cost of nutrient removal
was estimated based on the literature and USEPA guidelines (USEPA-nutrient-economicsreport, 2015) (Bashar et al, 2018).
Scenarios and Tradeoffs
Scenarios evaluated in this study were water yield and water quality projections using downscaled International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) data for 2050 and 2070. Land use and
land cover associated variables i.e. rooting depth, plant available water content and nutrient
uptake for 2010, were taken from InVest recommended sources and held constant for 2050 and
2070 (Natural Capital Project, 2017). InVest water yield and NDR models were run using the
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University of California at Davis (UC Davis) (Fick and Hijmans, 2017) WorldClim downscaled
data set. The UC Davis WorldClim team generates a series of downscaled variables from the
output of different climate models. The output used in this set of analyses came from the Beijing
Climate Center climate system model version 1.1. Water yield and nutrient loading models were
run for four different Representative Concentration Pathways for both 2050 and 2070.
The four different Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) are four greenhouse gas
concentration trajectories adopted by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for the
fifth assessment Report in 2014 (Moss et al, 2008). These pathways describe four possible
climate outcomes, each of which are possible depending on the mass of greenhouse gasses
emitted over the course of the next century. The four pathways; 26, 45, 60 and 85 are named for
the possible range of radiative forcing values in the year 2100 relative to preindustrial values
(Moss et al, 2008).
●

RCP26 corresponds to +2.6 Watts/m2, RCP 2.6 assumes that global annual GHG

emissions (measured in CO2-equivalents) peak between 2010-2020, with emissions
declining substantially thereafter (Meinshausen, M. et al. 2011). RCP 26 projects the
outcome of the most aggressive GHG management strategy
●

RCP45 corresponds to +4.5 Watts/m2, Emissions in RCP 45 peak around 2040,

then decline (Meinshausen, M. et al. 2011)
●

RCP60 corresponds to +6.0 Watts/m2 In RCP 60, emissions peak around 2080,

then decline (Meinshausen, M. et al. 2011)
●

RCP85 corresponds to +8.5 Watts/m2. In RCP 85, emissions continue to rise throughout

the 21st century

"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representative_Concentration_Pathways#cite_notercp_greenhouse_gas_projections-4"(Meinshausen, M. et al. 2011) RCP 85 is the ”do-nothing”
scenario.
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InVest modeling outcomes projected annual water yield and water quality for the study areas
using WorldClim version 2 for current weather and WorldClim version 1.4 for down-scaled
future climate. WorldClim current and projected bioclimactic data were used for these analyses.
WorldClim version 2 bioclimatic variables are derived from the monthly temperature and
rainfall average values for 1970-2000 (Fick and Hijmans, 2017). The variables were generated
through interpolation of average monthly climate data from weather stations on a 30 arc-second
resolution grid.
Projected bioclimactic variables were taken from WorldClim 1.4. Downscaled bioclimactic
variables are derived from the four RCPs. The variables are averaged across 19 years, 2041 thru
2060 for 2050 and 2061 thru 2080 for 2070 (Hijmans et al., 2005). The bioclimactic variables
used in the water yield modeling were precipitation, temperature and radiation (for the full
model inputs please see appendix A).
Valuation comparisons were based on 2010 water prices and 2010 municipal budgets for New
York City and the City of Austin. (NYC council, 2009) (City of Austin, 2009) (AustinWater,
2010) (NYC Water Board, 2010). Price comparisons were made to identify the range of
economic impacts climate change-based variation in water quantity and water quality could
have on cities. Potential for changes in water price over time or city budgets are beyond the
scope of this analysis and were not included.

Chapter 2.3 – Results, Discussion & Conclusion
The value of water in the context of electricity generation and potable water supply lies in
quantity and quality. The impact of several climate change scenarios on the quantity and quality
of water available were compared in two different climate regions; Texas and New York State. I
used the InVest modeling software packages to estimate annual landscape water yield and
nutrient loadings to reservoirs. The arid west; Austin Texas and humid northeast; New York City
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were chosen to understand the impact of climate change at the extremes of US hydro-social
regimes.
Modeling Scenarios
In the 2006 Sandia National Lab report on the water energy nexus, scholars Pate et al noted that
in geographies where precipitation is projected to decrease, current allocation methods may not
be up to the challenge of reduced water availability (Pate et al, 2007). With this critique in mind,
I analyzed water economics using the four IPCC climate change representative concentration
pathway (RCP) scenarios discussed earlier in the Scenarios and Tradeoffs section. This set of
analyses frames potential economic vulnerabilities associated with delivering water and
electricity in the context of a changing climate. Scholars and researchers from UC DAVIS
WorldClim team (worldclim.org/downscaling) and from the Stanford University InVest team
encourage use of ecosystems services modeling and outputs of analysis with WorldClim data for
comparison, comparing possible future outcomes to results of modeling with known data sets
(Ma & Griffin,2015).
Results
Both Austin and New York City derive their water supply from an extended water abstraction
landscapes covering multiple watersheds. Modeling runs cover these large geographies; the NYC
Cat-Del watershed covering 1,597 square miles (Watershed Agricultural Council, n.d.) and the
Texas Highland Lakes drainage basin covering approximately 40,000 square miles (LCRA.
Maps of LCRA Services Areas, Parks and Facilities, n.d.). The scale of analysis for the baseline
scenario and the future scenarios is 30 seconds. For both the baseline and the future scenarios,
variables used are averaged over several decades. Estimates using averaged variables necessarily
smooth annual extrema. There is potential for substantial variation from published operational
data.
Figure 2.8 below, shows the results of water quality and water volume modeling for the Austin,
Texas /LCRA Highland Lakes watershed system and the NYC Cat-Del watershed system. These
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calculations show the difference between modeled 2010 baseline water production and
projected water production for all four RCPs for both 2050 and 2070. The table also shows
potential variation between modeled baseline and projected nutrient loadings for 2050 and
2070 using all four RCPs.
Figure 2.8 Water quality / water volume modeling for the Austin, Texas /LCRA Highland Lakes

The baseline scenarios were modeled as close to 2010 conditions as reported by NYC DEP,
LCRA and TCEQ as possible. Models for both the New York City Cat Del watershed system and
the LCRA Highland lakes region were calibrated against 75-year average stream flow data.
InVest Water yield modeling for a subsection of the Pepacton watershed discharging through
USGS stream gauge 01413500 were within 4 % of 75-year average recorded stream flow data.
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Water yield estimates for the Texas Colorado river were significantly larger than the 75-year
average stream flow data recorded at the USGS 0815800018.
Austin, Texas /LCRA region – InVest Water Yield and NDR modeling projects water production
in the watershed systems under analysis serving Austin, Texas to decrease over the next 50-year
period. The largest divergence from 2010 modeled water yield is projected to occur in 2050.
Nutrient, nitrogen and phosphorus loadings can be expected to remain substantially the same.
The New York City Watershed – Modeling of the NYC Cat-Del system projects annual water
production to be consistent as late as 2070. In all scenarios modeled, nitrogen loads are
projected to decrease. Across all scenarios phosphorus loads are projected to continue
unchanged.
Drinking Water
Water quality constrains drinking water provision. The InVest NDR model enabled modeling of
two key water quality constituents, nitrogen and phosphorus. Nitrogen is of concern for
drinking water and phosphorus is a limiting factor in steam electric generation efficiency. Figure
2.9 below lists national drinking water standards and New York City drinking water standards.
Nitrite and Nitrate are limited in drinking water because of the risk of methemoglobinemia
(WHO, 2011). The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) regulates potable water
supply based on the National Primary Drinking Water Quality standards (TCEQ). The New York
City Department of Environmental Protection has set water quality standards in City reservoirs
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The NatCap Water Yield model users guide notes that the default assumption that average
evapotranspiration will be less that the potential evapotranspiration can lead to anomalously high
water yield numbers in areas where Potential evapotranspiration =Actual evapotranspiration.
These circumstances may have generated disproportionately high water yield estimates in the
Texas Colorado river basin. A large portion of annual precipitation is stored in various reservoirs
around the basin leading to the potential for very large evapotranspiration losses. Because,
InVest water yield land cover, rooting depth and available water content variables are constant
across the test scenarios with only the climactic inputs changing, the relationships evolving from
multi year comparison in Texas remain sound.
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to be more stringent than the national standard based on the FAD (NYC 2017 FAD Report).
Figure 2.9

Standards (2017 Basin Summary Report) (ibid.). Nitrogen species mobility is driven by runoff
volume and velocity (Baker et al., 2006). InVest NDR model runs projects that with all other
variables held constant, nitrogen will not be problematic in either LCRA or Cat-Del water in any
of the climate scenarios.
Phosphorus in surface waters is currently regulated by the Federal Clean Water Act. Phosphorus
enhances plant growth. Phosphorus species in water can lead to eutrophication19, loss of
dissolved oxygen and degradation of aquatic habitats (USGS). While not specifically regulated in
drinking water, phosphorus driven eutrophication can generate undesirable color and odor in
potable water supply. The Cat-Del system has total maximum daily load targets in place with
associated reservoir specific phosphorus targets (NYSDEC, 2000). The NDR base case was
modeled to match 2010 Cat-Del phosphorus targets as closely as possible. Model runs project
that with all land use variables remaining constant, levels of phosphorus will remain constant in
Cat-Del water over the test periods 2050: the average for 2041 through 2060 and 2070; the
average for 2061 through 2080 (Hijmans, et al., 2005).

19

excessive uncontrolled aquatic plant growth

162

Figure 2.10 below for the Cat-Del and Austin, Texas LCRA watersheds shows the projected
vulnerability of domestic water supply systems to modeled water quality variation associated
with changing precipitation patterns.
Figure 2.10 Projected vulnerability of water supply systems to modeled water quality variation

Modeled baseline and projected nitrogen concentrations in both the Texas LCRA and the NYC
Cat-Del water are well below the national primary drinking water regulation (NPDWR)
standards. This is consistent with water quality reporting for both the LCRA and the NYCDEP.
For the LCRA watershed, nitrogen concentrations are projected to increase across the modeling
scenarios by as much as 75%. The very low ratio of modeled LCRA nitrate-nitrite concentration
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to NPDWR standards suggest that the modeled degradation of water quality will be
inconsequential to Texas drinking water utilities.
Modeled concentrations of nitrogen species in NYC Cat-Del water are similarly low, less than
20% of NYC FAD water standards. Modeled outputs project decreasing nitrogen concentrations
for all scenarios in the NYC Cat-Del watershed.
Electricity Generation Process Water
Water quality also impacts the efficiency of electricity generation in steam based electrical
generating processes. Extremely high operating temperatures and pressures for steam vessels
drive water impurities out of solution, precipitating them onto boiler tubes and turbines.
Accumulation of precipitated material reduces plant efficiency and accelerates system
component failure. Species of phosphorus must be removed as part of power plant water
treatment systems. Power plant operations guidance for high pressure boilers recommends
phosphate concentrations of .93 mg/l or less to optimizes performance (Mitsubishi, 2013) Both
LCRA and Cat-Del water is projected to meet high pressure boiler water phosphorus
requirements.
Figure 2.11 below for the NYC Cat-Del and Texas LCRA watersheds shows the projected
vulnerability of electric generation to modeled phosphorus concentration variation associated
with changing weather patterns. As noted, boiler water concentrations with phosphate
concentrations of .93 mg/l or less are required for optimum high-pressure boiler operation. Of
that .93 mg/l, .30 mg/l is phosphorus. Modeled baseline phosphorus concentrations for both
Cat-Del and Austin, Texas/LCRA water are well below the optimum level. Modeled phosphorus
concentrations for LCRA water, however, are projected to increase over baseline in all scenarios
by as much as 80%. Even in the worst-case scenario, the do-nothing climate action in 2050,
modeled Austin, Texas/LCRA water phosphorus concentration is still projected to be well below
optimum high-pressure boiler operations guidelines. In Cat-Del water, projected phosphorus
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concentrations are not more than 10 % greater than baseline for any scenario, also well below
optimum high-pressure boiler operations guidelines.
Figure 2.11 Projected vulnerability of electric generation to modeled phosphorus concentration
variation

The role of nitrogen in electric generation is ambiguous. An excess of nitrogen species can
accelerate corrosion. High pressure boiler water treatment includes the removal of anions.
Nitrate, one of several anions to be removed, is measured as conductivity. Boiler water
treatment, however, often includes use of nitrite as an “Oxygen Scavenger” and nitrogen gas is
used as a corrosion inhibitor (Vakkilainen, 2017). Because of the complexity and system specific
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nature of optimum boiler water nitrogen concentrations it has not been included in further
analysis or discussion.
Discussion
Model runs for this analysis projected changing climate inputs to water supply. While
population in the arid west is projected by some to increase (Makun, 2019), predicting the
impact of land use and population changes would require politico-economic projections in the
Austin, Texas/LCRA region and the NYC Cat-Del watershed that are beyond the scope of this
chapter. InVest modeling results project that the NYC Cat-Del watershed is well positioned for
water supply and power generation for the 2070 test period. Water volumes are modeled to
increase, contaminant concentrations are projected to remain constant or decrease. Assuming
no land use changes, NYC Cat-Del watershed ecosystems are projected to continue to provide
high quality water for domestic and electric generation users. Water production is projected to
increase slightly in 5 out of 8 modeling scenarios, suggesting that water supply will be adequate
and of good quality for current use levels into the late 21st century.
Modeling results for Austin, Texas/LCRA project decreasing water availability with decreasing
quality. High End projections suggest that for the 2070 test period Austin water availability
could be 20% lower than baseline. The worst-case scenario projects a 40% reduction in water
production for the2050 test period. While modeling results project increasing concentrations of
nitrogen and phosphorus, bases line levels of both contaminants are low enough that projected
increasing nutrient loads are unlikely to have negative impact on either domestic water
production or electric generation with current technologies.
Ecosystems services values were assigned using the “Market Price” method. The market price
chosen for these estimates are the average cost to a residential customer in New York City (NYC
water & wastewater rate report 2017) and in Austin, Texas (AustinWater – water & wastewater
rates). Figure 2.12 below shows the projected cost outcome of LCRA water yield modeling for
each of the scenarios.
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Figure 2.12 Projected cost outcome of LCRA water yield modeling

Ecosystems Services in the Austin, Texas/LCRA Region
The value of ecosystems services for water production is projected to shrink for the Austin,
Texas/LCRA region in all the climate modeling scenarios. Bio-climactic inputs vary over time
however water use in the Colorado river basin fluctuates substantially also. LCRA reported 2010
water use 15% lower than water use in 2009. A 15 % difference in year to year water
use/production is consistent with the medium range of modeled variation. Some fluctuation in
water use can be traced to reduced agricultural use. Agricultural, “interruptible” withdrawals
constituting over 50 % of LCRA water withdrawals, were 18% lower in 2010, a comparably rainy
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year, than in 2009, a year of drought. Industrial uses were down by 30% in the rainy year.
Residential use was down by less than 5% (LCRA 2010 and 2011).
The price of water is difficult to pin down. The LCRA sells water at very low wholesale rates and
at higher “retail” rates that vary by quality and end use. In 2011, the LCRA charged $151 per
“acre foot of firm water”. That year, the LCRA charged residential customers less per “acre-foot”
of treated water than the City of Austin (LCRA.org). A portion of the water delivered to
customers by Austin Water is purchased from the LCRA “as of right”. The City of Austin water
rates vary by volume and by user type, in” increasing block rates” (AustinWater, 2018). The
Austin Water 2009 cost of service report recommended subsidizing residential water use for the
lowest volume users and charging commercial and industrial customers more than the cost of
service (AustinWater, 2008). The 2015-2016 average price of water to City of Austin Water
residential users is used in the figure 2.12 analysis.
The projected water deficit20 in figure 2.12 is compared to 2010 Austin Water production and
compared to 2010 LCRA water provision. For Austin Water, it is calculated as a percentage of
water produced by the Austin water treatment facilities in 2010. For the LCRA it is calculated as
a percentage of water volumes delivered to LCRA customers plus water lost to evaporation and
water delivered down-stream in 2010. Dollar values listed express the range of financial
vulnerabilities. The most extreme outcome results from modeling for the do nothing GHG
management strategy in the medium term by 2050 with a possible 40+% loss of water yield.
This could cost the City of Austin as much as 7% of their 2010 budget and knock out over 10% of
LCRA revenues. The value of water lost due to projected changes in temperature, precipitation
and insolation may impact on the annual budget of the City of Austin. It is likely that the hardest
hit however will be taken by interruptible agriculture that claims as much as 50% of LCRA water

The projected water deficit is calculated using the % of modeled baseline 2010 water
production multiplied by the 2010 recorded treated water production for Austin Water or the
2010 reported water through put for the LCRA.
20
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in a dry year.21 The potential impact of water yield changes on the LCRA loss of water revenue
could be very financially severe compared to LCRA water services business revenues alone.
Spreading projected revenue losses across the water and power services businesses together
offer a challenging but potentially manageable crisis.
Ecosystems Services for New York City Cat-Del Watershed
Figure 2.13 Cost outcome of NYC Cat-Del water yield modeling

Figure 2.13 above shows the cost outcome of NYC Cat-Del water yield modeling for each of the
scenarios. The price of water to Cat-Del watershed customers varies with New York City
customers paying the highest price. Private water utilities purchase Cat-Del water and resell it to
Hudson Valley and Westchester county customers at a prices below average New York City
prices. The New York City water board publishes water prices annually (NYCWB, 2016). The
NYC DEP water rate schedule, however, varies by customer type and meter type. The oldest and
most perplexing rate in NYC is based on street frontage for multi-unit dwellings with no meters.
The NYC Water Board published water price is used in the figure 6 analysis. Ecosystems services

The value of agricultural output is volatile and estimation of it is beyond the scope of this
study.
21

169

for NYC Cat-Del watershed water production are projected to fluctuate by + 10% around 2010
calculated baseline production. Water production for 2050 is projected to be lower for the more
aggressive GHG management scenarios than for the less aggressive and do-nothing scenarios.
Ecosystems services projections for 2070 show no recognizable pattern. Water yield variations
are not projected to have any serious impact on the City of New York finances.
Determining the “market price” of New York City Cat-Del watershed ecosystems services is
complicated by the multiple city bonds floated to support construction and maintenance of
water supply (and wastewater) facilities as well as maintenance of the FAD conditions. While the
value of a gallon of New York City water appears to be the willingness to pay for water, the actual
willingness to pay is more, it includes the public’s willingness to buy New York City bonds (NYC,
2018). Can the NYC Water board price truly be described as a market price? Of all the water
prices paid by users in the Austin Texas region which one is the Market Price? Assigning value to
ecosystems services are we prepared for the value to fluctuate with water prices that can change
annually?
Resource management is necessarily a geographically driven endeavor (Johnston, 1983). As
noted earlier, water is managed differently in the two different climates. New York City water
managers employ once thru processes. Texas water managers reuse. While maximum average
annual precipitation in New York State is almost two times higher than maximum average
annual precipitation in Texas, water prices are not proportionally different. Application of the
Market Price method using only the price of water might suggest that the low firm wholesale
price of LCRA raw water means that ecosystems services in the lower Colorado river basin are
less valuable than ecosystems services in the 5 counties of the NYC Cat Del watershed. Unlikely!
Expanding on the Market Price method for the Water Energy Nexus, the value of ecosystems
services for water abstraction can be estimated based on the value of water and the value of
electricity water provides. Based on my analysis, I propose the following relationship to describe
ecosystems services value using market prices.
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WEN ESV= (Wp-(Wtc*CL)*Ws + Ep*Wi*Eso

WEN ESV = water energy nexus ecosystem services value
Wp = the annual average wholesale price of untreated water ($/million gallons)
Wtc = the cost of water treatment ($/# of contaminant removed)
CL = the contaminant loading per unit volume of water sold (#/million gallons)
Ws = the annual volume of water sold (million gallons)
Ep =the regional annual average wholesale price of electricity ($/MWh)
Wi = the average water intensity of electric power generation in the region (million
gallons/MWh)
Eso = the annual electricity send-out for regional power producers (MWh/year)
The middle and long-term impacts of climate change of water provision ecosystems services in
the NYC Cat Del and Texas LCRA watershed couldn’t be more different. Climate changes in
south-central New York State are projected to maintain water availability at a fairly constant
level over the next 50 years and the New York City experiment with landscape management for
water supply may prove successful. For the arid west, precipitation and water supply predictions
are much less sanguine. Water availability is projected to decline. Water management styles and
water access reflect the different climate circumstances. In the arid west, the same water is used
for many things; electric generation, industry, domestic water supply, agriculture and a robust
recreation economy.
The entities that manage water supply are also different. The Texas water management entity
the Lower Colorado River authority is also the regional electric utility managing hydro-electric
generating stations on 6 of the “highland lakes” as well as natural gas and coal fired plants.
Because the LCRA is responsible for both electricity and water supply, water quality
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maintenance and water conservation fit together, and users are in the immediate environs of the
reservoirs. In most cases non-consumptive use returns treated water to the reservoirs.
The NYC DEP is a single resource utility. It sells water22. In the NYC Cat-Del watershed,
abstracted water is delivered to down-stream users without reuse. New York State agriculture is
not irrigated. 100 miles down-stream from the reservoirs, NYC Cat-Del water users are virtually
in another country. The watershed is perceived as a fiscal albatross by many watershed county
administrators; opportunities for economic development are limited and NYC quibbles about
paying real estate taxes. (Foderaro, 2002) Resource use efficiency is hampered by fragmented
water supply and electric generation paradigm. At least four different independent power
producers serve electricity customers in the NYC Cat-Del service territory23(NYISO/Markets).
NYC water and wastewater treatment are powered by a regional authority that generates most of
its’ electricity far beyond the city limits. In the Texas LCRA the cost of water storage
infrastructure is borne by both electric generation and water supply. In the Cat-Del it is not.
NYC electric customers pay for water supply infrastructure only indirectly through water rates
for electric generation stations and NYC government as an electricity customer does not pay for
Cat-Del water infrastructure at all.
Conclusion
Based on analysis of ecosystems services in the Austin Texas LCRA watershed and the NYC CatDel watershed, ecosystems services value depends very much on hydro-social systems in place.
Using a single valuation indicator even for a single service, in this case water supply, may not
adequately assess the value of the service. Assigning value to ecosystems services embedded in
the water/energy nexus using the market price valuation method for public utility services may
not consider the administrative process of rate setting that can enable subsidized prices
NYCDEP also sells wastewater treatment. Water and wastewater treatment fees are rolled into
one bimonthly utility bill.
23 National Grid – Schoharie County, NYSEG – Greene, Delaware, Schoharie and Sullivan
Counties, Central Hudson Electric – Ulster, Sullivan and Greene Counties, Orange and
Rockland Electric – Sullivan County
22
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(Knotts,2000). Using a single market price does not consider the possibility that multiple
resource prices can figure into the value of a single service. In most cases public water rates are
set based on the ability of the water utility to convince an oversight body of the cost of providing
service (ibid.). Rates are set to defray the cost of providing service and maximize utility to the
consumer (ibid.). The LCRA provides water and electricity. For the LCRA the cost of
impounding and delivering water is defrayed by both water and electricity rates. The services
provided by NYC DEP are water supply and wastewater management and rates are set
accordingly.
In their paper, Piacenza, et al. (2004) note that small and medium scale utilities that provide
services that use the same infrastructure can experience economies of scope. The LCRA provides
treated water to residential users north of Austin communities at a rate lower than the average
Austin water rate and at a lower rate than NYCDEP water. The cost of LCRA water is shared
across several value sectors.
Assessing the value of ecosystems to production of one critical resource using the market price
of a single resource can be in adequate. Human infrastructure systems are just as inter-linked as
environmental systems (Zimmerman, 2006). Furthermore, linking infrastructure systems can
optimize the value of ecosystems services. The value of impounded/abstracted water in Texas
accrues to both electric and water sectors of the LCRA. Both water and electricity customers
bear the burden of maintaining ecosystems and associated infrastructure. Additionally, it may
be inferred that modifying consumption behavior in the context of changing availability is an
“in-house” proposition for the LCRA rather than a negotiation across public and private lines. In
NYC Cat-Del system, the value of ecosystems services accrues to only downstate water users.
While NYC DEP is a fully integrated water utility providing water supply, wastewater and storm
water management services, there is no shared infrastructure, engineering processes or
economies of scope between the water and wastewater sectors of the utility except as relates to
demand management.
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The goal of this inquiry is understanding ecosystems services as they relate directly to water
supply and the water/energy nexus. Analysis presented here suggest that ecosystems services
value for water supply can accrue to other essential services depending on how services are
linked. Single utility water management can lead to economies of scope and use efficiencies for
electric and water supply essential in arid regions.
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Q3- The Water Energy Nexus and Payments for Ecosystems Services: The
Price Impacts of Including Ecosystems Services Value in Utility Rates - a
comparison of the Arid West and Northeastern United States.
Chapter 3.1-Background
Utility Rates and Utility Rate Setting
“Utilities are considered to be natural monopolies, businesses or markets where: 1, one
producer or group of producers acting in concert, controls the supply of a good or a service; and
2, where the entry of new producers is prevented or highly restricted.” (California Public Utility
Commission (CPUC),n.d.)( Ghadessi, 2017) Essential services such as energy and water are
provided by monopolies under government supervision. Government oversight is necessary
because “the natural tendency of any business is to maximize profits. When there is little to no
competition, monopolies can restrict access or service and/or increase prices with the customer
having no choice” (Ghadessi, 2017) The government, often in the form of a public utilities/public
service commission, provides oversight to ensure that essential services are provided safely,
reliably and at a reasonable rate (Beecher,2012).
The processes for setting rates in water and energy utilities are similar but not identical (Sobhy,
n.d.). The challenge of utility rate setting is meeting the costs of providing service to customers,
and the development of fair and equitable rates to meet expenses related to operations and
maintenance capital improvement projects and debt service on the physical plant (Black and
Veatch, 2012). At the core of utility rate setting is a demonstration of the “cost of service”. Cost
of service studies are executed periodically to make sure that utilities are not accumulating
excessive cash reserves and to ensure that the “costs of service” are being covered. Utilities
delivering critical resources; energy and water, petition an oversight body to set rates that meet
the cost of service requirements. (FERC, 1999) For the city of New York that oversight body for
water is the New York City Water Board, for electricity it is the New York State Department of
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Public Service. For the region of Texas that is the subject of this study it is the Lower Colorado
River Authority, for Austin electric it is the city council. Wholesale rates for LCRA electricity are
set by the LCRA board of directors with the input of the “rates and resources council” (LCRA,
n.d.) LCRA transmission rates are set by the Texas PUC. LCRA is a wholesale distributor of
power.
For water utilities, there are several methods of determining utility revenue requirements. These
are; the Cash-Needs method, the Utility basis method and a combined Utility basis with Cash
Residual method (RedOak Consulting, 2007)(Beecher, Mann & Landers, 1990)
Cash-Needs method is most applicable for municipally owned utilities that maintain a budget
where their revenue and expenses must balance each year. Municipal utilities generally do not
have sources of capital other than retained earnings and formally issued debt, so the total
customer revenue must be equal to budgeted expenses (RedOak, 2007) (AWWA, 2012)
Cash-Needs approach expenses include:
●

Operation and Maintenance expenses24

●

Debt service

●

Capital expenditures not financed by debt25

●

Increase in fund balances

●

Taxes and other requirements26

(RedOak, 2007)
Utility Basis method for determining revenue requirements is typically mandated for investorowned water utilities and mandated or permitted for government-owned utilities in jurisdictions
where the utility is regulated by a utility commission or other similar regulatory body (AWWA,

It appears that NYC DEP puts the watershed expenses in this category
Watershed protection costs can be assigned to this category
26 Watershed protection costs can be assigned to this category
24
25
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2012). While similar to the Cash-Needs approach, it is different in how capital infrastructure is
funded within the rates (AWWA, 2012). Utility-Basis expenses include;
●

Operation and Maintenance expenses

●

Return on Rate Base

●

Depreciation expense

●

Taxes and other requirements

(RedOak, 2007)
“Utility Basis with Cash Residual is a modification of the utility basis approach for municipally
owned utilities that must meet a balanced budget requirement. The over-all revenue
requirements are set to recover the cash-needs requirements. The utility basis is used to
determine the revenue requirements for the non-owner customers using a fair rate of return.
The difference between the total cash-needs revenue requirements and the utility basis revenue
requirements for non-owner customers is recovered from owner customers using the cash-needs
approach.” (RedOak, 2007).
Operation and Maintenance expenses include “salaries and wages, fringe benefits, purchased
power, purchased water, other purchased services, rent, chemicals, other materials and supplies,
small equipment . . . and general overhead expenses . . . Other elements of O&M expense might
also include the costs of support services rendered by the municipality to the utility, such as the
use of computer facilities, assistance in collecting water bills, procurement activities, human
resources administration, fleet management, and other support services.” (AWWA, 2012).
Depreciation expenses include, “the loss in value of facilities, not restored by current
maintenance, which
occurs in the property because of wear and tear, decay, inadequacy, and obsolescence. The
annual depreciation expense component of revenue requirements allows the utility to recover its
capital investment over the anticipated useful life of the depreciable assets (AWWA, 2012).
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The Return on Rate Base “component is intended to pay the annual interest cost of debt capital
and provide a fair rate of return for the total equity capital employed to finance facilities used to
provide water service. The utility basis of determining revenue requirements usually
necessitates establishing a rate base, defined to be the value of the assets on which the utility is
entitled to earn a return, and the setting of a fair return rate on the rate base. The rate base is
primarily composed of the depreciated value of the utility’s property devoted to serving the
public (AWWA, 2012).
According to the City of Lomita water utility cost of service study report, the cash needs
approach is typically used by municipally owned water utilities (Black and Veatch, 2012).
Review of New York City DEP rate reports shows expense categories consistent with the costneeds approach (NYCWB, 2016). The California Public Utilities Commission recommends a
revenue requirement assessment format similar to the utility basis approach.
Revenue Requirements = O&M + Taxes + Depreciation + Rate Base * r – OR
Where:
O&M = normal business expenses for running a utility company,
Taxes = Federal, state and local taxes,
Depreciation = accumulated depreciation of plants used to produce and deliver the utility’s
product,
Rate Base = net value of plant in service plus working capital,
r = rate of return on invested capital,
OR = other operating revenue.
(Ghadessi, 2017)
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The Texas PUC only regulates water utilities that serve retail customers27. In 2010 the LCRA
Board voted to sell their retail water and wastewater utilities. By July of 2012.the LCRA had
divested operations of most of its water and wastewater treatment facilities stopped serving
retail customers.28 Oversight of the LCRA across all services is provided by the State of Texas
legislature (LCRA, 2018). In the 2008 Red Oak COS study for the City of Austin, the consultants
recommended using the Cash-needs method of revenue requirements assessments. Texas PUC
Substantive rules applicable to water and sewer service providers allow for expenses consistent
with both the cash-needs approach and/or the utilities basis approach to revenue requirements
estimation (PUCT, 2018).
Ecosystems Services in Rate Cases and Cost of Service Studies
Ecosystems services valuation has been discussed in detail in earlier sections. Determining the
value of ecosystems services in living politico-economic systems requires incorporating the
”Valuation of Ecosystems Services” into the existing institutional system. This requires
ecosystems services value to be quantified and monetized in some form. Scholarship attempting
to frame the value of ecosystems services in the context of price frequently cite Ronald Coase’s
Nobel prize winning work on transaction costs (Coase, 1960).
Coase’s theorem states, the most efficient solution to overlapping uses of the environment, is a
bargaining process between involved property holders. Overlapping uses of the environment, in
Coase’s vision, include disposal of waste and generation of pollution. If property rights are
allocated to waste dischargers, victims can pay them not to discharge. This bargaining process
will facilitate a market-like solution similar to a payment for ecosystem services program.
Alternatively, if property rights are assigned to the victims, the dischargers can pay the victim or

April 2002 — LCRA ends its role as a retail electric provider with the transfer of its last
remaining retail customer to Austin Energy
(https://www.lcra.org/about/overview/history/Pages/an-era-of-change.asp)
28 July 2012 — LCRA transfers operation of most of its water and wastewater utilities to various
operators (https://www.lcra.org/about/overview/history/Pages/an-era-of-change.asp)
27
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purchase the right to discharge. In this way, the cost of the bargaining result is shared between
stakeholders without any external intervention. If transaction costs are small, the resulting
allocation of resources will be efficient.29, regardless of the initial allocation of property rights.
The creation of a market in the Coase solution internalizes externalities; however, it does not
necessarily bring pollution to a zero level. In addition, obviously it cannot be applied to
externalities affecting future generations or other species” (Bauler, 2015). These difficulties
inhere to solutions that strive to achieve “economic efficiency” and the “highest valued use”.
Coase and the New Institutional Economists (NIE) hitch their scholarly cart to the idea of
transaction costs and the role of institutions. They maintain that institutions (writ broadly) have
more impact on economic productivity than technology. This discourse is particularly relevant
to the question of realizing ecosystems services value (Shirley & Menard, 2012). Ecosystems
services valuation intersects with utility essential services delivery in the rate setting/rate case
process. Monetizing ecosystems service values in rate case/cost of service accounting will open a
window. . no, a barn door! to accountability. Reviewing utility pricing methods across the US,
there are no line items and no discussion of ecosystems services in the rate case material
reviewed for this paper.
“Most business and economic practices ignore ecosystems services” (Guerry et al., 2015). In the
corporate sector, ecosystems services valuation is often conflated with environmental
protection, celebrated in the glowing feel good sections of annual reports as part of corporate
citizenship initiatives (Guerry et al., 2015). Most payment for ecosystems services programs are
state run programs in developed countries (Wunder, 2005). In the United States, ecosystems
services are protected via federal and state environmental quality regulations. In Texas, USEPA
and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) guidelines impact water for Austin
Texas and the Lower Colorado River Authority. In many cases ecosystems services management

29

An efficient allocation of resources dedicates each resource to its highest valued use.
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and payments (or fines) for ecosystems services are dispersed across several agencies or
departments of one agency. For example; air quality is managed at the state or national level.
Forested ecosystems may be managed by regional, state or federal entities. In unprotected
landscapes, ecosystems can deteriorate, and services can be lost altogether without any
payments. Economist Arild Vatn notes “Payments for ecosystems services (PES) are never
established in an institutional vacuum. Rights to land — if existing — normally come with a lot
of local specificity. Moreover, there are other formal and informal rules, and perceptions which
cannot go unnoticed when establishing a PES system” (Vatn, 2009). In many cases pushback
against the loss of ecosystems services depends on the vulnerability of the population dependent
on the services at risk. The amount of bargaining power ecosystems services purchasers and
providers have will impact the method and PES. Imbalance in political power and or transaction
costs can skew the outcome (CIFOR, 2005).
So, what are transaction costs? Transaction costs are the costs of bringing goods (or services) to
market or the expenses incurred when buying or selling a good or service. “A would-be trader
must find someone to trade with, get information on cost and quality, come to an agreement,
draw up a contract and monitor/enforce the contract.” (Coase in Shirley and Menard, 2012). If
we are selling shoes, transaction costs might be finding out who might be interested in our shoes
and where they are most likely to buy shoes and of course getting the shoes to that place. In the
case or buying and selling rights to ecosystems services like water, transaction costs would
include the delineation of rights, determination of water quality, maintenance of water quality
and infrastructure to deliver water. This is not a comprehensive list.
In his article,” An institutional analysis of payments for ecosystems services” Vatn argues that
“in theory payments for ecosystems services are seen as a market solution to environmental
problems – as an alternative to state hierarchical and community governance” (Vatn, 2009).
“Creating ‘markets’ for environmental services depends . . . on state and community facilitation.
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. .. ‘Buyers’ are often public. High transaction costs also influence price setting. Payments do not
follow the market format as intermediaries frequently are setting the price, with users often
being unaware even of the fact that they pay. Finally, the distinction between payments as
incentives and as fair compensations is emphasized. While payments may strengthen
community relations and simplify action for environmental care, they may also introduce a
purely instrumental logic and in some cases worsen the environmental status by crowding out
environmental virtues.“ (Vatn, 2009).
Ecosystems service valuation research and modeling scholarship offers many case studies from
the global south and non-OECD countries. One of the most well publicized environmental
justice/theft of ecosystems services cases is the mis-allocation of water in Cochabamba Bolivia
(Bakker, 2010). The movie “Even the Rain” chronicles attempts by the Bolivian government to
privatize water in Cochabamba and the subsequent popular uprising (Even the Rain, 2011).
Ecosystems services scholarship and Coasean analysis underscores the potential for inequities in
power relationships to yield unpalatable solutions (Roumasset & Wada, 2012). Bargaining
between stakeholders with equal power can yield long term workable solutions where needs of
providers and users are well considered. Negotiations between entities with an unequal balance
of power will often yield an outcome closer to command and control management. The story of
the water supply for many American mega-cities is a story of ecosystems services tradeoffs from
San Francisco’s Hetch Hetchy to the five counties of the New York City Catskill-Delaware
watershed. In many cases the tradeoff is between “non-market” ecosystems services; cultural
and “spiritual” services versus services that can be brought to market. The value of ecosystems
services only filters into utility economics as provisioning services with market-based value.
Ecosystem service payments for provisioning services are for the most part assigned to
government entities.
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The struggle for the majestic Hetch Hetchy valley persists almost a hundred years after
inundation (Rosekrans et al., 2004). Conservation organizations such as the Environmental
Defense Fund publish plans for” Paradise Regained”; a potent and romantic image! Recent
reports on the economic impact of New York City filtration avoidance determination on
watershed counties reveal elements of power disparity, economic inequality and loss of
autonomy characterized by command and control PES processes (Downeast Development
Consulting Group, May 2009). The literature on the New York City watershed agreement
indicates that payments are made to property owners to protect surface waters using ‘best
management practices”. Implementation of farm runoff management measures are subsidized
(Armstrong et al., 2011). In Delaware County, payments are deemed too small and conservation
corridor maintenance requirements are deemed too onerous. Almost 40 % of responding
farmers surveyed had no intention of joining. Participation in the corridor protection plan
correlated to the age of the farmers, the number of years farming and the type of farming
livestock vs row crops (education did not correlate!) Younger farmers who had been working the
land longer were less likely to participate than older farmers relatively new to the business
(Armstrong et al., 2011). Efforts to preserve or accumulate ecosystems services may also be
thoughtlessly or haphazardly implemented giving rise to unnecessary hardship for communities
living in the ecosystem of concern (Downeast Development Consulting Group, May 2009).
The documentation of PES in the United States is varied and un-collated.30 Economic
scholarship and literature support including fines, permit fees and cleanup costs in payment for
ecosystems services programs. Securities and Exchange Commission filings require
environmental disclosure including “Material effects of environmental compliance” (US SEC,
2017). Environmental “liabilities” often appear as a line item in corporate annual reports.
Environmental liabilities or explicitly laid out payments for ecosystems services did not appear

There is no scholarly, regulatory or financial bucket that all PES research or payment records
have been dumped in.
30
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however in rate case or cost of service guidance documents reviewed for either electric utilities
or water utilities. Returning to Coase and the institutionalist assertion that institutions have
more impact on economic productivity than technology, the missing link to ecosystems services
accounting is institutional. This conclusion is supported by ecosystems services valuation
scholarship (CIFOR, n.d.) (Muradian et al., 2013). Mechanisms for ecosystems services trading
are VERY RARELY markets (Vatn, 2009), at best they are pseudo markets where the all criteria
for a free market are not met (Muradian et al., 2010). Payments for water supply ecosystems
services do occur frequently in the context of “Natural Monopolies” and/or monopsonies. PES
programs for water supply often involve a large group of small to medium sized land-owners
and a single water or water/electric utility. The utility is often the only purchaser of water
services from the land-owners and the only seller of water to distant water users. In these cases,
the utility is often purchasing the right to water. The nature of rights purchased and power
balance in such arrangements can create less than sanguine seller/purchaser relations.
Deteriorating relationships with sellers can lead to high transaction costs for utilities. In the
New York City Case, transaction costs can include large land purchases, an extensive monitoring
system and the cost of preserving water quality i.e. a watershed police force. With land use and
land access as the primary modes of water quality and quantity management in the ecosystems
service approach to water supply, utilities have little choice but to lay claim to increasingly large
tracts of land if service quality deteriorates. These land holdings can be expensive to acquire and
expensive to maintain through property tax payments. When the stakeholders “selling”
ecosystems services are farmers or small business owners, the production value of all of their
land assets is often carefully tracked and assessed. Based on a review of utility cost of service
documentation, the actual utility payments for ecosystems services may be dispersed across a
number of expense categories and harder to track. Tracking ecosystems services payments by
public utilities is necessary to measure the on-going costs against the original cost estimates.
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Tracking ecosystems services inputs to utility service delivery is essential to maintaining utility
resilience to both explicit human impacts – development and land-use changes as well as
climate change impacts (Cosens and Fremier, 2014). Changing land use or property values 31can
have unintended and potentially expensive impacts on watershed set asides (Wu, 2008). In
situations where a formerly lower valued use increases in value over time, the original PES
agreement may become obsolete. Because ecosystems services valuation assessments often
consider value in a temporal snap-shot unintended consequences of value-based set asides may
go unconsidered. Vatn points out in the discussion of PES as incentives or fines, sometimes
payments are incentives but sometimes payments are stumbling blocks. One of the unintended
consequences of ESV based set-asides is that the value of property for non-water supply
purposes can increase also. Scholarship and local reporting documents the increasing value of
property for vacation homes close to reservoirs and close to protected watershed lands (Vatn,
2010). Conflicts over water allocation for electric generation, agriculture and municipal water
supply are part of everyday life in the American arid west. What if economic efficiency suggested
that the highest value use of acres in a watershed set aside were agriculture? How can projected
costs of climate-based changes in ESV be considered? Ecosystems services valuation modeling
often evaluates a set of scenarios, the outcomes of changing values over the modeling period did
not appear in the literature reviewed.
The economic estimates used to compare the cost of building and operating a treatment facility
vs. taking land by eminent domain in the New York City watershed were based on property
values at the time of the proposal. There may have been some consideration of changing
property taxes over time. However, a review of local watershed newspaper articles suggests that
New York City did not foresee the property value increases in the region that resulted from the
demand for vacation homes in permanently protected forests created by watershed set asides
Watershed set asides often eliminate the possibility of further development, creating forested
landscapes that increase the value of existing residential and agriculture land as second home
sites. This has been documented in the NYCDEP Cat Del Watershed (Church, 2009)
31
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(Downeast Development Consulting Group, 2009)(Church, 2009) (Cairns, 2016)(Armstrong et
al., 2011). In situations where a formerly lower valued use increases in value over time, the
original PES agreement may become obsolete.
Measures of Ecosystems Services -the Palmer Drought Severity Index
Ecosystems service value estimation earlier in this study focused on the volume of water
available from the two landscapes of interest. I used a very low granularity mode, based on
County-level data to estimate that volume in several climate scenarios. Water availability can
also be described with the concept of drought. Severity of drought is dependent on a number of
variables considered in the Invest modeling scenarios; air temperature, precipitation soil
moisture etc. Data sets used in question 2 climactic variables averaged across one or more
decades. To understand how the value of available ecosystems services impacts utility prices, it
is more useful to consider ecosystems services value at the time scale of utility price changes. For
New York City, the New York Water board publishes prices annually (NYCWB, 2016), Texas
water utilities publish water rate changes at intervals of from 2 to 5 years. The national
integrated drought information system measures water availability as drought severity using
several indices including the Palmer Drought Severity Index. The Palmer Drought Severity
Index (PDSI)is a measure of water availability over a period of time developed in 1965 by Wayne
Palmer, a climatologist from the US Weather bureau (Palmer, 1965). it was originally developed
to assess water scarcity conditions in the agricultural Midwest. The focus of his original work
was Kansas, Iowa and North Dakota. . His goal was to create an evaluation technique that would
be ”considered as a strictly meteorological phenomenon.” (Palmer, 1965). Palmer’s Idea was
that “amount of precipitation required for a near normal established economy in an area during
some time interval is dependent on the average climate of the area and on the prevailing
meteorological conditions both during and preceding the month or period in question” (Palmer,
1965) For the PDSI successive monthly index values for past dry periods are combined . . to yield
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an equation for calculating drought severity”. The original PDSI index identified 4 classes of
drought from1 to 4 corresponding to mild, moderate, severe and extreme drought (Palmer,
1965).

Chapter 3.2 Methods and Materials
Utility Rate Setting Processes in Texas and New York State
I have reviewed literature on Texas and New York State utility rate setting to understand how
broad-brush rate setting paradigms were applied in the two regions. Differences in rate setting
in both states for water and electric utilities were of particular interest. Archived reports on
public utility finance are publicly available on the internet (NYC WB, 2016)(LCRA, 2019). I
found rate setting meeting minutes and cost of service reports for New York City DEP. Archives
for the LCRA and Austin water were found to a lesser extent. Ways to arrive at acceptable utility
rates are discussed at length in earlier sections of this paper. I found structures for water and
electricity rate setting were similar; based on a review of cost of service reports and annual
budgets. Comparing archived utility rate setting information to the Uniform System of Accounts
for water and electric utilities (USoA), there appear to be similar categories for electric utility
rate setting and water rate setting (NARUC,2002). Water and electricity rate setting differ in the
context of oversight. Most electric utilities set rates via state public utility commissions
(ACEEE, n.d.). Water rates are sometimes set by state entities and sometimes set by regional
entities (AWWA, 2012). These variations may reflect the extent of political concern over water
i.e. the more concern the greater the need for high level, high transparency oversight.
In all cases water rates are set based on an assessment of costs or a cost of service study (US
EPA, 2006). The cost of service framework for water and electric rate setting are published by
different entities. The American Water Works Association and Water-Environment Federation
publish water rate setting literature and the National Association of Regulatory Utilities
Commissioners (NARUC) publish electric rate setting guidance. The cost of service
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determination process, however, is substantially the same. Several differences stand out though,
the water utilities are very concerned with the cost of delivery infrastructure and the treatment
processes. For the electric utilities there is substantial focus on the price of fuel or purchased
electricity. In Texas there is additional focus on the availability of water (LCRA, 2009).
Ecosystems Services and Utility Rate Setting
Identifying the overlap between cost of service studies and payments for ecosystems services
lead (inevitably!) to Dr. Coase ant the New Institutional Economists (NIE). The Coasean NIE
analysis offers the critical breadth to include all expenditures associated with water abstraction
and the cost of water service. Economic analyses and discussion from various scholars from this
tradition offered a framework for discussing the importance of institutions that evolved from my
detailed review of rate setting processes. Coase and his colleagues described the value and
impact of relationships and delivery costs that matched processes documented in utility and
regulator publications, regional newspapers, and local blogging.
Dr. Coase and his cohort are cited in many scholarly articles 32 on ESV and PES as the basis for
including ESV in economic and financial analysis. Reviewing Coase’s theorem, writings of his
students and published rate setting and rate case information, the transaction cost analysis is
particularly useful. Transaction costs; the cost of “bringing a good or service to market” (Menard
and Shirley, 2011) aligns with managing landscapes to maximize the value of ecosystems
services. There are line items in the USoA for these types of activities. In discussion of
ecosystems services valuation and subsequent modeling, only a small amount of energy is
dedicated to understanding how to “bring the services to market. This disconnect is a grave
omission. An important stumbling block to taking ESV into mainstream economics and public
finance is the abstruse connection of theoretical values and costs to the concrete and steel of

See for example Cole et al., 2014, Muradian et al., 2010, Norgaard, 2010, Vatn, 2010, Galiani
and Schargrodsky, 2011,
32
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public finance. The NIE philosophy offers a mechanism to clarify, rationalize and concretize that
connection.
The study of New York City and LCRA mechanisms for abstracting and distributing ecosystems
services bring the impact of differing institutional frameworks for water supply into stark relief.
Differing reporting structures make it almost impossible to compare “apples to apples”.
NYCDEP is very open about water rates. Water rates are published annually from deep into the
previous century to the current year. Access to published water rates and tariffs for Texas
utilities is much more byzantine. Current water rates are published on-line as part of the online
water supply contract information (LCRA, 2015). Historical LCRA rates are published as part of
annual reports only when the rates change. The cost of water to retail NYC users can be
significantly higher than the cost of water to LCRA treated water customers depending on
consumption volumes33. This difference in water prices persist despite much higher
precipitation rates in the NYC area. It appears that water prices do not reflect the extreme
climactic differences between New York City and Texas. 34 Comparing the difference in water
prices from year to year to annual temperature fluctuation was similarly fruitless. Neither
temperature variation nor precipitation variation in either of the geographies of interest yielded
satisfactory models. From published LCRA literature, rate changes often come on the heels of
drought. The Palmer Drought severity index can be used to assess drought.
ESV - Evaluating Drought and Water Prices
I used the National Center for Atmospheric Research data set assembled by Dr. A. Dai at the
State University of New York in Albany (Dai, 2017) to compare drought to water prices in the

The LCRA uses an increasing block schedule of rates for water with the basic service of 2000
gallons/month. Higher usage volumes incur higher costs per 1000 gallons
34 It appears that differences in water prices between New York City and Texas reflect the fact
that electricity and water services are jointly produced in Texas and provided by separate
utilities in New York. The joint production of water and electricity services in Texas allows for
sharing of costs, and the cross-subsidization of capital, operations and maintenance costs from
the electricity side to water.
33
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two geographies of interest. The Dai annual average PDSI data set consists of the “Palmer
Drought Severity Index (PDSI) over global land areas on a 2.5-degree grid computed using
observed monthly surface air temperature and precipitation, plus other surface meteorological
forcing data for the self-calibrating PDSI Penman Monteith case. The PDSI can be used as a
measure of surface aridity anomalies and changes on seasonal to longer time scales. It is
correlated with observed soil moisture and water storage variations over land.“ (Dai, 2017). I
downloaded PDSI values for grids covering the Texas Colorado River watershed and the area
surrounding the Cat Del watershed. The Colorado River watershed is very large and covers
40,000 square miles. The NYCDEP Cat-Del watershed is much smaller covering only 2,000
square miles. Using the zonal statistics tool, I calculated mean PDSI values for the lower
Colorado river watershed from 1997 to 2014. The PDSI values downloaded for the Cat Del region
did not cover the entire region however a single value covered a large portion of the area and I
estimated that the PDSI was the same for the entire Cat Del watershed. These PDSI values were
used to compare water prices to drought conditions in each area of interest.
Transaction Costs –NYC Land Management Costs, Consumer Price Indices and Water Prices
Among the transaction costs identified in both the NIE literature and the USoA guidelines are
land maintenance costs. Published NYCDEP performance reports show NYCDEP property
purchases in the watershed over the course of the FAD period. A cursory review of land purchase
expenditures called for closer consideration of the impact of purchasing property on water
prices.
The National Association of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA) tracks the average annual cost of
clean water/ wastewater treatment against national average consumer price index (CPI)
(NACWA, 2017). The goal of the analysis is to highlight how wastewater system expenditures
connect to the larger economy. Stratton et al compare water and wastewater rates to the
national CPI also (Stratton et al, 2016). In my analysis, I compared regional urban CPIs to water
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utility prices. CPI data was taken from the Us Department of Labor Consumer Price Index
website. Both Stratton and NACWA note that water/wastewater rates are increasing faster than
the CPI. This scholarship connects increases to the increasing operating expenses and increasing
commodity prices (i.e. electricity and treatment chemicals), national water standard
compliance, drought, infrastructure maintenance and debt service (Stratton et al., 2016)
(NACWA, 2017). Comparing relationships between water prices and CPI for the Texas Colorado
River basin and the New York City Catskill Delaware watershed shed light on regional and
climate drivers of water price and economic variation.

Chapter 3.3 Analysis, Results & Conclusion
Analysis
In the context of this inquiry I will call the Price Impact of Ecosystems Services Valuation (ESV)
Payments for Ecosystems Services (PES). As discussed earlier, PES can take several forms;
permitting fees, fines, rents, etc. In most cases of ecosystems services trading PES includes
several forms. In the context of electricity and water utilities, utilities pay for environmental
goods/water. The price impact of ESV as PES are included in water utility prices with explicit
watershed set asides such as the New York City Catskill-Delaware watershed. For water and
electric utilities drawing water from mixed use landscapes PES are often spread across several
institutional entities. For the Lower Colorado River Authority and Austin Water, ecosystems
services management and censuring PES are the provenance of the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality (TCEQ). PES for water collection and storage are the responsibility of
Utilities.
“the Coase theorem . . states that when rights are perfectly defined, and the cost of transacting
is zero, resource allocation is efficient and independent of the pattern of ownership (Coase,
1960). However, because in reality the costs of transacting are positive, and the delineation and
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the enforcement of rights are costly, the system of property rights adopted by a given society will
affect the way its economy works. Indeed, as Coase has emphasized, his aim was not to suggest
that a zero-transaction cost was a plausible representation of the world but was instead set to
make clear the fundamental role that transaction costs do, and should, play in fashioning the
institutions that make up the economic system (Coase, 1988).” (Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2011).
Using the Coasean analysis, the size and direction of PES are influenced by institutional
frameworks and transaction costs. In the context of ecosystems services, trades will take place if
institutional frameworks can enable the trade and if transaction costs are not prohibitive.
Transaction costs can include the cost of utility infrastructure to take advantage of the
ecosystem service and the cost of employee salaries to operate it (Wang, 2003). Wang (2003)
indicates that transaction costs can also include the entire suite of policy induced costs. “In a
study of non-point source pollution control, transaction costs include information collection and
analysis, enactment of enabling legislation including lobbying cost, design and implementation
of the policy, support and administration of the on-going program, monitoring/detection, and
persecution/inducement cost. What was directly measured through interviews with program
staff and others is the amount of labor input required, which then is translated into monetary
cost. The result shows that the tax on fertilizer has the lowest transaction cost ($0.94 million),
followed by educational programs on best management practices ($3.11 million), the
requirement of conservation tillage on all cropped land ($7.85 million), and an expansion of a
permanent conservation easement program ($9.37million).“ (McCann & Easter, 1990 in Wang,
2003). “Hahn and Hester (1989) suggest that the Fox River water-pollutant trading program
failed because high transaction costs in the form of administrative requirements ultimately
eradicated potential gains from trade” (Wang, 2003).
Transaction costs are not the only costs involved in Watershed protection. Transaction costs
enable PES. PES was originally defined as a voluntary transaction for a well-defined ecological
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service, with at least one buyer, at least one provider, and based on the condition that the
buyer(s) only pay if the provider(s) continue to deliver the defined ecosystem service over time
(Wunder, 2005). Wunder describes government-financed PES as a centralized public
administration acting as a buyer on behalf of private service end-users (Wunder, 2015). The
voluntary provision of the PES definition calls into question the validity of the NYCDEP claim to
PES in the Cat-Del watershed. The eminent domain condemnation of valleys for reservoir
construction reinforced the inequality of power relations between NYCDEP and watershed
towns and ultimately drove up transaction costs by elevating long term Cat-Del resident
hostility. The right to eminent domain establishes the dominant position of NYCDEP relative to
local landowners. This power has been used to capture the economic value of environmental
services.
Institutional Frameworks for Assessing ESV and PES
The New York City Catskill-Delaware Watershed Experience
If transaction costs are included in the impact of incorporating ESV into resource pricing, the
impact of including ESV in utility pricing is far reaching. In the case of the New York City
Catskill Delaware watershed, transaction costs include all supporting costs for ensuring that
ESV,35 water that meets the filtration avoidance determination requirements, is actually
delivered. The payments for services are only a portion of the overall cost of operating and
maintaining the system. The literature identifies payments for services as the cost of land
acquisition, conservation easements and the cost of the agricultural agreement. Transaction
costs can include the extensive litigation required to come to an agreement with watershed
municipalities plus the extensive monitoring and modeling efforts that keep New York City’s
filtration Avoidance agreement in place. While the ecosystems services/ watershed management
approach promises to reduce both construction and operation costs, these costs are not readily
NYCDEP rate case documents justify rate increases using increasing generic capital and
operational costs (nyc_rate Report_fy17{1}.pdf).
35

202

discernable in standard rate case documentation. A review of NYCDEP “Public information
regarding water and wastewater rates” documents moneys spent on water supply and on
wastewater treatment. Personnel related expenses and fixed costs such office electricity costs,
are aggregated with more variable costs such as land purchases and property taxes into
categories like Water System & wastewater system (NYCWB, 2011). There is no line item for
watershed land purchased although moneys allocated for watershed protection are described in
detail in the narrative portion of the document (NYCWB, 2016). Neither the existing public
reporting methods nor the standard rate case format facilitate understanding or ecosystems
services(ESS) impact on utility budgets or rate setting.
In the 2006, USEPA final report on full cost pricing of water and wastewater service, Beecher
notes, “Comparing the O&M expenses of an electric utility with that of a water utility, it is
evident that the electric utility is focused far more on source and supply, while the primary focus
of the water utility is transmission. Source of supply and production-related O&M expenses
account for nearly 90% of the electric utility’s expenses and less than 5% of the water utility’s
expenses. Treatment, transmission and distribution, and pumping expenses account for the
majority of the water utility’s O&M expenses, followed by administrative and general (A&G)
expenses” (Beecher, 2007). Ecosystems services-based management of water supply systems are
implemented to manage water quality without constructing treatment facilities. From this
perspective watershed management techniques reassign water management costs from the
treatment bucket to the supply and production bucket. Regardless of this labeling sleight of
hand, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) Uniform System
of Accounts(USoA) for class A/B Water Utilities has created line items for Land and land rights
under the “Utility Plant” heading,” The accounts for land and land rights include the cost of land
owned in fee by the utility and rights, interests, and privileges held by the utility in land owned
by others, such as leaseholds, easements, water and water power rights, diversion rights,
submersion rights, rights of way, and other like interests in land.”(NARUC, 2002) Expenses
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assigned to these line items could reasonably be called rate base in cost of service studies. The
cost of land purchase does not appear in the 2009 Booz Allen Hamilton study of NYCDEP water
and wastewater rates (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2009). This heading also does not appear in annual
NYCDEP rate setting documentation. This discontinuity in water utility accounting suggests that
institutional oversight has not evolved to clarify ecosystems services inputs. Neither PES nor
ESS transaction costs are readily discernible, and the basis of water price variation is difficult to
extract from published financial data. The value of ecosystems services, however, is at the heart
of the watershed land use management approach to water supply development and in the case of
New York City all the associated transaction costs and PES are part of the rate making process.
The Texas LCRA Austin Water Experience
While Dr Beecher’s generalization about water utility O&M expenditures may hold true for
many US water utilities, published literature indicates that water utilities in the arid US west
spend a great deal of time, thought and money on source and supply. Interestingly, several
utilities in the arid US west are both water utilities and electric utilities. Water management and
electricity generation in these regions function in an entirely different culture with different
vulnerabilities and exigencies from separate water and electric utilities elsewhere in the US. The
history of rural electrification and water development in the American west created a vast (and
of late highly contested) landscape of water rationalization. Many combined water/electric
utilities in the arid west are the grandchildren of early 20th century water rationalization. These
utilities are subject to rate setting norms of both the electric industry and the water industry
(Beecher, 2007). Water allocation is assigned by rights structures in some cases over 100 years
old (Roderick, 1986). The NARUC Uniform System of Accounts (USoA) for Class A/B Water
Companies allows for accounting of lakes reservoirs springs and wells. As noted, it also allows
for accounting of land and land rights. The Public Utility Commission of Texas uses a modified
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version the NARUC USoA designating land and land rights not applicable in water utility plant
in service category (PUCT, 2018).
While water is a highly valued good, the ecosystems services value of provisioning water is not
clearly identified in the Austin water/ LCRA or Texas in general rate case process (Raftelis,
2017)(PUCT, 2018). Unclear expression of ESV for water and electric generation may be an
artifact of water management in the state of Texas. Texas water is managed by several state-wide
entities; the Texas Water Development Board and the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality (TCEQ). The Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) is tasked with managing statewide water development. The TWDB maintains a state water plan and provides technical and
financial support to regional and local water entities. The TCEQ is the state environmental
oversight entity. The Texas Public Utilities Commission (TPUC) assumed control of nonwholesale water /wastewater utility rates in 2013 further dispersing water management
oversight.
In the 2018 Texas water/wastewater pricing framework, (PUCT, 2018) some PES transaction
costs “information collection and analysis, enactment of enabling legislation including lobbying
cost, design and implementation of the policy, support and administration of the on-going
program, monitoring/detection, and persecution/inducement cost” (Wang, 2003) are the
purview of the TCEQ. Other transaction costs; the costs of collection and distribution
infrastructure are the responsibility of the water, water/wastewater or
water/wastewater/electric utility. The rate setting oversight entity is also separate. Review of
rate case documents for Austin water and LCRA indicate there are funded programs that
support land purchase or management and stream/creek-side management.(Raftelis, 2017)
(LCRA, n.d.). In the FY2009 business plan, the LCRA notes that water-based ecosystems
services oversight is spread across a host of regulatory entities (LCRA, 2019). Therefore, it seems
safe to conclude that the PES and transaction costs i.e. the full impact of maintaining
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ecosystems services or ecosystems services value is not incorporated into LCRA and Austin
water (or electric) water utility pricing.
Results
Climate, Ecosystems Services and Valuation
As noted in earlier chapters, ecosystems services can vary based on weather and ultimately
climate. There is some concern among utility managers especially in the arid west that IPCC
projected changes in regional climate may impact the cost of water service procurement (Pate et
al, 2007). Reviewing the history of water prices and the history relationships between climactic
variables and water prices in this study, there is clearly some merit in that concern.
In the analysis below the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) is used as a proxy for weather
variables of precipitation and temperature. As discussed, the PDSI is generated in a process
evaluating hydrology, evapotranspiration, groundwater recharge, storm water runoff, soil
moisture loss and precipitation. Negative PDSI indicates drought with increasing negative
numbers indicating increasing drought severity. PDSI greater than zero indicates adequate rain
or excess rain as positive numbers grow larger. Figure 3.1 and 3.3 below show trends of water
prices for the LCRA and for NYCDEP.
New York City
Based on the earlier discussion of including land acquisition/land management costs in ratebase calculations, New York City water rates were compared not only to PDSI but to total
accumulated watershed land purchases. Both graphical analysis and ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression analysis of New York City water prices suggest that DEP water prices have a
strong relationship to water prices. The graph in figure 3.1 below suggests that for years prior to
and including 2015, cumulative land purchases were the strongest predictor of New York City
water rate increases. This is consistent with both the requirements of National Association of
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Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) Uniform System of Accounts for class A/B Water
Utilities and with NY Water Board reports that 40% of the NYCDEP budget goes to debt service
a portion of which provides for land acquisition payments (NARUC, 2002). NYC DEP has
established a prioritization scheme based on location of land areas with respect to reservoirs and
waterways (NRC, 2000). The cost of financing land purchases, a function of cumulative land
purchased, is embedded in the cost of service. Reports from NYC Cat-Del watershed
communities suggest that land purchases will be problematic for New York City moving
forward. Local watershed municipal administrators “expect the city to begin challenging tax
assessments on the land it owns”(Cairns, 2006). Increased property purchases will not only be a
capital expense but an operational expense as part of the FAD agreement was an NYC
commitment to pay property taxes. 36
The models presented below compare NYCDEP water rates to PDSI, to the average consumer
price index for the north east (CPI) and to all three variables; PDSI, CPI and the total cumulative
acres purchased by NYCDEP in watershed counties. These relationships are visualized in figure
3.1 below. Water prices are expected to increase with increasing drought conditions/ decreasing
PDSI. Water prices are also expected to increase with increasing cumulative property purchases.
These analyses involve a small sample; data from 1996 to 2017, 22 data points in all. As such,
the models below make no claim to universality.37 They do, however, suggest important
relationships evolving from recent environmental policies in southeastern New York State.
These models also point to potential vulnerabilities of existing NYCDEP water supply policies
moving forward.

It is also possible that the DEP is purchasing cheapest land first, and over time the cost per
acre is increasing.
37 Data in these models were not organized as time series or panel data. As such the DurbinWatson(DW) test for Autocorrelation was not calculated. Subsequently the model was run as a
time series and the Durbin Watson coefficient for model 4 was .6. This positive DW outcome
suggests that there that the model is insufficiently specified and that there is data left out
improve the efficiency of the model.
36

207

Figure 3.1 Variables impacting NYC water rates

PDSI<0 = DROUGHT

1997
NYC
FAD

. The OLS regressions in figure 3.2 below suggest that the climate conditions captured in the
PDSI may drive as much 28% of the variation of New York City water rates.
Figure 3.2 OLS modeling of variables impacting NYC water rates
Explanatory
Variables

Dependent Variable: NYC Water Rates-$/100cf
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Intercept

2.091(0.175)*
**

0.892(0.132)
***

1.130(0.136)***

1.03(0.139)***

Palmer
Drought
Severity Index

.1779(.0675)*
*

-.081(0.034)**

-0.0679(0.0329)*

0.729(0.067)***

0.8111(0.0762)**

Cumulative
DEP Acres
Purchased/10,
000
Annual
Average CPI
for the Urban
NE/100
r^2

.867(0.078)*
**
0.289

0.87

0.00077(0.00041)*
0.891
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0.909

As noted in figure 3.1, negative values of PDSI indicate drought. In the models in figure 3.2, the
negative PDSI coefficient indicates that as PDSI decreases (and drought conditions grow more
severe) water rates increase. A combination of PDSI and cumulative property purchases can
account for as much as 89 % of water rate variation.
Looking forward, the FAD and subsequent land acquisition requirements call for NYC land
purchases to a maximum of 350,000 acres (NYS Dept. of Health and US EPA, 2017). Land
purchase costs may drive water rate increases until the target acreage has been acquired. Once
these purchases are complete, PES will take the form of property taxes. Rising taxes in
watershed counties have been documented (Downeast Development Consulting Group, 2009).
ESV related hedonic pricing increases have also been noted. As increasing acreage is set aside
for non-commercial purposes, available property increases in value because of the appeal of
surrounding “pristine forest lands”. This falls into the cultural services/ecosystem services
bucket. As the value of property increases so does the taxable value. The cost of maintaining the
watershed is likely to increase over time based on property taxes alone. The Consumer Price
Index (CPI) for the urban north east tracks with water prices as well (BLS, 2017). The
relationship between CPI and NYC water rates confirms that water prices impact consumer
costs and vice versa.
The Lower Colorado River Basin
LCRA wholesale water prices are set in conjunction with the Texas Public Utilities Commission
(LCRA, 2009). Because the LCRA is responsible for only a portion of ESV maintaining activities,
prices reflect only the LCRA ES management activities. The LCRA does not pay for all the
transaction costs of bringing ecosystems services to market. LCRA does not own a significant
portion of the Texas Colorado river watershed and has limited property for property tax liability.
LCRA is not responsible for monitoring/maintaining water quality (TCEQ/Water) or
maintaining water delivery beyond the wholesale distribution system for most of their
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customers (LCRA, 2009). LCRA prices reflect full cost recovery for the LCRA water and electric
system. They do not, however, reflect the full cost of ecosystems services maintenance.
Authority annual reports indicate that most frequently changes in wholesale prices coincide with
variations in annual precipitation and regional drought conditions. While not explicitly stated, it
appears that water pricing is used as a conservation enforcement measure. “Water supplies
managed by LCRA are divided into firm and interruptible water. Firm water is available even
during a severe drought. During water shortages, the supply of interruptible water, 38which is
mostly used for agriculture, is reduced or cut off completely.” (LCRA, 2015).
The graph in figure 3.3 below shows how LCRA wholesale firm water prices vary.
Figure 3.3 Variables impacting Lower Colorado River Authority water rates
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The consumer price index tracks almost perfectly with LCRA water prices. This closeness speaks
to the role purchased water plays in the economy of the arid southwestern US. Comparing

Interruptible water prices vary during the year based on previous customer water withdrawal
and customer specific water allocation
38
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LCRA firm wholesale prices to PDSI values calculated annually, there appears to be a lag in
administrative pricing response. This may be a function of how the annual PDSI is calculated or
how the lower Colorado river region responds to water scarcity and drought conditions Palmer
creator of the Palmer Drought Severity Index points out “We can describe drought in terms of
accumulation of the monthly index values” (Palmer, 1965), “a single wet month during a very
dry summer should not by the following summer have any great influence on the severity of a
drought influence of a drought which had continued during the intervening period” (ibid.). The
data for this analysis was downloaded as a cumulative annual gridded data set. A geographic
mean for the lower Colorado river basin was calculated for each year. It is possible that a single
annual PDSI number fails to capture regional water dynamics that drive administrative change.
Figure 3.4 Texas Drought
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Figure 3.4 above from the national integrated drought information system shows water
stress across the state of Texas. As would be expected Texas appears to be in a state of
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water stress more than half the time. Horizontal axis variables D0 through D4 represent
drought severity. The vertical axis indicates the percentage of Texas land area experiencing
drought.
D0 - Abnormally Dry

D3 - Extreme Drought

• Short-term dryness slowing planting,

• Major crop/pasture losses

growth of crops

• Widespread water shortages or

• Some lingering water deficits

restrictions

• Pastures or crops not fully recovered
D4 - Exceptional Drought
D1 - Moderate Drought

• Exceptional and widespread crop/pasture
losses

• Some damage to crops, pastures

• Shortages of water creating water

• Some water shortages developing

emergencies
• Voluntary water-use restrictions

(NDIS, 2019)
D2 - Severe Drought
• Crop or pasture loss likely
• Water shortages common
• Water restrictions imposed

Figure 3.5 below shows Palmer Drought Severity Indexes calculated for the Austin/ LCRA track
closely with the statewide drought indicators. Exceptional Drought-D4 spikes are for the most
part matched with strong negative PDSI values. LCRA firm wholesale prices have a less well-

212

defined relationship to both LCRA and statewide drought indicators. The LCRA web-presence
publishes water curtailment requirements associated with decreasing water levels in the
Highland Lakes reservoirs. It does not however publish price increase protocols. From the
graph, it appears that prices are increased after an extended period of drought conditions. This
may be because of limited political support for raising water prices until extreme scarcity
reservoir levels have been reached or it may be that the regulatory process for raising water
prices is slow and administrative controls on water scarcity are always playing catch-up to the
regional hydrology. LCRA annual reporting points out that drought is famously difficult to
predict (LCRA, 2019). In a state so dependent on agriculture, raising water rates or limiting
interruptible water may require a crippling level of social consensus.
Figure 3.5 Texas Drought, PDSI and LCRA firm water prices
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Figures 3.6 a & b below show the results of OLS modeling of firm wholesale water prices, PDSI
and CPI for the urban south. The LCRA uses both water prices for firm and interruptible water
and interruptible water curtailments to manage water supply in drought conditions. The models
below estimate only the relationship between firm water prices and drought.
Figure 3.6 a OLS modeling of LCRA firm water prices
Dependent Variable: LCRA Firm Wholesale Water Prices $/100
CF

Explanatory
Variables
Intercept
Palmer Drought
Severity Index

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

0.296(.011)***

−0.049(0.032)

−0.047(0.037)

−0.0096( 0.005)*

Annual Average CPI
for the Urban
South/100
r^2

−0.0003(0.002)

0.0017(0.00016)***
0.149

0.0017( 0.0001)**

0.85

0.85

The models in figure 3.6 a suggest a very minor relationship between PDSI and wholesale firm
water prices. These modeling outcomes show only part of the LCRA administrative response to
drought. This may explain the weak association between PDSI and firm water prices. It is also
possible that administrative lag obscures a stronger relationship
Figure 3.6 b time-lag OLS modeling of LCRA firm water prices and PDSI
Dependent Variable: LCRA Firm Wholesale Water Prices
$/100 CF

Explanatory
Variables
Intercept
Palmer Drought
Severity Index
r^2

No shift

Shift forward 1 year

shift back 1 year

0.296(.011)***

0.296(.011)***

0.296(.011)***

−0.0096(
0.005)*

-0.010(0.005)*

-0.012(0.005)**

0.149

0.168

0.23
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Because the LCRA fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30 it is possible that the time frame for
price changes do not coincide exactly with the time frame for annual average PDSI. Figure 3.6 b
above tests the correlation of PDSI to LCRA wholesale firm pricing shifted a year ahead and a
year behind. The OLS analysis using pricing data shifted a year earlier generates a PDSI model
that explains a larger portion of price variation, has a larger absolute value coefficient of
variation, a smaller P value and a larger t ratio. Based on this analysis and figure 3.6 a above, it
appears that LCRA raises water prices only after an extended period of drought conditions. The
2015 price increase from $150/acre-foot to $175/acre-foot came toward the end of an extended
drought period all over Texas. (see figure 3.5)
Conclusion
Returning to the question of impacts of ecosystems services on utility pricing, analysis of New
York City water prices and Lower Colorado River Authority firm wholesale prices suggest that
prices do track with availability of ecosystems services. Analysis presented in this paper
suggests that as availability of services decrease measured as drought severity, prices increase
particularly in Texas, a region plagues with “boom/bust’ cycles of flooding and drought.
Comparison of LCRA and NYCDEP public records suggest it may be inferred that as
responsibility for ecosystems services value maintenance and delivery is concentrated in a single
entity i.e. the water supply utility, water prices include more of the costs of providing or value of
ecosystems services. Understanding and creating business systems to capture and incorporate
the full value and cost of providing ecosystems services is the next challenge.
Utility and business accounting systems gather and store information to provide standard
financial statements to stockholders, financial institutions and regulating agencies. For
NYCDEP publicly available documents reviewed do not reveal mechanisms to extract all costs
associated with ecosystems services out of financial data gathered annually. For the LCRA
publicly available reports show where some ecosystems services monitoring activities
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(transaction costs) are “outsourced” to government entities. LCRA reports also show how the
cost of capturing and delivering ecosystems services are spread across two essential service
sectors; water and electricity. For LCRA customers, the impact of payments for ecosystems
services and associated transaction costs on consumer prices is distributed over several payment
structures. For utilities like New York City DEP that deliver potable water only from a closely
managed watershed, all the payments for ecosystems services and associated transaction costs
are condensed into water rates.
Whether or not the value of ecosystems services finds its way into utility pricing, the regional
economies will pay the price. What are the ways the cost of ESV (water quality) maintenance
accrue to individual riverine systems? The LCRA is a self-identified full cost recovery operation
(LCRA, 2019). It is not responsible for water quality regulation ES39. Non-utility oversight of ES
leads to externalization of ESV maintenance/regulation(transaction) costs. Government
regulatory entities pick up the slack (TCEQ, 2010). Water quality maintenance/regulation across
the state of Texas (ESV transaction costs) is shouldered by the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and funded with public monies. Insofar at the LCRA pays taxes,
a portion of corporate taxes go to the TCEQ water quality management systems. Individual taxpayers in riverine landscapes pay based on income and property value. Property value and
property taxes are based on property value that can be related to local water quality and
quantity. The hedonic pricing method of estimating ESV suggests that varying property values
based on environmental quality can be a measure of ESV. A report commissioned by Llano and
Burnett counties on the economic impact of the Colorado River Highland lakes suggest that a
10% drop in lake water levels cause business activity to drop by more than 20% (TXP, et al.,
2012). The recreation value of high-quality water is highlighted in by the differential value of

39

There is an LCRA environmental testing laboratory that contracts with responsible parties for water
quality analysis.
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highland lakes waterfront property (ibid.). These values are only embedded in the LCRA rates
thru corporate taxes.
If it is desirable that utility prices inform consumers of the cost of public goods, the utility
accounting systems reviewed do not enable a robust accounting of ecosystem services.
Institutional oversight in the geographies under analysis has not evolved to clarify payments for
ecosystems services or ecosystems services value inputs. Transaction costs are not readily
discernable. Institutional frameworks for developing the cost of water and electricity service
reviewed have no institutional mechanisms for explicitly connecting ESV to service costs. Rate
case frameworks reviewed do not enable assessment of total payments for ecosystems services
or transaction costs. PES and transaction cost information is buried in the detailed accounting
sections of rate case guidance documents reviewed . Rate case and USoA formats reviewed have
line items that could be used to asses ES inputs; however, review of existing publicly available
documents suggest that these line items are not consistently used. In watershed
management/filtration avoidance type water systems ESV as PES are included in water utility
prices (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2009). In water systems that require full scale treatment prior to
distribution payments for ecosystems services may be small and spread across a number or
regulatory jurisdictions (AWWA, 2012).
Payments for Ecosystems Services happen. The value of ecosystems services is part of all
economies, whether payments are delivered real time as the cost of goods and services or
generations later as loss of property value and degraded landscapes. As humans grapple with the
very real limits of planetary goods and services characterized by the water energy nexus, tools
must be developed to identify the ecosystems services inputs to the cost of essential services.
Current ES modeling and WEN scholarship focus on processes not payments. As utilities
increasingly claim to use ecosystem services for service provision, we need better tools to track
ecosystems services value and payments in our existing economies.
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The Water Energy Nexus in Consumption Behavior: Conclusion
The Questions
This work began with several questions comparing the relationship between water and energy
demand for the arid west and northeastern United States:
1. The Water Energy Nexus in Regional and Local Scale Consumption: What
Consumption Trends Drive Hot Weather Electricity and Water System
Operations ?
2. The Water Energy Nexus and Ecosystem Services: What are Some Potential
impacts of IPCC Climate Projections on Water Supply and Electricity ?
3. The Water Energy Nexus and Payments for Ecosystem services: The Price
Impacts of Including Ecosystem services Value in Utility Rates ?
The results of these analyses create a whole greater than the sum of its parts. First a brief review
of the individual question conclusions.

Question Conclusion Summaries
Question 1
What consumption trends drive hot weather electricity and water system operation ?- What are
the impacts of weather and climate on electricity use and water consumption? The null
hypothesis is that weather and climate affect neither electricity use nor water consumption. My
analysis was able to disprove the null hypothesis while revealing other important factors
contributing to increased water and electricity consumption in hot weather.
Engineered solutions evolve in response to a given set of social needs. Social behavior is
malleable. Water and energy access, in many places, are not (Ceschin and Gaziulusoy, 2016).
The outcome of these analyses clarifies the impacts of consumption behavior on water and
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electricity delivery systems. The synergies of water and electricity consumption explored here
suggest pathways to informed decision making in the context of climate change adaptation and
planning for population growth.
Results of the data analysis align with industry reports identifying urban centers as electric load
pockets and wastewater generation hubs (Benjamin, 2008; Kazimi and Furumai, 2005). The
spatial scale of electric load data used in this study obscured relationships with wastewater
generation behavior. Both wastewater generation and electricity use however, track with
temperature in the summer. In SENY, a region where an 8% change in electric use can be worth
millions of dollars (NYC DCAS, n.d.), small increases in energy using behaviors like wastewater
generation may have important impacts on the electrical grid. OLS modeling of wastewater
generation variability was able to explain as much as 4 % of the variability in electricity usage in
SENY. Poverty emerged as a key negative determinant in wastewater generation in almost all
the OLS models tested. Building age and residence size most consistently offer significant,
positive contributions to wastewater generation. There is an unexpectedly non-significant
precipitation signal in New York . “Most large municipal sewer systems in New York State
consist of combined sewers in older downtown urban areas with separate sanitary and storm
sewers serving outlying suburban areas. Each combined sewer is required to have coverage
under a municipal wastewater treatment plant's State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(SPDES) permit, which is issued by DEC.”(NYSDEC, n.d.). New York City counties all have
combined sewers, carrying both rainfall run-off and sanitary sewage. Given the use of combined
sewers in all of New York City and many of the high-density regions around the state, it seems
likely that rainfall would have had a correlation with wastewater flow. 40The Texas precipitation
signal is larger suggesting problems with storm water infiltrating the sewer system. In both

Combined Sewers suggest that a correlation between rainfall and wastewater flows would
exist up to the point that the WWTP capacity is reached.
40
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SENY and high-density New York State counties modeling suggests that smaller housing units
are more resource conservative.
How do these outcomes inform utility and regional planning?
These outcomes offer several insights.
●

Persons dwelling in larger older residences are the largest per person electric users and
wastewater generators.

●

While high density areas have a lower per person water and electric use profile, high density
counties still draw the majority of electricity used state-wide and generate the largest
volume of wastewater.

●

These findings may provide a basis for requiring grey water recycling, microgrids and on
site “distributed” electricity generation technologies in new construction in high density
areas in NYC and cities in the arid west.

●

Relationships developed in this analysis can suggest the direction and size of resource use
changes in the context of increasing temperatures and the impact of increasing population
density and climate-based demand.

The limitations in available wastewater generation data and electric use data limits the power
of estimating land cover impacts on water and electric use in hot weather in this analysis. The
spatial and temporal disconnect of publicly available data allows tentative statements only. This
analysis does suggest that electricity and water system overload vulnerabilities exist. A closer
look at hourly wastewater flows and more geographically specific electric use assessments in
high density load zones will enable more confident risk assessments. Further work in this area
will require more granular data in the high-density counties of New York State and Texas.
Question 2
What is the value of ecosystem services associated with modern water and electricity provision
and what might some costs of projected climate change be ? The null hypothesis is that the value
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of ecosystem services used for the same purpose would be substantially the same in the two
climate zones. This analysis revealed an interesting divergence from that initial hypothesis;
Water provisioning ecosystem services were evaluated across a northeastern boreal watershed
and a southwestern arid watershed. 2010 baseline ecosystem services value model outputs were
compared to model outputs using downscaled IPCC climate projections for 2050 and 2080.
Market price-based ecosystem services values were used to measure the economic impact of
ecosystem changes on resource availability. Projecting availability of water for domestic supply
and electricity generation as temperature varies revealed climate-based vulnerabilities and the
cost of vulnerability.
The results of these analyses revealed some unexpected nuances. Comparing market prices in
the different climate zones uncovered two distinct valuation systems. Ecosystem services value
from a watershed used exclusively for domestic water supply can be assigned using only the
price of water for domestic water supply. Water provisioning ecosystem services used for
domestic water supply , irrigation and electric power generation can be assigned value based on
both the price of domestic water supply, irrigation water and water for electric generation.
Ecosystem services value depends entirely on hydro-social systems in place. It seems realistic to
infer that no absolute value can be assigned to a particular type of ecosystem, that value is
always socially mediated. As needs evolve so will the value of ecosystem services (Costanza et
al., 2017). Ecosystem services value increases as the number of essential services depending on
them increases. I explored this question to uncover a potential relationship between market
prices and climate zones and found evidence to support an alternative hypothesis that utility
ownership patterns (separate water – electric vs combined water-electric utilities) is the more
important distinction.
Assigning value to ecosystem services embedded in the water/energy nexus using the market
price valuation method for public utility services ignores the rate setting process that can enable
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cross-subsidized prices. Using a single market price fails to capture multiple resource prices
contributing to the value of water provisioning ecosystem services. In most cases public water
rates are set based on the ability of the water utility to convince an oversight body of the cost of
providing service. Rates are set to defray the cost of providing service and maximize utility to
the consumer (Alt, 2006). The LCRA provides water and electricity. For the LCRA the cost of
impounding and delivering water is covered by both water and electricity rates. The LCRA
benefits from “economies of scope”. It provides treated water to residential users in north of
Austin communities at a rate lower than the average Austin water rate and at a lower rate than
NYCDEP water. The cost of LCRA water abstraction is shared across several value sectors. The
aggregate value of the ecosystem services is high while the cost of separate water-based services
in an arid climate remains comparable to water and electricity prices elsewhere in the country.
The services provided by NYC DEP are water supply and wastewater management. NYC Water
rates are set to cover both services (NYCWB, 2018). While state and federal regulators
periodically review compliance with the Filtration Avoidance Determination, NYCDEP is
responsible for all of the data collection, analysis and reporting. New York city water rate payers
are burdened with the entire cost of water and wastewater infrastructure.
Ecosystem service value can change with vulnerability (Weisshuhn et al, 2018). Water scarcity is
at the core of the hydro-social system in Texas (TWDB, 2017). Abundant Texas sunshine offers
alternatives to the existing water-energy nexus. However, changing the Texas electricity
generation mix won’t necessarily help manage water scarcity. Electricity generation in Texas is
a non-consumptive water use process. The majority of water used in power generation either for
steam generation or for system cooling is returned to surface water (King et al., 2008).
All hydrologic modeling in this analysis for New York State projects abundant water for the
foreseeable future. Abundance can reduce incentives for collaborative water management. In the
NYC Cat-Del system, the value of ecosystem services accrues to only downstate water users.
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While NYC DEP is a fully integrated water utility providing water supply, wastewater and storm
water management services, my research uncovered no economies of scope between the water
and wastewater sectors of the utility except as relates to demand management.

The linked infrastructure systems in Texas must optimize the value of ecosystem services.
Efficiency programs to mitigate the effects of changing water availability and climate change can
be implemented with a company-wide program rather than as part of a public/private
agreement ( LCRA, 2012). For the near term, closer coordination of resource demand can allow
for smoother un-fragmented adaptation to changing weather patterns at the regional scale
optimizing ecosystem services value as ecosystems themselves adapt to change.
Question 3
How might the inclusion of Price of Ecosystem Services in Water and Electricity rate-making
proceedings affect the prices of water and electricity?
The premise of this inquiry is that electricity and water rates do not fully reflect the price of
ecosystem services. I expected to conclude that a fuller accounting of PES in utility rates would
drive end-user costs up. My conclusion is that although some payments for ecosystem services
are included in utility prices, others are borne by taxpayers.
My review of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) revealed no way of capturing and
aggregating payments of ecosystem services (FASB, 2019).
Unpeeling the ecological economics of water and electricity provision revealed similarities and
differences in regional systems. While markets respond to price points, public utilities are not
exactly markets (Vatn, 2009). They respond slowly. Utility price setting is subject to a host of
exigencies generally not part of ordinary goods or service pricing (Alt, 2006). Reviewing utility
pricing suggests that New York City water prices and Lower Colorado River Authority firm

230

wholesale prices do track with availability of ecosystem services. 41 Availability of services was
measured as drought severity. This research suggests that concentrating ecosystem services use
value in a single service, i.e. water supply, funnels the cost of accumulating and delivering
ecosystem services into water prices. The price of goods and services are an important driver of
consumption, but water is a non-substitutable good with inelastic demand.(Bakker, 2018)
Water scarcity is managed in the LCRA service territory with price increases, and in cases of
extreme drought, allocation reductions (LCRA, n.d.). LCRA water prices do not however include
the full cost of maintaining and delivering ecosystems water provisioning services. Payments for
ecosystems services are allocated to both LCRA water and electricity business units. The LCRA
manages Colorado River flows for flood control and for water supply. All LCRA electricity
generation is water based; either steam turbine generation or hydroelectric42 ( LCRA. n.d.). The
water LCRA collects and delivers is either sold to water users or used for electricity generation
and returned to the Highland Lakes reservoirs. The combined water and electricity revenues
cover the operating costs of the Authority. The LCRA is a full cost recovery operation only when
bundling water and electricity revenues into one organization.
The cost of collecting and delivering water provisioning ecosystem services may change in the
context of climate change. “Full cost recovery” pricing of ES delivery can be an important
indicator/measure of service delivery system vulnerability. For economists, policy makers and
legislators struggling to create “climate ready” resource and service delivery systems, ‘full cost
recovery’ payments for ecosystem services are an essential tool (Dige et al., 2013). Research for
this paper did not uncover any accounting tool or mechanism to extract all costs associated with
ecosystem services out of financial data gathered for private or public entities annually.

NYC DEP serves mostly domestic and commercial customers. It delivers treated water to all of
its’ customers.
42 LCRA is adding solar power to its portfolio in late summer 2019(LCRA.org/energy)
41
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The value of ecosystem services is part of all economies, whether payments are delivered in real
time or generations later (Economics for the Environment Consultancy, 2005). The limits of
available global goods and services demand that we capture the ecosystem services inputs to the
cost of essential services. Current modeling and scholarship reviewed focus on ecosystem
services valuation processes not payments. If we are to require utilities to account for use of
ecosystem services for resource provision, we need better tools to track ecosystem services value
and payments in our existing economies. My research suggests that if the costs of ecosystem
services were fully reflected in electricity and water rates, those charges would in some cases be
higher. Environmental economic theory suggests however, that the price-induced adjustments
in water and electricity use may obviate the need for environmental regulation (Ferris et al.,
2017).
Synthesis
Integrated management of water and electricity requires an understanding of resource codemand as well as shared factor inputs. In the previous sections data were gathered and
analyzed to reveal the shared supply and demand mechanisms. Here all of the outcomes are
considered to generate a multifaceted vision. Taken together the outcomes of these 3 questions
offer a unique window into the water energy nexus.
Yes, people in the study areas use more water and electricity in hot weather. How much more
depends on geography and the age and size of their homes. Data analysis suggests that wealthier
people use more water and electricity per household/person than the less wealthy. 43
Water provisioning ecosystem services provide inputs to more essential systems in the Texas
LCRA basin than in the NYC Cat-Del watershed. The Texas Colorado River watershed serves
multiple uses; water supply, water for electric generation, irrigation and water for unrestricted

While wealthier households may have access to more energy- and water-efficient appliances,
but these savings are offset by more uses (AC, pools, dishwashers, etc.)
43
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recreation (LCRA, 2012). The Cat-Del watershed serves only one; water supply44. The value of
ecosystem services and payments for ecosystem services are reflected in part in the price of
water and electricity services and in the regional taxes in the study areas.
In addition to the price of water, payments for ecosystem services include transaction costs: the
regulatory activities that monitor and protect environmental quality and the infrastructure
necessary to bring the service to market (Coase, 1960). In the NYC Cat-Del payments for
watershed management, water abstraction services, and water delivery services are included in
the water rates charged by the New York City Department of Environmental Protection. In the
Texas LCRA basin, payments for watershed management are made to the state in the form of
taxes (TCEQ, n.d.). Payments for water abstraction services and water distribution services are
made to the LCRA. Regardless of how payments for ecosystem services are made, research for
this paper has uncovered no large-scale mechanism for identifying and aggregating payments
for ecosystem services. Payments for ecosystem services are buried in public utility financial
records or in regulatory financial statements. None of the generally accepted accounting
methods reviewed contain any reasonable way to extract these data.
Using ecosystem services for water and wastewater treatment has a broad impact. When water
utilities manage water quality using ecosystem services rather than traditional engineered
treatment facilities, they are also creating demand for workers with different skill sets.
Ecosystem services-based water treatment requires hydrologists, GIS specialists, conservation
biologists and bio-geo-chemists rather than treatment plant operators and mechanics, civil
engineers and construction workers (Am. Rivers, 2012). The availability of skilled workers
needed to support the shift to ecosystem services-based technologies may be a barrier to shifting
water management paradigms.

Increasingly NYCDEP is attempting to make parts of the Cat-Del watershed available for
recreation (NYCDEP, 2013)
44
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The Water-Energy Nexus takes different forms in different geographies and different hydrosocial systems (Keeler et al.,2019). Regional climactic stresses drive electricity provision and
water supply stress. In the Texas LCRA system, water scarcity drives essential service delivery.
LCRA electric generation; hydro-electric and steam-based electricity generation is vulnerable to
water scarcity. Drought threatens the ability to generate electricity. In the Texas Colorado River
basin, the cost of water abstraction infrastructure is born by all LCRA customers. In their annual
reports the LCRA notes that water rates alone would not cover the costs of operating the utility
(LCRA, 2012). The water abstraction infrastructure; dams, reservoirs conduits, pipes and
channels as well as the electric generation infrastructure, run of river and impoundment hydro
generation as well as steam-based generation are paid for from all revenues.
In question 1, I showed the breakdown between the revenues from the LCRA electricity
generating entity and the water supply entity. Electric revenues are more than two times larger
than water revenues even though water service counties outnumber electric service counties. In
2012, electric power revenues made up approximately 72% of LCRA revenue (Kanin, 2012). This
economic breakdown suggests that electricity sales subsidize water service in the LCRA service
territory. It was also noted that the price of LCRA treated water for domestic water supply in
2015 was lower than NYC Water Board prices. LCRA prices for interruptible irrigation water are
even lower though agriculture is the largest water user in the state of Texas. The business model
for water and electricity provision in the LCRA, based on the cross-subsidization of water
services by electric ratepayers, may actually keep water prices artificially low for both residential
and agricultural users. The trio of electricity, domestic water supply and irrigation water might
seem at first glance like an ideal model for water development across the arid western US and
arid regions across the globe. In the arid western US, however, the existing hydrology is
increasingly unable to supply water demand associated with agriculture and population growth
(Hansen et al., 2011). It may be that subsidizing water prices with electricity revenues keeps
water prices artificially low and stimulate the demand for water, demand that the existing
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hydrology cannot satisfy. Dependence on electric revenues to fund water supply may also act as
a barrier to the market penetration of alternative energy technologies, such as wind and solar 45.
It can be inferred that, to the extent that high electricity prices encourage large users to abandon
the grid for wind and solar, the revenues required to support cross-subsidies to the water sector
may be drawn from increasingly small pool of electricity users and may ultimately cause this
model to break down.
In New York City and South Eastern New York, the electric delivery system is threatened by heat
and density (Culliton, 2016). While there is plenty of water in New York State and plenty of
electric generation capacity, getting electricity into key load pockets is a challenge. The concern
is electric grid overload (NYISO, 2017). The ecosystems providing water for the NYC and SENY
region are projected to be adequate for the current level of consumption into 2080. While much
temperature related water demand can be traced to electric air conditioning (AC), the moment
to moment impact of AC based electric demand on domestic water supply availability is minimal
because of power plant water recycling and use of surface water for cooling. As noted in question
1, temperature as cooling degree days can have impact on wastewater generation. Wastewater
treatment plants in SENY and NYC all use high electricity intensity activated sludge processes
(NYCDEP, 2005). My research suggests that the impact of wastewater treatment electric
demand on SENY and NYC electric load, however, may be the difference between system
overload and the steady state. Water conservation initiatives will result in less wastewater
generation and in hot weather this could keep the grid stable.
IPCC projects increasing temperatures in the American northeast (Fick and Hijmans, 2017). The
US census projects increases in SENY population (Cornell Program on Applied Demographics,

n.d.). Increasing temperatures and population may drive electricity use and make the grid more
Despite the relationship between water supply and electricity generation in the LCRA service
territory, “Texas continues to dominate the nation’s wind energy production, adding far more
generating capacity than any other state last year and having more installed wind power
capacity than all but five countries in the world” (Druzin, 2018)
45
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vulnerable to wastewater electric demand spikes. In this context, the drivers of vulnerability will
not be water availability or electricity availability, the driver will be grid stress.
In SENY and NYC, the electric industry pays for ecosystem services in the price of water. For
NYC power generation, the water rate may indeed cover a significant portion of the PES however
the cost of water is a small portion of generation costs (Con Edison, 2017). The limited impact of
water prices on electric generation and the projection of stable water availability in the New
York City watershed suggests that PES will not contribute significantly to the price of electricity
or electricity availability for NYC in its’ current demographic. Population increases, higher
resource demand development and increasing temperatures could shake NYC energy water
stability.
The separation of electricity and water utility infrastructure and financial operations deprives
NYC water and electric utilities of economies of scope. Residential utility prices reflect this.
Electricity prices in New York City are among the highest in the country. Depending on usage,
New York City water and sewer rates are at or above the mid-point of large American city rates
(Bui and Morales, 2016). With utility silo-ism however comes flexibility. NYCDEP makes
independent water/wastewater management decisions. The NYC electric utility considers water
supply only in certain contexts. The cost of water does not appear as a line item in electric utility
annual reporting. This financial distance means that alterations to the hydro-social paradigm in
NYC need not be vetted thru the electric utility and vice versa. Changes to the NYC electric
system can proceed without interference from the water utility. Ignoring the potential inequities
of NYC Cat-Del watershed land management, the water supply system appears to be sustainable.
Financial separation of water and electric systems diminish the possibility for cascading system
failure. Separation of NYC water and electric utilities also enables each entity to make resilience
decisions independently. NYC electric utilities can develop renewables generation without
threatening the economics of water supply. Inability to integrate small volume combined utility
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efficiency initiatives is recovered with the ability to support distributed generation;
neighborhood solar and storage. The dearth of SENY hydro-electric generation specifically in
the Cat-Del watershed enables a wider range of climate resilience choices in water provisioning
ecosystem services.
The two ecosystem services management paradigms are at the ends of the operational spectrum.
The Texas LCRA system is highly integrated by design. This connection offers opportunities for
efficiency and resource reuse. The large scale system however may be inflexible. A set of
overlapping systems dependent on a single ecosystems service - water provision, is neither
sustainable nor resilient as water supplies dwindle and demand grows. The NYC water and
electricity provision systems are almost entirely unintegrated and given the current climate
projections sustainable. More aggressive off-gridding of NYC and SENY water and wastewater
plants46 would increase resilience of both water and electric systems.
In her work on public and private water systems, Karen Bakker (2018) notes that effective
governance frameworks are site specific and most frequently a hybrid of the two paradigms. A
similar recommendation can be made for managing the water and electricity systems. IPCC
projected climate change scenarios are modeled to have greater impact on the value of ES and
payments necessary to maintain ES availability in the LCRA basin than in the Cat-Del
watershed. On a near term scale, integrated water and energy systems allow for rapid
implementation of efficiency programs. On a midrange and long range scale, the separation of
the NYC systems may allow for bolder experiments and transforming solutions.
Further Work
This work answers many questions but opens many more. The follow up to question 1 is using
equations developed from the high-level data analysis to project electricity use and wastewater
generation evolving from increased population density and increasing temperatures. Currently
46

providing on site distributed electricity generation capable of serving the entire plant load
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the impact of CSOs on various components of the New York City wastewater system is estimated
through the use of hydrologic models. These models estimate flows to CSO outfalls and
wastewater treatment plants around the city (NYCDEP, 2012). More granular electricity use
data would enable more effective estimation of the hourly impact of storm water flows on the
electric grid.
The next steps evolving from question 2 would be inquiry into the similarities of all arid land
water provisioning ecosystem services valuation to determine if the LCRA paradigm recurs
across the arid west. Observations from question 2 suggest that the “hedonic pricing” method of
ecosystems service valuation can be used to monetize the impact of climate change on ecosystem
services value. Changes in hedonic pricing would allow us to consider how setting aside
watershed lands for water quality maintenance may undermine the expectation of a low-cost
solution to potable water treatment. It can also translate into compelling calculations on
property value lost in desiccating landscapes.
The conclusion to question 3 calls for development of an aggregation schema to collate and
aggregate the full extent of payments for ecosystem services. For large utilities managing costs is
a herculean task. Large utilities turn to contractors to build a cost tracking system that will help
them meet their goals “cost effectively”. Opportunities for flagging ecosystem services costs and
payments exist in these large data management systems. The next task is to build systems to
capture them.
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